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California Supreme Court Survey
June 1991-November 1991
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent deci-
sions by the supreme court The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader
of the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve
as a starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are
analyzed in acvordance with the importance of the court's holding and the ex-
tent to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline
and judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW .................................... 736
The Governor's appointment calendars and
schedules are within the scope of the public interest
exemption from the disclosure requirements of the
Public Records Act because disclosure would
jeopardize the Governor's deliberative process and
would pose a threat to the Governor's physical
security: Times Mirror v. Superior Court ............. 736
II. CIVIL RIGHTS ............................................. 741
Under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act, the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission may not grant a victim of
discrimination compensatory damages for
emotional distress, and must limit the victim's
award of punitive damages to $1000: Walnut Creek
v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission .......... 741
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ................................... 747
The inclusion of religious invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation
ceremonies violates the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution: Sands v. Morongo Unified
School District ....................................... 747
IV. CORPORATION LAW ...................................... 772
A dissolved corporation remains subject to suit for
harm resulting from the corporation's
predissolution activities discovered after
dissolution: Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court ....... 772
V. CRIMINAL LAW ........................................... 774
A. A person's driver's license may not be suspended or
revoked for refusing to submit to chemical testing
following an arrest for driving under the irfluence
of drugs or alcohol unless the arresting officer
observed volitional movement of the vehicle: Mercer
v. Department of Motor Vehicles ...................... 774
B. In determining liability as an aider and abettor to
robbery, a robbery is not confined to a fixed place
or time but continues so long as the stolen property
is being carried away to a place of temporary
safety: People v. Cooper .............................. 777
C. A patient found not guilty by reason of insanity
and committed to a state hospital may not demand
a jury trial to determine whether the patient is
eligible for supervised outpatient placement in a
community mental health program: People v.
Tilbury ............................................... 782
VI. DEATH PENALTY LAw ................................... 787
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases
imposing the death penalty. Rather than a case-by-
case approach, this section focuses on the key issues
under review by the court and identifies trends and
shifts in the court's rationale ....................... 787
VII. FAMILY LAw ............................................. 808
In a child support enforcement action brought by
the district attorney on behalf of the custodial
parent, a trial court may allocate the federal tax
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent.
This procedure does not violate the custodial
parent's due process rights, even though that parent
is not a party to the proceeding: Monterey County v.
Cornejo .............................................. 808
VIII. LABOR LAw .............................................. 818
A. The explicit language, structure and purpose of the
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
demonstrates a congressional intent to preempt
Civil Code section 3111, which creates liens on
property in favor of trust funds established
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements:
Carpenters Southern California Administrative
Corporation v. El Capitan Development Corporation .... 818
B. Under the National Bank Act, a terminated
national bank officer is precluded from filing a
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state law action for wrongful termination only
where the board of directors removed the officer or
the directors approved or ratTied the removak
Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court ................... 822
IX. PROPERTY LAW .......................................... 827
A. After spousal separation but before dissolution
proceedings, because the marriage is still in effect,
the character of community property remains
unchanged. During this period (1) both spouses
must consent to any sale, conveyance, encumbrance
or lease greater than one year involving community
property, and (2) a nonconsenting spouse, who
brings suit during the marriage, may invalidate the
transfer in its entirety: Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan &
R oss ................................................. 827
B. In an action against a title insurer for breach of the
duty to defend, the limitation period provided in
section 339(1) of the Civil Procedure Code accrues
upon discovery of loss or harm, but is equitably
tolled until entry of final judgment in the
underlying action: Lambert v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co .......................................... 836
X . TAX LAW ................................................ 838
C7arter city taxation of financial corporations is a
matter of statewide concern, cannot be considered a
"municipal affair," and is subject to preemption by
the State: California Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. City of Los Angeles ..................... 838
X I. TORT L kW ............................................... 842
A. To obtain an award of punitive damages, a
plaintiff must introduce evidence of a defendant's
financial status: Adams v. Murakami ................ 842
B. In a failure to warn cause of action, under strict
liability, state of the art evidence is admissible as a
relevant defense: Anderson v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglass Corp ....................................... 846
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Governor's appointment calendars and schedules are
within the scope of the public interest exemption from
the disclosure requirements of the Public Records Act
because disclosure would jeopardize the Governor's
deliberative process and would pose a threat to the
Governor's physical security: Times Mirror v. Superior
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme
Court considered whether the Governor properly refused a newspa-
per's request pursuant to the Public Records Act ("The Act") to
disclose "appointment schedules, calendars, notebooks, and any docu-
ments that would list [the Governor's] daily activities as governor
from [his] inauguration in 1983 to the present."2 The records re-
quested were exhaustive itineraries of the governor's daily activities. 3
The Times Mirror sought injunctive and declaratory relief on the
grounds that the information requested was within the purview of
the Act,4 and hence, subject to public scrutiny.5 In opposition, the
Governor asserted the requested documents fell within the Act's cor-
respondence and public interest exemptions.6
. 1. 53 Cal. 3d 1325, 813 P.2d 240, 283 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1991). Justice Arabian wrote
the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, Justice Panelli and Justice Baxter con-
curring. Justices Mosk and Kennard wrote separate dissenting opinions with Justice
Broussard joining in both.
2. Id. at 1329, 813 P.2d at 241, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 894. The Act declares that "access
to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and
necessary right of every person in this state." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6250 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1992). The governor concedes that his appointment calendars and schedules are
"public records" under the Act. Section 6252 of the Act defines public records to in-
clude "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's busi-
ness prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of
physical form or characteristics." CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 6252(d) (West 1980 & Supp.
1992). The Governor did not contend his documents were outside the scope of the Act,
but rather that they were exempt from disclosure. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1329,
813 P.2d at 241, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
3. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1330-31, 813 P.2d at 241, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
4. Id at 1329, 813 P.2d at 241, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
5. See supra note 2. The purpose of the Act is to make public information avail-
able "to permit the public to decide for itself whether government action is proper."
Washington Post Co. v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 690 F.2d 252,
264 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1329, 813 P.2d at 241, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 894. The
correspondence exemption to the Act provides:
Correspondence of and to the Governor or employees of the Governor's office
or in the custody of or maintained by the Governor's legal affairs secretary,
provided that public records shall not be transferred to the custody of the
Governor's legal affairs secretary to evade the disclosure provisions of this
chapter.
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The court of appeal held the documents were accessible, as strict
factual accounts of the Governor's past meetings.7 The supreme
court reversed, finding no correspondence exemption,s but holding
the records fell within the public interest exemption because they
implicated the Governor's deliberative process9 and represented a
possible threat to the Governor's physical security.10
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
In Times Mirror, the supreme court found California Government
Code Section 6255, the "catchall" public interest exemption, disposi-
tive.11 Section 6255 provides: "The agency shall justify withholding
any record by demonstrating ... that on the facts of the particular
case the public interest served by not making the record public
clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the rec-
ord."12 The majority's two-fold analysis addressed both the delibera-
tive process privilege and security risks.
First, the supreme court found a patent intrusion into the gover-
nor's deliberative process.'3 The deliberative process privilege ex-
empts documents from public scrutiny if the disclosure exposes the
policy-formulation process, thereby inhibiting the flow of candid in-
formation to the Governor.14 The majority equated disclosing the
CAL. GOV'T CODE 4§ 6254(l) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
The public interest exemption to the Act provides:
The agency shall justify withholding any record by demonstrating that the
record in question is exempt under the express provisions of this chapter or
that on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not mak-
ing the record. public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclo-
sure of the record.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
7. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1332, 813 P.2d at 243, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
8. Id, at 1337, 813 P.2d at 247, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 900. The correspondence exemp-
tion was limited to the governor's letters; however, the governor's appointment calen-
dars and schedules were outside of this exemption. Id.
9. Id at 1343, 813 P.2d at 250, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
10. I at 1329, 813 P.2d at 252-53, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 904-06. Once the court deter-
mined the records fell within the public interest exception, a balancing of interests was
required. Id
11. Id at 1338-39, 813 P.2d at 247, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 901. Section 6255 aims to bal-
ance the competing interests of disclosure. Id. "Nothing in the text or history of sec-
tion 6255 limits its scope to specific categories," and each case must be considered on
its own particular facts. Id at 1339, 813 P.2d at 248, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). See supra note 6.
13. Times Mirror, 52 Cal. 3d at 1343, 813 P.2d at 251, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
14. Id at 1342, 813 P.2d at 251, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 903. See Dudman Communications
v. Department of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (disclosure of
materials exposing decision-making process undermines the agency's ability to perform
identity of persons with whom the Governor has met with "revealing
the substance or direction of the Governor's judgment and mental
processes."15 This information, according to the court, reflects the in-
dividuals and interests the Governor considered important.16 The
court hypothesized that a meeting between the Governor and a politi-
cally unpopular group, for example, or even routine meetings be-
tween the Governor and legislators, might be discouraged if the
information were regularly revealed to the public. Such revelations,
therefore, would disrupt the Governor's deliberative process.17
Second, the court believed disclosure of the requested documents
could pose a threat to the Governor's physical security.' 8 The reports
detailed the Governor's duties, companions, aircraft and ground
transportation, essentially detailing every event in the course of his
day, including times the Governor "is likely to be alone."'19 The court
reasoned such schedules and calendars could allow a reader to iden-
tify patterns of behavior indicating the times and places where the
Governor is particularly vulnerable. 20
In her dissent, Justice Kennard outlined the history and purpose of
the Act.21 She argued that to qualify under the Section 6255 deliber-
ative process privilege, the "document must be both predecisional
and deliberative," 22 and that in this case, neither element was satis-
fied.23 The documents were not predecisional because the Governor
its functions); Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(even if content of document is factual, it remains exempt from public view if it is re-
lated to the policy formulating process).
15. Times Mirror, 52 Cal. 3d at 1343, 813 P.2d at 251, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
16. Id
17. Id at 1344, 813 P.2d at 251, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 904. The court found the factual
content of the records essentially deliberative, noting that the Governor's strategies on
continuing policies might be prematurely revealed. Id
18. Id. at 1346, 813 P.2d at 253, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The Times' argument that
the Governor waived his security interest by providing "public schedules" of the times
and places the Governor is scheduled to speak, was dismissed. These itineraries do not
contain the specific details of the schedules and calendars requested. Id
19. Id at 1330-31, 813 P.2d at 242, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
20. Id. at 1346, 813 P.2d at 253, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
21. Id. at 1350, 813 P.2d at 255, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 909 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Kennard traced the origin of the Act from its model, the federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA). 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). She noted that FOIA's exemption 5, which
is similar to the public interest exemption, was termed by the United States Supreme
Court to be a "somewhat Delphic provision." Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1351 n.4, 813
P.2d at 256 n.4, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 910 n.4 (quoting United States Dep't of Justice v. Ju-
lian, 486 U.S. 1, 11 (1988)). Justice Mosk's dissent was written to amplify Justice Ken-
nard's and, therefore, is treated second.
22. imes Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1352, 813 P.2d at 257, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting). See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-54 (1975).
23. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1352, 813 P.2d at 257, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (Ken-
nard, J.,'dissenting). I
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did not prove -they contributed to an agency decision or policy. 24 Fur-
ther, they were not deliberative because they merely named persons
who met with the Governor, without revealing the substance of those
meetings.2 5 Governors do not meet with only those whose views they
are inclined to favor.26 Moreover, she recognized a substantial public
interest in knowing who "seek(s] to influence the Governor's deci-
sions on critical issues. ' 27
Furthermore, Justice Kennard dismissed the potential security
threat argument as inapt, because disclosing these records would not
elevate the risk to the Governor above that normally accepted by
public officials.28 She emphasized that any information in the re-
quested materials capable of invoking the Governor's deliberative
process privilege or leading to a potential security risk could be easily
segregated from the bulk of the documents. The schedules and cal-
endars would thus be accessible to public scrutiny.2 9
Justice Mosk's dissent heralded Justice Kennard's opinion as "ir-
refutable" and questioned the majority's public policy analysis.30
Proclaiming secrecy as anathema to democracy, Justice Mosk chal-
lenged the governor's secrecy as legally unjustifiable.S1 The Presi-
dent of the United States releases a daily schedule to the media in
advance of events, and hence, Justice Mosk asked whether the gover-
nor's activities require more protection from public scrutiny than the
President's.3 2 Justice Mosk asserted that no statutory or constitu-
24. 1& (Kennard, J., dissenting). This privilege does not protect "post decisional
or non-decisional meetings." Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
25. I& at 1352, 813 P.2d at 257-58, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
See Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for Intra-agency Memo-
randa, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1065-66 (1973) (names are factual material that fall
outside the exemption).
26. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1354, 813 P.2d at 258, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting).
27. Id at 1354, 813 P.2dat 258, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 911 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See
Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1985) (the
deliberative process privilege does not protect records of parties seeking to influence
government decisions). See generally Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The De-
liberative Process Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REv. 279, 300 (1989).
28. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1357-58, 813 P.2d at 261, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard cited legislators in public session and
judges in public hearings as examples of ordinarily accepted risks. Id (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
29. Id at 1349-50, 813 P.2d at 255, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
30. Id at 1347, 813 P.2d at 254, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 1347.48, 813 P.2d at 254, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1348, 813 P.2d at 254-55, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
tional provision provides the governor with the right of secrecy.3 3
III. CONCLUSION
A representative democracy recognizes the need not only for the
free flow of information to an enlightened electorate, but also the
leader's need for a certain level of confidentiality to ensure a candid
exchange of critical information.3 4 The Public Records Act requires
that public business fall under "the hard light of full public scru-
tiny."3 5 The supreme court, in Times Mirror, determined that the
Governor's schedules and calendars dating back five years were pub-
lic records, but were exempt from disclosure because the public in-
terest in the Governor's deliberative processes and physical safety
clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure.36 Further,
whatever merit existed in disclosure was crushed under the massive
weight of requests for literally thousands of documents.3 7
Although the majority found the Times Mirror request unfeasible,
the dissenting opinions are noteworthy. Secret government activities
breed distrust and derision between the governed and those who gov-
ern,38 while the free flow of information to the electorate ensures
healthy self-government.3 9 Citizens must hold their governors and
other public officers accountable for their time and activities. The
extent to which Times Mirror expands the deliberative process privi-
lege, protecting the identity of persons with whom a governor has
met, raises privilege issues affecting all levels of responsible public
officials.
DEAN THOMAS TRIGGS
33. Id. at 1349, 813 P.2d at 255, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Mask
cited Justice Kennard's dissent as authority for this assertion. Id (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id at 1328-29, 813 P.2d at 241, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
35. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Hous. Admin., 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th
Cir. 1972). See supra notes 2 and 20.
36. Times Mirror, 53 Cal. 3d at 1344-45, 813 P.2d at 252-53, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
37. Id. at 1345, 813 P.2d at 252, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
38. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (discussing the impor-
tance of open proceedings in criminal cases).
39. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989) (access to information
provides a check on government abuse and corruption).
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II. CIVIL RIGHTS
Under the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
may not grant a victim of discrimination compensatory
damages for emotional distress, and must limit the
victim's award of punitive damages to $1000: Walnut
Creek v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Walnut Creek v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,'
the California Supreme Court2 held the Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission violated the judicial powers clause of the California
Constitution3 by awarding a victim of racial discrimination compensa-
tory damages for emotional distress. The court also limited the vic-
tim's punitive damage award against apartment complex operators,
responsible for multiple acts of racial discrimination, to $1000-the
maximum amount recoverable for a single discriminatory act.4 The
case presented the supreme court with its first opportunity to review
the constitutionality of an administrative agency's award of "general"
compensatory damages.5
Section 12987 of the Fair Employment and Housing Acts authorizes
the Fair Employment and Housing Commission ["Commission"] to
order a respondent found in violation of the act's housing provisions
1. 54 Cal. 3d 245, 814 P.2d 704, 284 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1991).
2. Justice Panelli wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Mosk, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Justice Kennard dissented in an opin-
ion in which Justice Broussard joined.
3. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
4. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 270, 814 P.2d at 719, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
5. Id at 256, 814 P.2d at 709, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The court stated it had set out
the approach for resolving questions of an administrative agency's authority to award
compensatory damages in McHugh v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 49 Cal. 3d 348,
371-74, 777 P.2d 91, 106-08, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318, 332-35 (1989). Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d
at 256, 814 P.2d at 709, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 723. In McHugh the court held that the Fair
Employment and Housing Commission, in awarding treble damages against landlords
who had charged excess rent, violated the judicial powers doctrine, stating:
[W]e believe that the power to award treble damages in the present context
poses a risk of producing arbitrary, disproportionate results that magnify, be-
yond acceptable risks, the possibility of arbitrariness inherent in any scheme
of administrative adjudication.
McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 378, 777 P.2d at 111, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (citing 2 AREEDA &
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 150 (1978); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Par-
ties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1062
(1952) (discussing policy reasons against private actions for treble damages)).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12999 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
to pay "punitive damages in an amount not to exceed one thousand
dollars ($1000) . .. and the payment of actual damages."7 In 1979,
Robert Cannon, an African-American, applied to rent an apartment
at the 418 unit Walnut Creek Manor complex.8 The apartment man-
ager told Cannon he would place Cannon on a waiting list and that
Cannon should check back periodically.9 In 1982, the manager re-
peatedly thwarted Cannon's attempts to obtain an apartment in the
complex or learn his position on the waiting list. Cannon later spoke
with a non-African-American who told Cannon that he had applied
to Walnut Creek Manor a few months ago and had moved in the
same month.' 0 Cannon thereupon filed a complaint with the Com-
mission." The Commission determined that Walnut Creek Manor,
its owner, and its manager had discriminated against Cannon on the
basis of his race and awarded him $50,000 in compensatory damages
for emotional distress and $40,635 in punitive damages (calculated at
$1000 for each of 35 apartment rentals to people who applied after
Cannon, plus interest).12 Reviewing the trial court's decision to re-
mand to the Commission, the California Court of Appeal struck the
$50,000 emotional distress compensatory damage award, but upheld
the punitive damage award.13
The supreme court accepted the Court of Appeal's determination
that the defendants had committed unlawful racial discrimination;14
however, it reversed the punitive damages award and modified the
Court of Appeal's judgment to strike the $50,000 emotional distress
compensatory damages award.15
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). See generally 8 B. WrrKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 764 (9th ed. 1988) (explaining the
goal and scope of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and declaring that "Il]iberal
construction is required").
8. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 252, 814 P.2d at 706, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
9. Id
10. Id at 253, 814 P.2d at 707, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Commission decided to impose significant punitive damages after
learning the apartment manager of Walnut Creek Manor apartments had discussed
Cannon with the apartment complex owner and received information from the
owner's lawyer on "how to treat" Cannon and how to refuse to rent to "undesirable"
applicants. Id at 252-53, 814 P.2d at 707, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 721. Based on the lawyer's
opinion letter, the manager requested that Cannon fill out a questionnaire, even
though no such request was made to anyone else on the waiting list. Id. at 253, 814
P.2d at 707, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 721. See also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
13. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 254, 814 P.2d at 707-08, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22.
14. Id. at 254-55 n.3, 814 P.2d at 708 n.3, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 722 n.3.
15. Id, at 273, 814 P.2d at 721, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
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II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. Compensatory Damages for Emotional Distress
In Walnut Creek, the Commission argued that the supreme court
should not substitute its judgment for the legislature's by allowing an
agency to award compensatory damages for emotional distress.' 6 The
Commission cited cases holding that due process requires that when
the legislature allows an administrative agency to award monetary
damages pursuant to the agency's express purpose, courts should
limit their inquiry to whether the agency's specific remedy is proce-
durally fair and relates to the legislative goal.'? The Commission in-
sisted that the Fair Employment and Housing Act clearly authorized
the Commission to award compensatory damages to further the legit-
imate purpose of eradicating housing discrimination.' 8 The supreme
court rejected the Commission's due process analysisi9 and instead
implemented t judicial powers inquiry. Relying on McHugh v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Board,2o the court outlined a two-prong test for
determining whether an agency's action violates the judicial powers
clause of the California Constitution.2 ' The court first determined
whether the compensatory damage award for emotional distress22
was "'reasonably necessary' to accomplish the commission's legiti-
16. Id. at 257, 814 P.2d at 709, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
17. Id. See, e.ag., Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 397-98, 584 P.2d 512, 518, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 380-81 (1978) (interpreting due process principles as limiting court's inquiry
into agency's actions to the determination of procedural and purpose propriety).
18. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 257, 814 P.2d at 709, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 723. See
supra note 7.
19. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 257, 814 P.2d 709-10, 284 Cal. Rptr. 723-24.
20. 49 Cal. 3d 348, 371-73, 777 P.2d 91, 106-08, 261 Cal. Rptr. 318, 332-35 (1989). see
supra note 5.
21. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 256, 814 P.2d at 709, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The
McHugh court based its judicial powers test on tests used in other states, finding no
modern California decision on the precise qiuestion. McHugh, 49 Cal. 3d at 374-75, 777
P.2d at 107-08, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
22. The court analyzed the Government Code section 12987 remedy of awarding
"actual damages" to determine whether to give the term abnormal meaning. Walnut
Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 255, 814 P.2d at 708-09, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 722-23 (citing OLECK, DAm.
AGES TO PERSON AND PROPERTY 22 (1961)). See 22 Am. Jun. 2D Damages § 24 (1961); 23
CAL. JuR. 3D Damages §§ 12-18 (1975 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the general meaning of
"actual damages" in the common law context). The court found nothing in the Fair
Employment and Housing Act to suggest it should give the term "actual damages" any
meaning contrary to its common law definition. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 255, 814
P.2d at 708, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 722. See also Hess v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n., 138
Cal. App 232, 237, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712, 715 (1982). C. Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp.
674, 678 (N.D. Ill. 1.977) (construing the damages provision of the federal fair housing
act); Weider v. Hoffman 238 F. Supp. 437, 445 (M.D. Pa. 1965) (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages
§ 2 (1952)).
mate regulatory purposes." 23 The court articulated the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act's purpose as primarily "to prevent and
eliminate specified discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of
housing."2 4 The court then noted that historically, cease and desist
orders 25 and corrective reimbursement relief had predominantly, and
effectively, enforced the act's purposes.2 6 Accordingly, it concluded
the availability of compensatory damages for emotional distress was
an unnecessary additional remedy which failed the first prong of the
judicial powers test.2
In applying the second prong, the court assessed "whether the
challenged remedial power is merely incidental to a proper, primary
regulatory purpose."2 8 The court found that the Commission's power
to compensate for emotional harm was incidental to the Commis-
sion's primary goal of insuring the same or comparable housing.2 9
Thus, the court held the Commission's emotional distress award
failed both prongs of the judicial powers test.30 Accordingly, the
court indicated the Commission must limit awards to verifiable out-
of-pocket compensatory damages, such as increased rent and
utilities.31
B. Punitive Damages
Section 12920 of the Fair Housing and Employment Act authorizes
the Commission to order payment of $1000 in punitive damages for
23. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 258-59, 814 P.2d at 711, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
24. Id. at 257, 814 P.2d at 710, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (citing Peralta Community Col-
lege Dist. v. Fair Empl. and Hous. Comm'n., 52 Cal. 3d 40, 48, 801 P.2d 357, 362, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 118-19 (1990)). See generally 51 CAL. Jun. 3D §§ 60-61 (1979 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing policy against housing accommodation discrimination).
25. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992) (explaining cease and
desist procedures). See generally 8 B. WITKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Consti-
tutional Law § 770 (9th ed. 1988) (explaining hearing and enforcement stages).
26. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 260-61, 814 P.2d at 712, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
27. Id. at 261, 814 P.2d at 713, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The court warned that al-
lowing unbridled damage awards could potentially cause the damages issue to domi-
nate the administrative hearing. Id. at 261-62, 814 P.2d at 713, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
28. Id. at 262, 814 P.2d at 713, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 727. See supra notes 7 and 24 and
accompanying text (discussing purposes of the Fair Employment and Housing Act).
29. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 262, 814 P.2d at 713, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The
court noted that it had previously held that "'[t]he power to award compensatory and
punitive tort damages to an injured party is a judicial function."' Id. (quoting Youst v.
Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 80, 729 P.2d 728, 738-39, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294, 304-05 (1987)). Accord
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974). Further, the court noted that general com-
pensatory damages for emotional distress are difficult to fix; therefore, courts have tra-
ditionally left their quantification to the trier of fact. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 263,
814 P.2d at 714, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 728. See generally Robert G. Schwemm, Compensa-
tory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 83 (1981)
(noting difficulty of fixing discrimination damages).
30. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 265, 814 P.2d at 716, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
31. Id. at 266, 814 P.2d at 716, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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"discrimination because of race, color," or other unlawful grounds.32
Under this section, the Commission argued that each of the 35 times
Walnut Creek: chose a more recent non-Black applicant over Cannon
constituted a separate discriminatory act.3 3 The supreme court de-
clined the Commission's interpretation; instead, it concentrated on
the wording of section 12987(2) which allows the Commission to or-
der punitive damages upon a finding of any "unlawful practice."3 4
The court contended that it must interpret the word "practice" to
mean a course of conduct, encompassing an act which may be per-
formed often, customarily, or habitually.35 Thus, the court held that
where one individual is victim to multiple acts of any one form of dis-
criminatory conduct at the hands of a single perpetrator, the victim
has established only one unlawful practice, punishable by a maxi-
mum of $1000 in punitive damages.3 6
C. Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Justice Kennard argued the majority decision severely
impairs the Fair Employment and Housing Act's administrative en-
32. CAL. GOv'r CODE § 12920 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
33. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 267-68, 814 P.2d at 717, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The
court of appeal agreed with the Commission's calculations of punitive damages and in-
terest costs. See sipra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 269, 814 P.2d at 704, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The
court noted that the act allowed the Commission, upon finding any "unlawful prac-
tice," to award punitive damages. I, See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12987(2) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1992). The Fair Employment and Housing Act interfaces with other California
civil rights provisions. Section 12955(a), which enumerates unlawful practices, prohib-
its "any person subject to the provisions of Section 51 of the Civil Code, as that section
applies to housing accommodations .... [from discriminating] against any person be-
cause of race .... " CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a) (West 1980). Civil Code section 51,
commonly called the Unruh Civil Rights Act, guarantees equal accommodations in
business facilities. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). See generally 8 B.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 748 (9th ed. 1988).
35. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 269, 814 P.2d at 704, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The
court observed that although section 12987 enumerates unlawful practices, it does not
define the term "practice." Id. The court found, however, that the term "practice" is
defined unambiguously as "'[r]epeated or customary action; habitual performance; a
succession of acts of similar kind; custom; usage."' Id (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICION-
ARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990)). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(g) (West 1980) (connecting
unlawful "acts" with unlawful "practices").
36. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 270, 814 P.2d at 719, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 733. The
court cited federal fair housing act cases holding that plaintiffs could receive no more
than $1000, regardless of repeated acts of discriminatory conduct. Id at 270, 814 P.2d
at 718, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 732. See, e.g., Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 494 (9th Cir.
1978); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973).
forcement ability.3 7 She asserted the holding was neither faithful to
the act's purpose nor compelled by the California Constitution.38 Ad-
dressing the majority's judicial powers analysis, Justice Kennard as-
sailed the majority's conclusion that compensatory damages were not
"reasonably necessary" to effectuate the act's purpose.3 9 She empha-
sized that victims of housing discrimination are often unable or un-
willing to undertake the costly burden of prosecuting a civil suit,
even where their emotional distress is severe.4o Further, out of
pocket damages in such cases are usually de minimis.4 1 Therefore, to
achieve the act's express purpose of providing effective remedies to
eliminate discriminatory housing practices, Justice Kennard asserted
that compensatory relief for a victim's emotional distress is not only
necessary, but essential.42
Justice Kennard also dissented to the majority's decision that puni-
tive damages must be limited to $1000.43 Interpreting "unlawful
practice" in light of legislative intent, Justice Kennard asserted that
the phrase means any single act in violation of the Fair Employment
and Housing Act.44 Accordingly, each instance in which Walnut
Creek Manor rented to non-African-American applicants while Can-
37. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 274, 814 P.2d at 722, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 736 (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting). See aupra note 24 and accompanying text.
38. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 275-76, 814 P.2d at 722-23, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
39. I& (Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 278, 814 P.2d at 724, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See
generally Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Federal Fair Housing
Act, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 380 (1988). Justice Kennard emphasized the fact that
Cannon had friends living at Walnut Creek Manor who supported his claim of severe
humiliation and embarrassment. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 274, 814 P.2d at 722, 284
Cal. Rptr. at 736 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
41. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 280, 814 P.2d 725, 284 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Schwemm, supra note 40, at 380). See also notes 7 and 24 and ac-
companying text.
42. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 275, 814 P.2d at 722-23, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard ultimately concluded that an administra-
tive system to combat housing discrimination that relies on private enforcement while
prohibiting administrative agencies from awarding compensatory damages for emo-
tional distress is "doomed to fail." Id. Accord, James A. Kushner, An Unfinished
Agenda, The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement Fffort, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 348,
354 (1988) (criticizing limitations on agency authority). See generally Marshall Kaplan,
Discrimination in California Housing: The Need for Additional Legislation, 50 CAL.
L. REV. 635, 643 (1962) (emphasizing the negative societal effects of housing
discrimination).
43. Walnut Creek, 54 Cal. 3d at 282-83, 814 P.2d at 727-28, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 283, 814 P.2d at 728, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Kennard asserted that the legislative purpose of punitive damages in housing dis-
crimination is punishment and deterrence. Id. at 284, 814 P.2d at 728, 284 Cal. Rptr. at
742 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Dyna-Med v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Com., 43 Cal. 3d
1379, 1389-90, 743 P.2d 1323, 1330-32, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 72 (1987)). Thus, Justice Ken-
nard argued that a liberal approach to punitive damages is appropriate. Id. (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
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non's application was pending constituted a punishable violation.45
III. CONCLUSION
This case constricts the adjudicative and enforcement authority of
the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. The court leaves
the Commission power to grant injunctive and out-of-pocket compen-
satory relief, but it instructs the Commission to refrain from award-
ing general compensatory damages, and requires the Commission to
limit awards of punitive damages for any one form of discrimination
to $1000.46 Although the decision does not strip the Commission of
its ability to compensate victims and punish violators, the ultimate
recovery of the plaintiff in the instant case indicates the decision's
practical effect. After 35 instances of discrimination over a two-year
period by operators of a 418 unit apartment complex, the Commission
could require damages totalling only $3800.47 Vhile this decision
clearly protects judicial prerogatives under the California Constitu-
tion, it is less clear whether the magnitude of damages it endorses
can effectively punish violators or compensate victims of housing
discrimination.
KURT M. LANGKOW
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The inclusion of religious invocations and benedictions
at public high school graduation ceremonies violates the
FiRst Amendment of the United States Constitution:
Sands v. Morongo Unified School District
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Es-
tablishment Clause' in the public school setting,2 the Court has yet to
45. 1l at 286, 814 P.2d at 730, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
46. Id at 273, 814 P.2d at 721, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
47. The court ultimately endorsed a punitive damages award of $1000 plus inter-
est. Id at 252, 814 P.2d at 706, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 720. The court also awarded out-of-
pocket expenses totalling $2724.50. Id at 275 n.2, 814 P.2d at 723 n.2, 284 Cal. Rptr. at
737 n.2 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
1. The Establishment Clause provides that the government shall "make no law
respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (concluding
that daily Bible reading and prayer recitation in public school, although voluntary, vio-
lated the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that
resolve whether invocations and benedictions at public high school
graduation ceremonies are constitutional. In Sands v. Morongo Uni-
fied School District,3 a bitterly divided California Supreme Court
held that invocations at public high school graduations violated sepa-
ration of church and state as mandated by the United States
Constitution.4
The United States Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its opin-
ions regarding religion because of the First Amendment's breadth
and imprecision.5 The Court has attempted to clarify the Establish-
ment Clause by providing the three-prong Lemon test.6 To pass con-
stitutional muster, government activity must have a secular purpose,
must have a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, and cannot potentially cause excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.7 In Sands, the California Supreme Court used
the Lemon test to evaluate whether invocations and benedictions at
public high school graduation ceremonies violate the Establishment
Clause.8
In Sands, the trial court enjoined the Morongo Unified School Dis-
trict from conducting religious invocations at its ceremonies. 9 The
District appealed, and the court of appeal held these invocations to be
constitutionally valid, reversing the trial court decision.10 Because of
the highly controversial nature of this question, the California
Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the judgment of the
court of appeal."1 The opinion of the court reflects its adherence to
the separation of church and state, which it considers vital to the
preservation of religious diversity inherent in American culture.12 In
addition, Sands demonstrated the court's continuing commitment to
public school district's daily practice requiring each class to recite a state-composed
prayer acknowledging "Almighty god" was unconstitutional); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (finding that a New Jersey statute, authorizing local school
districts to reimburse parents of sectarian and public school students for transportation
fares to and from school, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
3. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991). Justice Kennard wrote
the majority opinion; Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian wrote concurring opin-
ions; Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Broussard joined; and
Justices Panelli and Baxter wrote dissenting opinions.
4. Id. at 867, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
5. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
7. Id. at 612-13.
8. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872-73, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
9. Id. at 870, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The trial court in Sands relied
on Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819
(1987), a California Court of Appeal case which held that religious invocations at pub-
lic school graduations violated state and federal constitutions.
10. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1385, 1395, 262 Cal. Rptr.
452, 461 (1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991).
11. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 881, 809 P.2d at 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
12. Id. at 867, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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the Lemon test in evaluating Establishment Clause issues.13
This survey begins with an overview of the historical background
of the Establishment Clause, summarizing relevant case history
which interprets this constitutional provision.14 Next, it summarizes
the facts and procedural history of Sands v. Morongo Unified School
District.'5 The analysis of the majority opinion, the concurring opin-
ions, and the dissenting opinions follow the statement of the case.' 6
Finally, this survey examines the impact Sands may have on future
Establishment Clause cases in the public school context, as well as its
precedential value in light of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Lee v. 'Weisman.17
II. HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND
A. The Meaning of the Establishment Clause
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution requires
that government "make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. . ."18 This provision,
known as the Establishment Clause, is designed to prevent the intru-
sion of church or state into the confines of the other.19 The Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the
Establishment Clause to the states.20 The framers of the Constitu-
tion, who themselves had recently attained religious freedom, recog-
nized that "freedom of religion flourishes only when the government
observes strict adherence to the principle of separation of religion
13. Id at 872, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
14. See infra notes 18-44 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 59-159 and accompanying text.
17. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 72-73 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991) (holding that prayer at a high school
graduation ceremony is unconstitutional because nonadherents to the religions en-
dorsed may perceive the government as preferring certain beliefs). See infra notes
160-173 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See generally 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law § 371 (9th ed. 1988).
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See also Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (arguing that it is not within the power of govern-
ment to invade the precinct of religion, "whether its purpose or effect be to aid or op-
pose, to advance or retard.") See generally JOHN NOWAK, RONALD ROTUNDA & J.
NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.3 (3d ed. 1986).
20. California Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 599 n.6, 526 P.2d 513,
516 n.6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 n.6 (1974) (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 760 n.3 (1973)).
and state authority."21 Consequently, our diverse nation is founded
on this principle of government neutrality in the religious forum.22
The Supreme Court first defined the Establishment Clause in Ev-
erson v. Board of Education,23 where it stated:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another .... In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
state.'2 4
Although the Constitution mandates strict separation of church and
state, the Supreme Court has recognized that complete separation is
not possible.25 An inflexible division would be counterproductive, re-
sulting in "state and religion [being] aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly."26
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has urged a continued separation
between church and state, and declared that "[i]n the relationship be-
tween man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position
of neutrality."2 7 If federal and state courts chip away the "wall of
separation" between church and state, they jeopardize the religious
diversity and freedom so unique to our country.28
B. Case History Regarding the Establishment CMause
In Everson v. Board of Education,2 9 the Supreme Court held that
governmental payment for student transportation in both public and
sectarian schools was constitutional. 30 The Court did not articulate a
21. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 868, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
22. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989) (concluding
that the United States Constitution requires government to remain secular to avoid
religious discrimination).
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (emphasizing that there can-
not be absolute separation of church and state for a relationship between the two is
inevitable); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (explaining that the Estab-
lishment Clause does not require rigid constitutional neutrality); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (finding that the First Amendment does not mandate that
there shall be separation of church and state in all respects).
26. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-13. For example, the absolutist approach to separation
of church and state would not allow police or fire departments to service religious or-
ganizations, would render the governmental recognition of Thanksgiving Day as a holi-
day unconstitutional, and would declare courtroom oaths uttering "so help me God"
violative of the First Amendment. Id.
27. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
28. Id. at 225. In Abington, the Court stressed the vital importance of the separa-
tion of church and state in maintaining liberty of religion. It emphasized that "[t]he
great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by any free government to in-
dividual enterprise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests,
lying outside the true and legitimate province of government." Id. at 214 n.7 (quoting
Board of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872)).
29. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30. Id. at 17 (comparing this state action to police monitoring traffic for students
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clear test to determine whether a challenged state practice violated
the Establishment Clause, however, until Abington School District v.
Schempp.31 In that case, the Court declared that, to pass constitu-
tional scrutiny, a state practice must have a "secular legislative pur-
pose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."32 The Court modified this test, and articulated a third
prong in Walz v. Tax Commission,33 namely, that the practice must
also avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.34 Fi-
nally, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,35 the Supreme Court instructed that
courts should consistently apply these three tests, now known as the
Lemon test, in evaluating an alleged Establishment Clause viola-
tion.36 The Lemon test remains the controlling analysis in this area
of law.37
The Supreme Court's sole departure from the Lemon test occurred
in Marsh v. Chambers,38 where the Court held that legislative prayer
did not violate the Constitution. The Court relied on the "unambigu-
ous and unbroken history of more than 200 years" of legislative
prayer which "has become part of the fabric of our society." 39 The
Court reaffirmed its commitment to the Lemon test, however, in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union ["ACLU"].40
traveling to and from church, both actions being constitutional because of the valid
secular purpose of promoting the school children's welfare and safety).
31. 374 U.S. at 222.
32. Id (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 303 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
33. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
34. Id at 674. The Court expounded on the entanglement test, stating that the is-
sue is "whether [there] is a continuing [practice] calling for official and continuing sur-
veillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." Id at 675.
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
36. Id at 615.
37. The California Supreme Court observed that the Lemon test had been consist-
ently applied in all cases except Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Sands v.
Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 871, 809 P.2d 809, 812, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37
(1991) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987)).
38. 463 U.S. 78:3 (1983).
39. Id at 792.
40. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The Court applied the Lemon test, refining the "primary
effect" prong by specifying that the questioned practice cannot have the primary effect
of endorsing religion. It stated that "[tihe Establishment Clause, at the very least, pro-
hibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or
from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community.' Id at 593-94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Applying the Lemon test, the Court held that a nativity scene displayed in a county
courthouse had the effect of endorsing religion, and violated the First Amendment. Id
at 602. It also held that a menorah displayed outside government buildings was consti-
Lemon "has remained controlling law for twenty years," and must be
applied in all Establishment cases.4 1
Thus, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution re-
quired the California Supreme Court to apply the Lemon test in
Sands.42 Although the United States Supreme Court had not yet ad-
dressed the issue presented in Sands,43 the Lemon analysis resulted
in the California Supreme Court's holding that invocations and bene-
dictions at public high school graduations violated the federal
Constitution.44
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
The plaintiffs, James Sands and Jean Bartolette, were taxpayers
residing in the Morongo Unified School District, which operated four
high schools: Yucca Valley High School, Twenty-Nine Palms High
School, Sky High School, and Monument High School. At each of
these schools, the District included religious invocations and benedic-
tions at graduation ceremonies. 45 At two of the schools, the adminis-
tutional because it did not endorse religious beliefs, but instead had the secular pur-
pose of governmental recognition of cultural diversity. Id. at 620-21.
41. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (footnote omitted).
In addition, the Court has urged that the Establishment Clause be applied with greater
sensitivity in the public school setting. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84
(1987). See generally Julie K. Underwood, Establishment of Religion in Primary and
Secondary Schools, 55 WEST's EDUC. LAW REP. 807, 809 (1990) (concluding that in the
primary and secondary school environment, the wall of separation between church and
state must be very high considering "the impressionability of the young children
involved").
42. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 884, 809 P.2d at 821, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Lucas, J.,
concurring).
43. Another California decision is directly on point. See Bennett v. Livermore
Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987). In Bennett, the
court held that a government practice of including religious invocations at public high
school graduations violated beth the United States and California Constitutions. Id. at
1024, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
44. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 864, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
45. Id. at 868, 809 P.2d at 810-11, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35-3. All of the invocations and
benedictions, with the exception of one, were expressly religious. For example, one of
the benedictions read:
Will the audience please stand and join us in prayer. Dear Father, we thank
You for these graduates who have meant so much to us. We thank You for
their energy, their enthusiasm, their sense of humor and their sense for life
.... We ask Your guidance as these graduates try to meet the many chal-
lenges of their future years. Grant them the strength to meet these chal-
lenges with courage, confidence and faith. We ask Your blessings so that their
lives will brim with happiness and good health .... We ask for these in Your
name, amen.
Id. at 869, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
Likewise, one invocation speaker concluded as follows:
Heavenly father, I thank you for the privilege it is to see these graduates go-
ing forth receiving their diplomas this evening. To celebrate this time, I pray
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tration either initially chose the speaker, or ultimately approved of
the students' choice of speaker.46 In the remaining two schools, the
selection process was not revealed.47 The plaintiffs sued to enjoin the
District from further inclusion of the religious invocations and bene-
dictions at public school ceremonies, claiming that the prayers vio-
lated both the United States and California Constitutions.48
B Procedural History
While this case was pending in the district court, the court of ap-
peal held in Bennett v. Livermore Unified School District,49 that in-
cluding religious invocations and benedictions at public high school
graduations violated both the state and federal constitutions. 50 Con-
sequently, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, and entered a judgment prohibiting the District from in-
cluding religious invocations and benedictions at any public school
ceremonies.51
The District appealed, and the court of appeal reversed the trial
court's decision..52 The court of appeal applied the Lemon test in de-
termining whether the invocations violated the Establishment
Clause. First, the court decided that the prayers had the secular pur-
pose of adding dignity and decorum to the ceremony, and served to
that you would give them that blessing, that confidence, courage, vision, hope,
peace and gladness, and looking forward to the days to come, the years to
come being confident of what they have already been able to do in receiving
this diploma. Now I pray your blessing upon them, in the name of our Lord,
amen.
46. Id at 868, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35. At Yucca Valley High School,
the graduating class president chose the speaker subject to the approval of the vice-
principal. In 1985, a Protestant minister gave the invocation; in 1986, a Protestant min-
ister (selected by the vice-principal alone) delivered the invocation. Id
At Twenty-Nine Palms High School, a student committee initially chose the gradua-
tion speakers. In 1985, a Presbyterian minister delivered the opening invocation, while
a Catholic priest delivered the closing benediction. In both cases, the students' choice
of speakers required the administration's final approval. Id
47. Id At the two schools where the record did not reveal the speaker selection
process, religious figures also delivered the prayers. For example, at one school, a
Protestant minister delivered both the invocation and the benediction in 1985. At the
other school, the same Methodist pastor had delivered every invocation and benedic-
tion since the school's first graduation ceremony in 1977. Id,
48. Id at 869, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
49. Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr.
819 (1987).
50. Id at 1014, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
51. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 869-70, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
52. Id at 870, 809 P.2d at 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
focus audience attention.53 Second, it held that the primary effect of
the invocations neither advanced nor inhibited religion, but instead
had an incidental religious effect.54 Third, the court determined that
the prayers did not produce excessive government entanglement with
religion, because the District did not fund the prayers; the ceremony
was in a non-sectarian setting; and the invocations did not require
continuing state supervision.55 Thus, the court of appeal held that in-
vocations and benedictions did not violate the state or federal
constitutions.56
The California Supreme Court granted review to hear this case of
first impression. The court overturned the court of appeal's ruling,
affirming the district court's decision.57 Applying the Lemon test,
the California Supreme Court held that invocations and benedictions
at public high school graduation ceremonies violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the United States Constitution.58
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
At the outset of the opinion, Justice Kennard emphasized that the
cultural diversity of our nation is vital to our heritage, and is the
foundation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment of the
Constitution.5 9 Embodied in the Establishment Clause is "the funda-
mental wisdom that freedom of religion flourishes only when govern-
ment observes strict adherence to the principle of separation of
religion and state authority."60
53. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1385, 1397, 262 Cal. Rptr.
452, 459 (1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991).
54. Id. at 1399, 262 Cal Rptr. 461.
55. Id. at 1400, 262 Cal. Rptr. 461.
56. Id. at 1397-1402, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 459-62.
57. Id. The California Constitution contains a provision almost identical to the Es-
tablishnent Clause of the federal Constitution. It mandates that "[t]he Legislature
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
The California Constitution provides further guarantees of separation of church and
state in addition to those found in the United States Constitution. It provides that
"In]either the Legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school district, or
other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public
fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose ...." CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (emphasis added). This provision
"prohibits not only material aid to religion, but any official involvement that promotes
religion." Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 883, 809 P.2d at 820, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (emphasis in
original) (citing California Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 605 n.12, 526
P.2d 513, 521 n.12, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 369 n.12 (1974)). See generally B. WITKIN, supra
note 18; 13 CAL. JUR. 3D, Constitutional Law §§ 246-48 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
58. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 867, 809 P.2d 809, 810, 281
Cal. Rptr. 34, 35 (1991).
59. Id. at 870, 809 P.2d at 811-12, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35-37.
60. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 867-68, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35. See Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court stressed that:
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1. The Lemon Test
a. "Secular Purpose" Prong
The opinion recognized that the Lemon test controlled Establish-
ment Clause cases.61 The majority did not apply the secular purpose
prong of the test, however, noting that the challenged government
practice must violate only one prong to establish its
unconstitutionality. 62
b. "Primar Effect" Prong
The court applied the second prong of the Lemon test, the primary
effect test, to decide "whether, irrespective of the government's ac-
tual objective, the practice in question conveys a message of endorse-
ment or disapproval."63 The court reasoned that because the
government controlled the graduation ceremony, there was an inevi-
table appearance of government endorsement. Therefore, a religious
invocation sends "a powerful message that [the government] ap-
proves of the prayer's religious content."6 4 Although the graduation
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long
tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the
individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experi-
ence that it is not within the power of the government to invade the citadel
Id at 226. But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (noting that total separa-
tion of church and state is not realistically possible).
61. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38. Although the
Supreme Court departed from the Lemon test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790
(1983), it utilized Lemon in its most recent establishment clause analysis in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989). See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying
text.
62. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 32. Although this
may be viewed as an incomplete analysis, the Supreme Court did not apply the* pri-
mary effect prong in Lemon either. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
Moreover, even if the majority had applied the secular purpose test, it would likely
have found there was no primary secular purpose because of the primarily religious
purpose of prayers. See, e.g., Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App.
3d 1012, 1020, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819, 823 (1987) (holding that religious invocations at public
high school graduations violated the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test).
63. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872-73, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38 (citing Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 n.42 (1985); County of Allegheny V. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-
94 (1989)).
64. Id. at 872-74, 809 P.2d at 814, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (footnote omitted). Justice
Kennard explained that through the inclusion of religious invocations and benedic-
tions, "the government appears to prefer religion over nonreligion; appears to prefer
religions that acknowledge the practice of petitionary prayer over religions that do not
recognize such prayer; .. .and implicitly endorses religions that address a single, an-
thropomorphic, and male deity over those that do not." Id. at 874, 809 P.2d at 814, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 39. See also Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831 (11th
ceremony occurred only once a year, the significance of this event to
the graduate is not reduced, as it signifies a great academic achieve-
ment as well as the passing from childhood to adulthood. The court
noted that "[e]ven when such a milestone in the lives of participants
is not involved, courts have invalidated annual government practices
of a religious nature."6 5 In addition, it pointed out that the brevity of
the invocation cannot vindicate an unconstitutional government prac-
tice; the focus must instead be on the religious character of the act.66
Justice Kennard proposed that the overall secular nature of the in-
vocation did not dispel the government endorsement of religion.67
She reasoned that viewing the challenged practice in the context of
the physical setting is an inappropriate analysis of graduation prayers
and cannot eliminate the "symbolic union" of church and state.68
Although the United States Supreme Court has considered context in
evaluating Establishment Clause cases, it has limited this approach to
government displays of religious symbols.69 Unlike these passive dis-
plays of religious objects, invocations and benedictions are active ex-
ercises which encourage audience participation in prayer. Therefore,
the Court did not consider the prayers in the context of the secular
graduation ceremony.70
The majority asserted that the challenged government action could
not be justified as an accommodation of religion. Although the
United States Supreme Court has approved of an accommodation 7 ' of
Cir. 1989) (concluding that religious invocations preceding public high school football
games conveyed a message of government endorsement of religion); See generally
James J. Dean, Comment, Ceremonial Invocations at Public High School Events and
the Establishment Clause, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1001 (1989) (evaluating recent court
application of the Lemon test in the public school context).
65. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 875, 809 P.2d at 815, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (citing County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 598, 602 (1989) (annual creche display); Fox v. City of
Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (annual display of
lighted cross)).
66. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 875, 809 P.2d at 815, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 40. See also Bennett,
193 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (1987) (finding that prayer's duration is
irrelevant to the determination of an Establishment Clause violation).
67. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 876, 809 P.2d at 816, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
68. Id at 876, 809 P.2d at 815-16, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
69. Id. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (inquiring into the constitu-
tionality of a creche in the context of the Christmas season); County of Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 597 (determining the constitutionality of the government's annual display of
both a creche and a menorah by considering the physical setting of these displays).
70. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 876, 809 P.2d at 816, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 41. The court further
reasoned that, according to the context approach, "prayers at the beginning of the pub-
lic school day would be constitutionally unobjectionable solely because they would be
part of an educational experience that is predominantly nonreligious. Yet prayers at
the beginning of the school day have long been held unconstitutional." Id.
71. The accommodation approach recognizes that religion pervades our culture,
and therefore the First Amendment permits some government accommodation of pub-
lic expression of religious belief. See Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 921-25, 809 P.2d at 846-49, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 71-74 (Pannelli, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has inter-
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religion, it has done so only where government action "remove[s]
burdens on the free exercise of religion." 72 Here, the court noted
that including prayers at public school ceremonies did not remove
any burden on the free exercise of religion; there existed no free ex-
ercise right for school administrators to include invocations at public
school ceremonies, and thus the government lifted no burden by al-
lowing these prayers.73 Therefore, the District could not validate its
actions as accommodating religion.
The court concluded that including invocations and benedictions at
public high school graduations violated the "primary effect" prong of
the Lemon test:, because the practice "inevitably conveys a message
that the District favors or prefers the religious beliefs expressed by
the invocation and benediction speakers."74
c. "Excessive Entanglement" Prong
The majority next decided whether the government practice im-
permissibly entangled government with religion. The court con-
cluded that the District's action impermissibly entangled government
with religion in both the selection of speakers and the approval of
prayer content.75 First, the District controlled the selection of the
speaker, because school administrators either chose the graduation
speaker or gave final approval to the students' choice of religious
speakers.7 6 Second, the practice of including religious invocations
would require the government to monitor the content of the prayers
to ensure against endorsement of specific religions.77 As the court
preted the Establishment Clause as permitting the government to accommodate reli-
gion in public life). See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
72. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 n.51.
73. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 876-77, 809 P.2d at 816, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 41. Cf. Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (upholding state law permitting release of public
school students to go to religious centers because the law accommodated religion, thus
removing the burden on the student's right to free exercise of religion).
74. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 876-77, 809 P.2d at 816, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
75. Id. at 879-81, 809 P.2d at 817-17, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43.
76. Id, Justice Kennard further explained the way in which the speaker selection
process fostered excessive entanglement with religion. The court stated that
"[b]ecause the tendency is great to make such choices dependent on the religious pref-
erence of the school official, or on the religious preferences of the majority of the
school community, the degree of entanglement is unacceptably high." Id.
77. Id. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (holding that continuing
state surveillance of subsidized teachers to ensure that they do not inculcate religion
involves excessive entanglement between government and religion). Justice Kennard
warned that this "preventive monitoring by the state of the content of religious speech
inevitably leads to gradual official development of what is acceptable public prayer,"
noted, "Such prophylactic government monitoring of religious speech
is constitutionally impermissible."78 Therefore, the court concluded
that including religious prayers at public high school graduation cere-
monies fostered excessive government entanglement with religion,
and was thus unconstitutional.79
3. The Applicability of Marsh v. Chambers
The majority then considered whether Marsh v. Ohamberso ap-
plied to the facts of Sands. In Marsh, the United States Supreme
Court did not apply Lemon to decide whether beginning legislative
sessions with prayer violated the Establishment Clause. Instead, the
Court held that because of legislative prayer's "unique history" of 200
years, the practice was constitutionally justified.8l In Sands, the ma-
jority concluded that the court could not use Marsh to determine the
constitutionality of religious invocations in the public school setting,
because the public school system was not in existence 200 years ago.8 2
Moreover, the court declared that "Marsh plainly does not stand for
the sweeping proposition ... that all accepted practices 200 years old
and their equivalents are constitutional today .... [This] reading of
Marsh would gut the core of the Establishment Clause, as this Court
understands it."83 Therefore the majority concluded that Marsh was
inapplicable to the instant case, and instead based its holding on the
Lemon test.
4. The California Constitution
The majority held that including prayers at public high school
graduation ceremonies also violated the Establishment Clause of the
California Constitution, which is almost identical to the correspond-
which violates the Establishment Clause. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 880, 809 P.2d at 818, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 43.
78. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 880, 804 P.2d at 818, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
79. 1I at 881, 809 P.2d at 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
80. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
81. Id. at 790-92. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
82. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 881, 809 P.2d at 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44. See Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (concluding that Marsh is not useful in the public
school setting because free public education did not exist when the Constitution was
adopted); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971) (finding that the Court could
not rely on history in deciding the constitutionality of state aid to religious-affiliated
schools because this type of aid did not exist 200 years ago).
In Sands, the court declined to consider history as a factor in its evaluation. History,
however, can facilitate in court interpretation, and has been used by the United States
Supreme Court to decide whether a challenged government practice violates the Es-
tablishment Clause. See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (not-
ing in an evaluation of a church tax exemption that "an unbroken practice according
the exemption to churches, openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by
state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside").
83. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 881, 809 P.2d at 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (citations omitted).
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ing federal provision.8 4 The state constitution provides even greater
church and state separation than does the United States Constitution,
as it prohibits both material aid to religion and any government in-
volvement which promotes religion.8 5 Therefore, Justice Kennard
concluded that the government practice in Sands violated the reli-
gion clauses of the California Constitution.8 6
B. Justice Lucas' Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Lucas reluctantly concurred with the majority, agree-
ing that the religious invocations had the primary effect of advancing
religion, thus violating the second prong of the Lemon test.8 7 How-
ever, Justice Lucas admitted he would have upheld the challenged
government practice if the Supreme Court precedent from Lemon
had not bound the court.88 Justice Lucas focused on the integral role
of history in constitutional analysis.8 9 History reveals that absolute
separation of church and state is unreasonable,90 because "benign
recognition" of religion is "a consistent element of American culture,
specifically endorsed by the framers and upheld in the traditions of
both state and national governments since the founding of the repub-
lic."91 Therefore, Justice Lucas evaluated the instant case through a
historical approach, emphasizing the importance of Marsh v. Cham-
bers in his constitutional analysis.92
84. Id. at 882-83, 809 P.2d at 820, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44. See supra note 57.
85. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. See supra note 57.
86. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 883, 809 P.2d at 818, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
87. Id. at 884-85, 809 P.2d at 819, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
88. ld. at 884.-85, 809 P.2d at 821-22, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring).
89. Ld. at 886, 809 P.2d at 822, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Justice
Lucas asserted that history reveals the core principles underlying the Constitution,
what evils it meant to prevent, and what benefits it sought to promote. In addition,
history demonstrates whether a challenged government practice has "enhanced or in-
hibited basic corstitutional values and principles over time." Id. (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring).
90. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring). Instead of a "wall of separation" between church
and state, Justice Lucas suggested a "permeable membrane [which] allows the free
flow of government action, based on a historical tradition that recognizes... the civic
importance of religion .... Id. at 891-92, 809 P.2d at 827, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52 (Lu-
cas, C.J., concurring).
91. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 890, 809 P.2d at 825, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (Lucas, C.J., con-
curring). Justice Lucas used examples of intermingling of church and state in our cul-
ture to demonstrate that benign recognition of religion comports with the
Establishment Clause.
92. Id. at 897..901, 809 P.2d at 830-33, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 54-58 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring).
He began his analysis by stressing the importance of context in as-
sessing constitutionality. First, he emphasized the high degree of au-
dience freedom at the graduation ceremony. 93 Participation was
voluntary and references to God were broad symbols which could
easily accommodate individual interpretation.9 4 Second, the invoca-
tions served an important secular function of "solemnizing" the occa-
sion and unifying the community.95 Third, the District did not
evidence religious bias in its purpose or effect.9 Thus, considering
the context of the invocations, Justice Lucas concluded that the gov-
ernment practice was constitutional.
Justice Lucas also analogized Marsh to the instant case by showing
the similarity of the prayers in both cases. He stressed that courts
must consider Marsh's historical analysis in evaluating whether a
government action violates the Establishment Clause.97 Although
public school graduation ceremonies did not exist 200 years ago, com-
parable civic ceremonies that contained religious invocations were in
existence.98 The tradition of opening and closing prayers at these
civic ceremonies, he argued, validated the graduation prayers in this
case. He opined that Marsh is not "an aberration in the mainstream
of constitutional decisionmaking . . . [and] is not an historical
93. Id. at 895, 809, P.2d at 828, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
94. Id. at 895, 809 P.2d at 828-29, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
Justice Lucas explained that the individual who did not wish to participate could view
the prayers as a "cultural phenomenon." It may be argued, however, that impressiona-
ble young graduates and their younger siblings in the audience might not view the
prayers in such a mature manner. Unlike adults, children are highly impressionable.
See Lemon c. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971) (stressing that students are very
impressionable, enhancing government's imparting of religion).
95. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 896, 809 P.2d at 829, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (Lucas, C.J., con-
curring). However, a majority of the United States Supreme Court did not adopt the
"solemnizing" approach presented by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly. Id. (cit-
ing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
In County of Allegheny, the Supreme Court also considered the availability of secu-
lar alternatives in evaluating the constitutionality of a challenged religious practice.
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 618 n.67. Using this analysis, the wide array of secu-
lar alternatives to religious invocations in the present case demonstrates a considerable
degree of government involvement in and endorsement of religion.
96. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 896-97, 809 P.2d at 829-30, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 54-55 (Lucas,
C.J., concurring). Justice Lucas indicated that the selection of speakers involved stu-
dent choice. Although the District was required to give its final approval of the
speaker, there was no evidence of religious favoritism. Further, the content of the
prayers made only general references to God and did not "promote favoritism or fac-
tionalism among churches." Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
97. Id. at 898-901, 809 P.2d at 831-33, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 56-58 (Lucas, C.J., concur-
ring). However, as the majority states, Marsh does not apply in the public school set-
ting. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
98. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 901, 809 P.2d at 831, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 56 (Lucas, C.J., con-
curring). But see Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1022,
238 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (1987).
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artifact."99
Finally, Justice Lucas addressed the California constitutional issue,
which he felt should not be resolved in this case. 100 He explained
that California is part of a federal system and must defer to the
supreme law of the land. In addition, these constitutional issues are
"daily grist for the mill of the Supreme Court."' 0 ' Justice Lucas thus
preferred to await Supreme Court guidance on the graduation invoca-
tion issue.102
C. Justice Mask's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk began by emphasizing that the California Supreme
Court owes its primary duty to the state constitution, and should only
resort to the Federal Constitution where the court cannot resolve the
issue on independent and adequate state grounds.103 This reliance on
the California Constitution in decision-making allows the court to
render a final judgment quickly and avoid the time and costs of du-
plicative proceedings.10 4 Using this approach, Justice Mosk con-
cluded that while the invocations at issue did violate the Federal
Constitution, they independently violated the stricter state
constitution. 05
1. Increased Protection Under the California Constitution
Justice Mosk indicated that the framers of the state constitution
99. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 901, 809 P.2d at 832, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 57 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring).
100. Id. at 902, 809 P.2d at 833, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 58 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
101. Id. at 904, 809 P.2d at 834, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 59 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
102. Id. at 905, 809 P.2d at 834-35, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 59-60 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
103. Id at 906, 809 P.2d at 836, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., concurring).
104. Id (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk referred to State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990), where the Minnesota Supreme Court underwent unneces-
sary cost and delay. After the initial state determination, State v. Hershinger, 444
N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), the United States Supreme Court heard the case on certio-
rari, and remanded the case for consideration in light of a prior Supreme Court deci-
sion. On remand, the Minnesota court did not follow the Supreme Court precedent,
but instead based on its final holding on the state constitution, reaffirming its initial
decision. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 396-97. Justice Mosk urged the California
Supreme Court to learn from this case and avoid future delay and cost by relying on
the state constitution if possible.
105. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 905, 809 P.2d at 835-36, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Although Justice Mosk felt that the court was not bound by application
of federal authority, he agreed with the majority's reliance on the Lemon test in con-
cluding that the prayers violated the California Constitution. Id at 910 n.3, 809 P.2d at
839 n.3, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 64 n.3 (Mosk, J., concurring). See supra notes 61-86 and ac-
companying text.
intended to have absolute separation of church and state. First, the
delegates stressed the word "preference" in adopting article 1, section
4, prohibiting governmental preference of religion.' 0 6 Second, the
framers amended article 1, section 4, and "guaranteed" free exercise
of religion instead of merely "allowing" it.107 Finally, the delegates
adopted article XIV, section 5, further grounding government neu-
trality in religious matters.10 8 These examples strongly demonstrate
that the framers of the state constitution "carefully selected the lan-
guage that provided the greatest level of protection to California
citizens."109
2. Application of the California Constitution to Religious
Invocations
Justice Mosk next applied the state constitution to the case at
hand, and found that the invocations violated both article 1, section 4,
and article XVI, section 5110 of the constitution.
a. Article 1, Section 4
Although the Establishment Clause of the state and federal consti-
tutions are almost identical, Justice Mosk stated that the California
Constitution provides for heightened government neutrality in reli-
gious matters through the Preference Clause. The Preference Clause
of article 1, section 4, forbids any government preference of religion,
even where there has been no discrimination.ll Thus, Justice Mosk
106. Id. at 907, 809 P.2d at 837, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 62 (Mosk, J., concurring). See
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 907, 809 P.2d at 838, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 63 (Mosk, J., concurring).
108. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
109. Id at 907, 809 P.2d at 837, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (Mosk, J., concurring). In addi-
tion to recognizing the intent of the framers, Justice Mosk referred to early California
case law that recognized the separation of church and state. See, e.g., Ex Parte New-
man, 9 Cal. 502, 506-07 (1858) (holding that a legislative enactment which required ob-
servance of the Sabbath violated Article 1 of the California Constitution).
110. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 910, 809 P.2d at 838, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 63 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). The California Constitution provides a more stringent separation of church and
state than does the United States Constitution, particularly in the public school set-
ting. Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1016, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 819, 821 (1987) (citing Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150
Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978)). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
111. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 910, 809 P.2d at 839, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 64 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring). See supra note 57. Justice Mosk demonstrated that California courts have uti-
lized the Preference Clause to find government practices unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Fox, 22 Cal. 3d at 797, 587 P.2d at 665, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (finding that a display of a
lighted Latin cross on city hall was unconstitutional, partly because it seemed to prefer
one religion); Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Philobosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076,
1090-92, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918, 926-27 (1984) (holding that city district attorney's plan to
bury aborted fetuses, where one religious organization would hold a memorial cere-
mony, was unconstitutional partly because the plan would prefer a religion); Mandel v.
Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976) (holding that government order
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believed the relevant inquiry in determining a Preference Clause vio-
lation was "whether government has granted a benefit to a religion
or religion in general that is not granted to society at large." 112
Justice Mosk applied this inquiry to the case at hand, and con-
cluded that the invocations were unconstitutional under article 1, sec-
tion 4.113 First, Justice Mosk reasoned that the government
conferred a benefit on religion by including religious prayers at an
important secular function. He noted that "[t]his form of prayer, and
the religious world view that underlies it, is . . . invested with the
prestige with which the importance of the occasion endows it."114
Second, the government's selection of clergy members to deliver
these prayers also granted a preferential benefit to religion. 115
Therefore, Justice Mosk found the District's inclusion of invocations
unconstitutional under the Preference Clause of the California
Constitution.l 16
b. Article XV, Section 5
Article XVI, section 5, provides further guarantees against the in-
trusion of government into religious matters, banning any govern-
ment aid "which has the direct, immediate, and substantial effect of
promoting religious purposes."" 7 Justice Mosk set forth a two-
pronged analysis in evaluating the validity of government aid: (1)
whether the benefit is direct or indirect; and (2) whether the aid is
substantial or incidental.118 Justice Mosk then applied this analysis
to the instant case. First, he believed that choosing Christian clergy
to deliver religious prayers at an important secular function provided
a direct benefit to one particular religion.1 19 Second, this benefit was
not incidental, because the government objectively appeared to en-
to close state offices for three hours on Good Friday was unconstitutional because it
discriminated against non-Christians and preferred Christian employees).
112. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 912, 809 P.2d at 840, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
113. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
114. lI (Mosk, J., concurring). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
115. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
116. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
117. California Ed. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 605 n.12, 526 P.2d 513,
521 n.12, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 369 n.12 (1974).
118. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 913, 809 P.2d at 841, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring) (citing California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 300 (1981)).
119. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 913, 809 P.2d at 840, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
dorse the religious views espoused in the prayers, while implicitly re-
jecting contrary views.120 Justice Mosk found, therefore, that the
invocations at issue violated article XVI, section 5 of the California
Constitution.121
D. Justice Arabian's Concurring Opinion
Justice Arabian concurred reluctantly with the majority based
upon the Lemon test, and emphasized the inapplicability of Marsh to
the instant case.122 Although Justice Arabian found the invocations
to be unconstitutional, he recognized that public prayer reinforces
religious diversity and is thus vital to our country.123 Therefore, Jus-
tice Arabian expressed his hope that the high court would soon de-
cide to uphold invocations at public high school graduations. 2 4
1. The Lemon Test
Justice Arabian found that the prayers violated the second prong
of Lemon, the "primary effect" test, because they conveyed an ap-
pearance of government endorsement of religion.' 25 Yet he reformu-
lated this part of Lemon, and stated the relevant inquiry as "whether
... the prayers in question, though seemingly innocuous to the ma-
jority of citizens, nevertheless offend" the minority of non-adher-
ents.126  Justice Arabian concluded that the prayers were
120. Id. at 912-13, 809 P.2d at 840-41, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66 (Mosk, J., concurring).
The second part of the analysis proposed by Justice Mosk mirrors the second prong of
the Lemon test, the "primary effect" test. This test prohibits government endorse-
ment of religion, banning the government "from appearing to take a position on ques-
tions of religious belief." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989). See
supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
121. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 914, 809 P.2d at 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
122. Id. at 914-16, 809 P.2d at 842-44, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-69 (Arabian, J., concur-
ring). Justice Arabian based his opinion solely on the federal Constitution stating he
did not find it necessary to look to the California Constitution. He, therefore, joined in
neither the portion of the majority which addressed the state constitution, nor in Jus-
tice Mosk's concurring opinion. Id. at 914, 809 P.2d at 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Ara-
bian, J., concurring). See supra notes 84-86 and notes 103-21 and accompanying text.
123. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 918, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
124. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 916-17, 809 P.2d at 843, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (Arabian, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 915, 809 P.2d at 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Arabian, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Arabian found it critical to view the endorsement issue from the minority perspec-
tive because "they [the minority] compose a large segment of the symphony which is
America." Id. Justice O'Connor also recognized this reformulation of Lemon's second
prong, finding government endorsement of religion where a challenged practice sends
"a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the relevant
inquiry as whether the government action conveys a message to minority religious
groups and those that recognize no religion, "that their views are not similarly worthy
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unconstitutional according to this part of Lemon, because the minor-
ity perceived them as a government endorsement of religion.127
2. The Inapplicability of Marsh v. Chambers
Justice Arabian next analyzed whether the religious practice of in-
vocations "has a legitimate constitutional place in a public high
school graduation ceremony."'128 Justice Arabian noted that religion
and prayer have historically been significant to public ceremonies, in-
cluding presidential inaugurals and legislative prayers like those ad-
dressed in Marsh.129 Yet, he found those 18th century invocations
historically distinct from the invocations in the instant case; in-
augurals and legislative sessions have basically remained the same in
the past 200 years, while "public education has experienced a contin-
uous revolution."' 3 0 Therefore, Justice Arabian concluded that the
legislative prayers in Marsh could not guide the court in its
determination. 131
Although Justice Arabian found that Marsh was not determinative
of the case at bar, he stated that an historical analysis provides a use-
ful perspective. 3 2 History indicates that public prayer is an Ameri-
can tradition which enhances religious diversity and freedom in our
country.133 Therefore, Justice Arabian would have preferred to find
the invocations constitutional, because they allow Americans to "re-
inforce and celebrate the rich diversity that has made us a great and
of public recognition nor entitled to public support."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1284, 1293 (2d ed. 1988) (urging courts to adopt the perspective
of a non-adherent in deciding whether government action has conveyed a message of
religious endorsement). See generally Dean, supra note 64, at 1-26 (analyzing Justice
O'Connor's reforumulation of Lemon's second prong).
127. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 916, 809 P.2d at 843, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
128. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring).
129. Id, See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (concluding that legisla-
tive prayer has been part of our society for 200 years); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963) (demonstrating prevalence of prayer in public life). Cf Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952) (listing numerous examples of the inevitable
concert of church and state in our society).
130. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 917, 809 P.2d at 843, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (Arabian, J., con-
curring). See supro note 82 and accompanying text.
131. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 917, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (Arabian, J., con-
curring). See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
132. See generally Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (utilizing a historical analysis to find
whether a governmental practice violated the Establishment Clause).
133. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 918, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
noble people."'134
E. Justice Panelli's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Panelli primarily stressed that courts are not restricted to
any one test in an Establishment Clause analysis.13 5 Therefore,
his opinion used both an accommodation136 as well as a Lemon analy-
sis. This broadened analysis compelled Justice Panelli to conclude
that religious invocations at graduation ceremonies are not
unconstitutional. 137
1. Accommodation of Religion
Justice Panelli applied an accommodation approach to the present
case, 138 recognizing that the United States Supreme Court inter-
preted the Establishment Clause to allow government accommoda-
tion of religion in Marsh.139 Furthermore, in Lynch, the Court
recognized that because religion pervades our history, it requires ac-
commodation of all religions with hostility toward none.140 This line
of authority led Justice Panelli to conclude, irrespective of Lemon,
that the District's practice did not violate the Establishment Clause;
rather, brief prayers at public high school graduation were permissi-
ble as government accommodation of religion.141
134. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 920, 809 P.2d at 845, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 70 (Panelli, J., dissenting). See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting that the Court will not limit itself
to one criterion in this area of the law). Justice Panelli asserted that the danger in
using only one test is that the test chosen often determines the outcome. For instance,
of the courts that have applied the Lemon test, only two have found religious invoca-
tions constitutional; yet all courts applying other tests have found religious invocations
constitutional. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 920-21, 809 P.2d at 846, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (1991)
(Panelli, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Panelli preferred considering other approaches
in addition to Lemon.
136. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
137. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 939, 809 P.2d at 859, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (Panelli, J., dis-
senting) (Panelli, J., dissenting) (Panelli, J., dissenting) (Panelli, J., dissenting)
(Panelli, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 921, 809 P.2d at 846, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (Panelli, J., dissenting). See
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-78 (emphasizing that the Constitution affirmatively authorizes
government accommodation of religion); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (finding that govern-
ment activity is not barred solely because it "harmonizes" with religious beliefs); Zo-
rach, 343 U.S. at 312-14 (concluding that government need not be hostile toward
religion, because church and state cannot be separated in all respects). But see County
of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601 n.51 (explaining that accommodation is allowed only
where the government practice unburdens the right to free exercise of religion).
139. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 923, 809 P.2d at 848, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 73 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
140. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting). But see Bennett, 193 Cal. 3d at 1022, 238 Cal. Rptr.
at 825 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682-83) (distinguishing Lynch from similar public
school cases).
141. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 923-25, 809 P.2d at 848-49, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74 (Panelli,
J., dissenting).
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2. The Lemon Test
Justice Panelli also applied the Lemon test to further his analy-
sis. I4 2 First, he found that the prayers had a valid secular purpose,
adding ceremony and solemnity to the occasion.143 Justice Panelli
explained that secular and religious purposes coexist, and that the
state can use religion to achieve a state interest.144 Second, Justice
Panelli found that the graduation invocations did not significantly
benefit religion because the prayers were brief, the ceremony was
voluntary, and the graduates were mature and intelligent young
adults.145 Therefore, one could not view the invocations as a govern-
ment endorsement of religion. Finally, he noted that the invocations
did not excessively entangle government with religion; the govern-
ment would not have needed to censor the prayers, considering there
was no "realistic risk that a private speaker's use of religious lan-
guage will be seen as an official endorsement of religion."'1
3. The California Constitution
Justice Panelli indicated that the challenged government practice
did not violate the California Constitution. 147 First, he declared that
the framers of the state constitution did not intend to proscribe cere-
monial prayer. It is counterintuitive, Panelli argued, to believe that
the delegates who began each day with a religious invocation, and
who included a religious invocation in the preamble, would have in-
tended to ban religious invocations at graduation ceremonies. 148 Sec-
142. 1d. at 925, 809 P.2d at 849, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 926, 809 P.2d at 849-50, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
144. 1d. at 926, 809 P.2d at 850, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (Panei, J., dissenting). See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (explaining that although government ac-
tion may advance religion, it is not constitutionally invalid for this reason alone).
145. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 929, 809 P.2d at 851-52, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting). Although Justice Panelli classified high school graduates as mature, some,
in fact, are insecure and impressionable, and perhaps quite influenced by religious in-
culcation. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
In addition, Justice Panelli dismissed rather quickly the availability of secular alter-
natives as a factor in Establishment Clause analysis, as suggested by the United States
Supreme Court. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 927-28, 809 P.2d at 851, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 76
(Panelli, J., dissenting). See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 618 n.67
(1989). When government uses religious means when valid secular alternatives exist,
government endorsement of religion is unavoidable because "the religious medium be-
comes the state's message." TRIBE, supra note 126, at 1283.
146. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 931, 809 P.2d at 853, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting).
148. Id at 931-33, 809 P.2d at 853-54, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
Article I, § 4 of the California Constitution, known as the "discrimination or prefer-
ond, the framers of the California Constitution did not intend to
erect a higher "wall of separation" between church and state than did
the Federal Constitution.'4 9 As Justice Panelli reasoned, the wall
"has always had holes large enough to permit state aid to religious
institutions, religious instruction in such institutions, ceremonial
prayer in the state constitutional convention, and a religious invoca-
tion in the Constitution ....*"150 Therefore, because the religious
guarantees of the state and federal constitutions are equal, he con-
cluded that the invocation here did not violate either constitution.
F. Justice Baxter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Baxter dissented because he felt that the injunction ban-
ning the inclusion of religious prayer in all public high school gradua-
tions was overly broad.15l Although he found that two of the
graduation invocations were constitutionally suspect under Lemon's
second prong, he argued that the court should not enjoin invocations
at public school graduations in general. 5 2
Justice Baxter found that the Lemon test was the appropriate anal-
ysis because of its second prong, which asks "whether 'the challenged
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adher-
ents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious
choices.' "153 Justice Baxter stressed that the court must apply this
"endorsement" test by considering the context in which the conduct
occurs.154 Therefore, using the second prong of Lemon, Justice Bax-
ter found that two of the invocations at issue were unconstitutional
because the speaker selection process resulted in the appearance of
ence" provision, prevents the state from discriminating against or preferring a particu-
lar religious sect. Id. at 933, 809 P.2d at 856, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 57. Justice Panelli suggested that the District could meet
this standard by requiring a rotation of speakers representing different religious be-
liefs. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 935, 809 P.2d at 856, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (Panelli, J., dissent-
ing). Yet, Justice Panelli's suggestion of speaker rotation would violate the third
prong of Lemon. The District would be forced to survey the selection process to en-
sure that various religions were represented, excessively entangling government with
religion. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
149. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 933-34, 809 P.2d at 855, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting). But see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
150. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 937, 809 P.2d at 857, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
151. Id. at 939-40, 809 P.2d at 859, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 943, 809 P.2d at 862, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 940, 809 P.2d at 859-60, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)). See supra notes 63-66 and
125-27 and accompanying text.
154. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 941, 809 P.2d at 860, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 85 (Baxter, J., dis-
senting). But see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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government endorsement of religion.155 Justice Baxter emphasized
that while the court must ban such speaker selection practices, it is
unnecessary to ban all invocations at public high school graduations,
because "recitation need not be viewed in all cases as reflecting state
endorsement or support of the religious views of the speaker. ... "156
Justice Baxter found that the invocations did not independently vi-
olate the California Constitution. First, the invocations did not vio-
late article 1, section 4, except where the speaker selection process
implied government preference of religion.157 Second, the invoca-
tions did not violate article XVI, section 5, because the benefit to reli-
gion was incidental, considering the de minimus expenditure of
government funds on the prayers.158 Therefore, Justice Baxter con-
cluded that the District's practice was permissible on state constitu-
tional grounds as well.159
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
Sands v. Morongo Unified School District is a valuable constitu-
tional decision, upholding government neutrality on religious matters
"[i]n a world frequently torn by religious factionalism and the vio-
lence tragically associated with political division along religious lines
... ."160 It appears, however, that because of the increased conserva-
tism of the both United States Supreme Courtl6l and the California
155. Id. at 943, 809 P.2d at 861, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 86 (Baxter, J., dissenting). At
Yucca Valley High School, the vice principal alone chose the speaker; and at Sky High
School, the school had chosen the same Protestant minister to speak since the first
graduation in 1977. Therefore, "[i]n the absence of guidelines adequate to ensure a di-
versity of views," the speaker selection process resulted in the appearance of govern-
ment sponsorship of religion. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Justice Baxter felt that invocations need not be banned because the court could pro-
vide guidelines for speaker selection and prayer censorship, thus eliminating govern-
ment endorsement of religion. Yet, because Justice Baxter failed to suggest any
guidelines, his proposed limited injunction would not adequately prevent government
sponsorship of religion.
156. Id. at 947, 309 P.2d at 864, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 945-46, 809 P.2d at 863, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Baxter, J., dissenting). But
see supra notes 111.-16 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 947, 809 P.2d at 863-64, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Baxter, J., dissenting). But
see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 947, 809 P.2d at 864, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 821, 809 P.2d at 821, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
161. The Bush Administration urged the Supreme Court to hear Weisman v. Lee,
728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), off'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S.
Ct. 1305 (1991), so it could adopt a less stringent standard, allowing for increased gov-
ernment accommodation of religion. David G. Savage, Courts May Ease Church-State
Separation, L.A. TIMES, March 19, 1991, at Al. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
Supreme Court,I6 2 the Sands decision may not ban this type of gov-
ernment involvement in the religious arena for long. The United
States Supreme Court will decide upon the constitutionality of reli-
gious invocations at public high school graduation ceremonies in Lee
v. Weisman,6 3 and will most likely approve of the invocations.1 4
A. The Temporary Effect of Sands
In the meantime, Sands will impact Establishment Clause decisions
in California by maintaining a strong distinction between govern-
ment activity and religious practice. Under the majority's "broad" in-
junction, religious invocations at any public school function will
likely violate separation of the church and state.165 The court af-
firmed that the public school system is an inappropriate forum for
religious instruction because of the constitutional mandate that "reli-
gion . .. be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice.... "1 6  Yet, government invocations in
non-school settings may be constitutional notwithstanding Sands,
considering that the Establishment Clause is applied with more vigi-
lance in the public school context.16 7 In any case, the Sands decision
will at least temporarily prevent government endorsement of prayer
in the public school system, which is extremely important to those
who fear the ease with which government can establish religion in
schools.18s
Justice Kennedy, and Justice White all support increased government support of reli-
gion. Id. Justice O'Connor, however, has refused to support this type of change and
insists that government endorsement of religion is unconstitutional. Id. Justice Sou-
ter's stance is unknown. However, as New Hampshire's state attorney general, Souter
defended the reinstatement of the Lord's Prayer in schools and flying flags at half-
mast on Good Friday "'to memorialize the death of Christ on the Cross."' Id. In addi-
tion, recent Supreme Court appointee Clarence Thomas is a conservative and may sup-
port a relaxed Establishment Clause standard as well. Thus, it appears that five of the
Justices will most likely approve of invocations at public high school graduations.
162. Former Republican Governor George Deukmejian appointed the newest con-
servative justices to the California Supreme Court, changing the court from liberal to
conservative. Philip Hager, Justice Prohibits Prayer at Public School Rites, L.A.
TIMES, May 7, 1991, at Al.
163. 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), off'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert granted,
111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
164. In a brief to the Supreme Court, Bush Administration attorneys stressed that
they wanted to clarify First Amendment confusion by obtaining a Court ruling that
would forbid only "'religious coercion'" by the government. Therefore, they stated
that a public school ceremony referring to God would not be unconstitutional. Savage,
supra note 161.
165. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 863, 809 P.2d at 858, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
166. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1981).
167. See supra note 41.
168. Underwood, supra note 41. There is an increased risk that the government
will establish religion in the schools, even with slight religious favoritism, "[b]ecause
the school's role is to educate students and inculate values." Id. at 817-18.
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Sands reinforced the importance of the Lemon test in constitu-
tional analysis, 169 concluding that the historical approach set forth in
Marsh v. Chambers is inappropriate in the public school context.170
Through this affirmation of the more stringent Lemon test, the court
demonstrated its commitment to separation of church and state,
which it found necessary to enhance religious diversity and
freedom.171
B. The Future of the Sands' Decision
If the United States Supreme Court holds religious invocations at
public high school ceremonies to be constitutional, a change in state
law is also highly likely. Although the Sands majority held that reli-
gious invocations violate the federal Constitution, only three justices
held that the invocations independently violated the state constitu-
tion. 72 Thus, the California Supreme Court is likely to re-examine
whether religious invocations violate the state constitution, and will
probably permit invocations on state grounds. 73 This state approval
of graduation prayer, in conjunction with the likely federal approval,
will establish the constitutionality of religious invocations at public
school graduations in California.
VI. CONCLUSION
The divisiveness reflected in the majority, concurring, and dissent-
ing opinions reveals the gradual change from a complete "wall of sep-
aration" between church and state to a "blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier."74 Although the United States Supreme Court's
probable approval of graduation invocations seems insignificant,
"[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too
soon become a raging torrent," 7 5 resulting in further intermingling
169. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 809 P.2d at 853, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. at 882, 809 P.2d at 819-20, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
171. Id. at 883-84, 809 P.2d at 821, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
172. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 931, 809 P.2d at 853, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
173. In May 1990, State Attorney General Daniel Lungren asked the California
Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in Sands after the United States Supreme
Court rules on invocations in Lee v. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908
F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991), in early 1992. Phillip Ha-
ger, Court is Asked to Set Aside Its Graduation Prayer Ruling, L.A. TIMES, May 24,
1991, at A41.
174. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
175. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
of church and state through prayer in schools or other forms of inte-
gration. Courts considering Establishment Clause issues may wish to
revisit the admonition from Lemon that "[a] certain momentum de-
velops in constitutional theory... [which] can be a 'downhill thrust'
easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop."176 Thus, govern-
ment infringements on religious freedom which remain unchecked
today may result in insurmountable government infringements in the
future.
CHRISTINA KATRIS
IV. CORPORATION LAW
A dissolved corporation remains subject to suit for harm
resulting from the corporation's predissolution activities
discovered after dissolution: Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior
Court
In Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court,1 the California Supreme
Court unanimously held that plaintiffs may bring suit against a dis-
solved corporation for defect or harm that is caused by the corpora-
tion's predissolution actions but is discovered after statutory
dissolution.2 The court interpreted California Corporations Code sec-
tion 2010(a), 3 which provides that "a corporation which is dissolved,
nevertheless continues to exist for the defending of actions by or
against it," 4 to eliminate any distinction between pre- and post-disso-
lution causes of action against a dissolved corporation.5
176. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
1. 53 Cal. 3d 1180, 812 P.2d 154, 283 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1991). Homeowners brought
actions for construction defects against Penasquitos, Inc. and Crow Pacific Develop-
ment Corporation. Crow Pacific built homes on lots graded by Penasquitos. The earli-
est damages were discovered more than three years after both Penasquitos and Crow
Pacific's statutory dissolution. The trial court overruled Penasquitos' demurrer and
denied Crow Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both Penasquitos and
Crow Pacific petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of mandamus. The court of ap-
peal consolidated the two actions and granted the petition, holding that a dissolved cor-
poration could not be sued on claims that arose after dissolution. Id at 1183, 812 P.2d
at 155, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
2. Justice Kennard authored the opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Jus-
tices Mosk, Broussard, Panelli, Arabian and Baxter concurred.
3. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010(a) (West 1990).
4. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West 1990). The court articulated this point by
referencing California Corporations Code section 2011(b), which provides for the ser-
vice of summons on a dissolved corporation. Penasquitos, 53 Cal. 3d at 1185-86, 812
P.2d at 157, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 138. See generally Robert Morrow, Comment on Recent
Cases, 4 CAL. L. REv. 409 (1916) (regarding Lewelly Iron Works v. Kinney, 51 Cal. 287,
155 P. 986 (1916)). See also 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §§ 2882, 2905-07 (1986).
5. Penasquitos, 53 Cal. 3d at 1185, 812 P.2d at 157, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 138. The court
commented, "[lilt would be incongruous to allow a corporation that exists for purposes
of defending actions and discharging obligations to defend a lawsuit on the basis that it
did not exist." Id. at 1186, 812 P.2d at 157, Cal. Rptr. at 138.
[Vol. 19: 733, 1992] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The court set forth three reasons for its literal construction of the
statutory phrase: (1) plaintiff's suit against a dissolved corporation on
a post-dissolution claim does not disrupt the distribution of assets to
shareholders;6 (2) courts have repeatedly construed the phrase to
permit parties to bring suit against dissolved corporations; 7 and (3)
evidence of the legislature's intent to literally interpret the phrase is
available, as illustrated by contrasting section 2010's lack of distinc-
tion between pre- and post-dissolution claims8 and section 2011(a), 9
which limits post-dissolution actions against dissolved corporations'
shareholders to those claims filed prior to the corporation's
dissolution.10
In its reading of the phrase, "a dissolved corporation continues to
exist," the court demonstrated that a corporation's dissolution is
more a change in its business activities than a change in its "status.""
It is likely, however, that many plaintiffs' claims against dissolved
6. Id. at 1191, 812 P.2d at 160-61, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42. The dissolved corpora-
tion's shareholders have a right in finality and repose after they recover their invest-
ments. Id. Their right is respected in this and similar cases because the distribution of
a corporation's assets occurs before dissolution. Id. Also, once the shareholders re-
cover their investments, the assets are outside the reach of claims arising after dissolu-
tion. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West 1990). See also 9 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations §§ 214, 222 (9th ed. 1989).
7. The supreme court noted two court of appeal cases in its analysis: North Amer-
ican Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 225 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1986),
and Allen v. Southland Plumbing, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 60, 246 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1988).
In North American Asbestos, the court held that under California Corporations Code
section 2010, the plaintiffs' asbestos-related claims, which arose after the defendant's
dissolution, could not be barred by any time limitation other than the applicable stat-
ute of limitations. North American Asbestos Corp., 180 Cal. App. 3d at 904, 179 Cal.
Rptr. at 877. In Allen, a dissolved corporation was subject to suit on a cross-complaint
filed after the corporation's dissolution. Allen, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 246 Cal. Rptr. at
862. Based on these two cases, the supreme court stated that section 2010 enabled par-
ties to sue dissolved corporations. Penasquitos, 53 Cal. 3d at 1188, 812 P.2d at 159, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 140.
8. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010 (West 1990).
9. Section 2011(a) provides:
In all cases where a corporation has been dissolved, the shareholders may be
sued in the corporate name of such corporation upon any cause of action
against the corporation arising prior to dissolution.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(West 1990).
10. Thus, the court construed the legislature's use and subsequent omission of this
restrictive language, in sections 2011 and 2010 respectively, as an intention to allow suit
against dissolved corporations on both pre- and post-dissolution activities. Penasquitos,
53 Cal. 3d at 1188, 812 P.2d at 159, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 140. See also People v. Valentine,
28 Cal. 2d 121, 142, 169 P.2d 1, 14 (1946) ("where a statute with reference to one subject
contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute con-
cerning a related subject.., is significant to show a different intention existed").
11. Penasquitos, 53 Cal. 3d at 1190, 812 P.2d at 160, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
corporations will prove pyrrhic because the corporation's assets will
have been distributed to the shareholders upon the corporation's dis-
solution.12 Thus, post-dissolution actions will most likely prove suc-
cessful where there is potential "recovery from the dissolved
corporation's liability insurance,' 3 from undistributed assets, or from
the corporation's assets discovered after dissolution."'14 The extent to
which a dissolved corporation remains subject to suit on post-dissolu-
tion claims arising from pre-dissolution activites is, presently, well-
prescribed and not soon to be revisited.15
DEAN THOMAS TRIGGS
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A person's driver's license may not be suspended or
revoked for refusing to submit to chemical testing
following an arrest for driving under the influence of
drugs or alcohol unless the arresting officer observed
volitional movement of the vehicle: Mercer v. Department
of Motor Vehicles.
In Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles,' the California
Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the courts of appeal2 re-
12. See supra note 6. The court also discounted a possible equitable trust-fund
claim against shareholders of a dissolved corporation, observing, "by enacting [sec-
tion] .... 2011, subsection (a), the Legislature has occupied the field of creditors' reme-
dies against the shareholders of the dissolved corporations, to the exclusion of the
equitable trust fund doctrine." Id at 1193, 812 P.2d at 162, 283 Cal. Rptr. 143.
13. Id. at 1192, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 142, 283 P.2d at 161. The argument that corporate
dissolution provides a reason to excuse the insurer from defending the action was dis-
missed, because a corporation's insolvency or bankruptcy does not excuse the insurer
from paying subsequent money damages. Id See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(1) (West
1988).
14. Penasquitos, 53 Cal. 3d at 1191, 812 P.2d at 161, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
15. See generally 3 HAROLD MARSCH JR., CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 21.31
(3d ed. 1990).
1. 53 Cal. 3d 753, 809 P.2d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1991). A police officer found
Barrie Gray Mercer in the driver's seat of a legally parked car with the engine running
and the headlights on. Although Mercer attempted to put the car into gear, the vehi-
cle did not move in the officer's presence. The officer arrested Mercer for driving
under the influence of alcohol and informed him that he was obligated to take a chem-
ical test under the implied consent law. Mercer refused to submit to any chemical
testing, thereby incurring the statutory penalty of driver's license revocation.
The trial court granted Mercer's petition for a writ of mandate, reversing the revoca-
tion order on the ground that Mercer's arrest was unlawful because the officer did not
see Mercer's vehicle move and therefore Mercer was not driving while intoxicated.
The court of appeal reversed and ordered reinstatement of the revocation order. The
California Supreme Court granted review. Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
798 P.2d 1212, 274 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1990). Chief Justice Lucas wrote the opinion for the
court, in which Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Jus-
tice Broussard, without writing separately, concurred in the judgment.
2. Compare Music v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 221 Cal. App. 3d 840, 270
Cal. Rptr. 692 (1990) (finding observed volitional movement of a vehicle necessary for
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garding interpretation of the implied consent statute3 and associated
license revocation statutes4 by construing the phrase "to drive a vehi-
cle" within sections 23152(a) 5 and 231536 of the Vehicle Code as re-
quiring evidence of volitional vehicular movement by the driver.7
The court emphasized that, pursuant to section 836, subdivision 1, of
the Penal Code,8 lawful arrest for a misdemeanor offense, such as
driving under the influence, requires that the arresting officer per-
ceive or witness the commission of the crime. 9 Because the peti-
valid license suspension or revocation for failure to submit to chemical testing) and
Padilla v. Meese, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1986) (holding that arrest
pursuant to section 23152(a) of the Vehicle Code for driving under the influence is un-
lawful unless the vehicle moves in the arresting officer's presence) with Mercer v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, 222 Cal. App. 3d 823, 271 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1990)
(interpreting the term "drive" within the meaning of the implied consent statute as
encompassing acts of vehicular manipulation without actual movement), rev'd, 53 Cal.
3d 753, 809 P.2d 404, 280 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1991).
3. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157 (West Supp. 1991). Section 23157(a)(1) provides in rel-
evant part:
Any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her
consent to chemical testing of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the pur-
pose of determining the alcoholic [or drug] content of his or her blood .. . if
lawfully arrested for any offense allegedly committed in violation of Section
23152 or 23153.
4. Californial's driver's license suspension and revocation provisions are located in
sections 13353 and 23157 of the Vehicle Code. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 13353, 23157 (West
Supp. 1991). Both sections allow the Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend or re-
voke a driver's license for various periods of time, depending upon prior drunk driving
offenses, after refusal to submit to, or failure to complete, chemical testing under the
implied consent law, if the officer had "reasonable cause to believe the person was
driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23152 or 23153." CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23157(a)(1). See also § 13353. See generally 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 164.16 (1969 &
Supp. 1990) (discussion of implied consent and license revocation statutes).
5. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(a) (West Supp. 1991). Section 23152, subdivision (a),
provides: "It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of an alcoholic bev-
erage [and/]or any drug ... to drive a vehicle." (Emphasis added).
6. CAL. VEI. CODE § 23153 (West Supp. 1991). Section 23153, subdivision (a)
states:
It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of... [intoxicants], to
drive a vehicle and, when so driving, do any act forbidden by law or neglect
any duty imposed by law in the driving of the vehicle, which act or neglect
proximately causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver.
Id. at § 23153(a) (emphasis added).
7. Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 53 Cal. 3d 753, 768, 809 P.2d 404, 414,
280 Cal. Rptr. 745, 755 (1991).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(1) (West 1985). See generally 5 B. WITKIN & N. EP-
STEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Proceedings Before Trial 1928 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp.
1991) (discussing the "presence" requirement of section 836, subdivision 1). See also in-
fra note 9 (additional sources).
9. Mercer, 53 Cal. 3d at 761, 809 P.2d at 408, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 749. See generally
20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2402 (1985) (discussing section 836, subdivision 1, of
the Penal Code); Annotation, What Amounts to Violation of Drunken Driving Statute
tioner's car remained stationary in the arresting officer's presence,
the court concluded that his arrest for drunk driving under section
23152(a) was unlawful and, consequently, the revocation of his
driver's license for noncompliance with the implied consent law was
improper.'o
The court set forth three reasons for its narrow construction of the
statutory phrase: (1) the traditional and ordinary understanding of
the term "drive" necessarily entails vehicular movement;" (2) the
use of the word "drive" and like terms in related statutes evidences
the legislature's intent to distinguish the act of driving from operat-
ing or physically controlling a vehicle;12 and (3) numerous court deci-
sions in other states have interpreted the term "drive" and similar
words in drunk driving statutes as requiring a defendant's volitional
movement of the vehicle.1
By defining the phrase "to drive a vehicle" as requiring evidence of
observed volitional movement of a vehicle, the court restricted the
utility of the license revocation provisions as used in conjunction with
in Officer's "Presence" or "View" so as to Permit Warrantless Arrest, 74 A.L.R. 3D
1138 (1976) (discussing "presence" requirement).
10. Mercer, 53 Cal. 3d at 769, 809 P.2d at 414, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 755. The court
stated that application of the license suspension or revocation provisions within sec-
tions 13353 and 23157 of the Vehicle Code is conditioned upon a lawful arrest for driv-
ing while intoxicated. Id. at 760, 809 P.2d at 408, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (citing Music v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 221 Cal. App. 3d 841, 847, 270 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696 (1990);
Padilla v. Meese, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1026, 229 Cal. Rptr. 310, 312 (1986); Henslee v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 168 Cal. App. 3d 445, 451, 214 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (1985);
Mueller v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 163 Cal. App. 3d 681, 684, 210 Cal. Rptr. 14,
15 (1985); Buttimer v. Alexis, 146 Cal. App. 3d 754, 758, 194 Cal. Rptr. 603, 605 (1983);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West Supp. 1991)). See also Behan v. Alexis, 116 Cal. App.
3d 403, 172 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 (1981); Shackelton v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46
Cal. App. 3d 327, 330-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. 921, 923 (1975).
11. Mercer, 53 Cal. 3d at 763, 809 P.2d at 410, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The supreme
court observed that because the drunk driving statutes are penal in nature, the phrase
"to drive a vehicle" must be given a narrow interpretation. Id. See generally 8 CAL.
JUR. 3D Automobiles § 309 at 298 (1973) (discussion of the term "driving" and its nar-
row interpretation); 2 B. WrIKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes
Against Public Peace and Welfare, § 918 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing "driving" within
drunk driving statutes).
12. Mercer, 53 Cal. 3d at 763-64, 809 P.2d at 410, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The court
noted several statutes in which the legislature used the disjunctive "or" to differenti-
ate between driving and other acts of vehicular manipulation. Id. (citing CAL. VEH.
CODE §§ 305, 13353.2, 12501(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1991)).
13. The court relied primarily upon the South Carolina case State v. Graves, 269
S.C. 356, 237 S.E.2d 584 (1977). The Graves court reasoned that the word "drive" in
South Carolina's drunk driving statutes requires observed vehicular movement for the
offense to be committed because the overwhelming majority of states have either re-
tained the single prohibition of "driving," interpreting the term as requiring evidence
of vehicular movement, or have broadened their statute to include "operating" or "be-
ing in physical control" of a vehicle. Mercer, 53 Cal. 3d at 764-68, 809 P.2d at 410-14,
280 Cal. Rptr. at 751-55. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Driving, Operat-
ing or Being in Control of Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated
Statute or Ordinance, 93 A.L.R. 3D 7 (1979 & Supp. 1990).
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California's implied consent law. The court's decision indicates its
unwillingness to interpret broadly a penal statute even where public
policy favoring deterrence militates otherwise. 14 The statutory con-
struction provided by the court may, however, trigger prompt legisla-
tive revision of the relevant statutes to allow the mere operation of a
vehicle to constitute a violation of drunk driving law.i5
SUSAN L. SPARKs
B. In determining liability as an aider and abettor to
robbery, a robbery is not confined to a fixed place or time
but continues so long as the stolen property is being
carried away to a place of temporary safety. People v.
Cooper.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Cooper,' the California Supreme Court addressed
whether a "getaway" driver in a robbery was culpable as a principal
rather than accessory, where the driver had not formed the requisite
intent to facilitate or encourage commission of the robbery prior to
the robber's flight with the stolen property.2 The court held that the
driver may be convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery,3 and thus
14. Mercer, 53 Cal. 3d at 768-69, 809 P.2d at 414, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 755. See supra
note 11.
15. The court invited the legislature to revise the drunk driving laws and even
supplied several options for broadening the offense of driving while intoxicated to in-
clude situations in which an officer does not see the arrestee's vehicle move. See Mer-
cer, 53 Cal. 3d at 769 & n.24, 809 P.2d at 414 & n.24, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 755 & n.24.
1. 53 Cal. 3d 1158, 811 P.2d 742, 282 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Arabian and Baxter con-
curred. Justice Kennard wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Mosk and
Broussard joined.
2. Defendant Cooper drove his two codefendants to a shopping mall where he
waited several minutes while the codefendants stole a wallet from a shopper. The co-
defendants ran with the stolen property and entered Cooper's car which was moving
with its two right doors open. Cooper was charged as a principal in the robbery based
on an aiding and abetting theory. Cooper claimed he was an accessory after the fact.
Defendant Cooper was found guilty as a principal at the trial level, but this decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeal which determined that the trial court had erred
in instructing that a robbery was ongoing until the perpetrator had effected an escape.
The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve a conflict in the courts of
appeal regarding the duration of the commission of robbery. Id at 1161-62, 811 P.2d at
745-46, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54.
3. 1& at 1161, 811 P.2d at 745, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 453. See People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.
3d 547, 561, 674 P.2d 1318, 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 68 (1984). In Beeman, the California
Supreme Court determined that a person aids and abets the commission of a crime
when that person, "acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetra-
may be considered a principal 4 rather than a mere accessory after the
fact.5 In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the durational
aspect of robbery6 and concluded that the commission of a robbery is
not confined to a fixed place or a limited period of time.7 Instead, the
crime of robbery continues so long as the stolen property is being car-
ried away to a place of "temporary safety."s Therefore, a getaway
driver may be held liable for aiding and abetting a robbery if he
forms the requisite intent either before or during the asportation of
the stolen property to a place of temporary safety.9
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
1. Duration of the Commission of Robbery
The court prefaced its analysis by stating that the question had ear-
lier been "expressly left open" as to the culpability of a getaway
driver who formed the requisite intent to aid and abet qfter the rob-
bers' entry into the getaway car.10 The court then applied the ele-
tor; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the com-
mission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the
commission of a crime." Id. For a discussion of this topic, see Westerfield, The Mens
Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law - Knowledge or
Intent, 51 Miss. L.J. 155 (1980). See also 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 105 (1980).
4. California Penal Code section 31 defines principals as:
"All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the of-
fense or aid and abet in its commission, or not being present, have advised and
encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encourag-
ing children under the age of fourteen years, lunatics or idiots, to commit any
crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of an-
other for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats,
menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime...."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1988). See also 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 104-04
(1985).
5. Cooper, 53 Cal, 3d at 1165, 811 P.2d at 748, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 456. California Pe-
nal Code section 32 defines an accessory as:
"Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or
aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that
said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such a fel-
ony, or convicted thereof .. "
CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 1988). For an overview of party liability, see generally
W. LA FAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw §§ 63-66 (1972). See also 17
CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 110 (1980).
6. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1164, 811 P.2d at 747, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455. Although the
court recognized that a robbery has been "committed" for purposes of "guilt establish-
ment" once the requisite elements have been met, it distinguishes this from the actual
"commission" of robbery which is ongoing until all acts have "ceased." Id,
7. Id. at 1165, 811 P.2d at 748, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 456. See infra note 16 and accom-
panying text.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Id at 1164, 811 P.2d at 747, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455 (citing People v. Croy, 41 Cal.
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ments of aiding and abetting" to the commission of robbery and
determined that a robbery is ongoing until every individual element
has "ceased."12 Although the crime of robbery has two requisite ele-
ments, (1) the actual gaining of possession of the stolen property; and
(2) the carrying away of that property,13 the court enunciated that
the focus for determining the duration of the robbery must necessar-
ily be on the asportation element.14 Relying on a line of undisturbed
courts of appeal cases dealing with the durational concepts of rob-
bery,' 5 the court concluded that asportation does not end merely
upon "slight movement,"'1 but rather continues while the stolen
property is being carried away.17
2. Definition of "Immediate Presence"
The court determined that the use of "immediate presence" in sec-
3d 1, 15 n.9, 710 P.2d 392, 400 n.9, 221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 n.9 (1985) (raising whether a
person may be classified as an aider and abettor where there was no prior knowledge
of robbery)).
11. Id. See supra note 3.
12. Cooper, 5S Cal. 3d at 1164, 811 P.2d at 747, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455. To distinguish
between "committed" and "commission," the majority set forth the following
illustration:
The rape victim, for example, would not agree that the crime was completed
once the crime was initially committed (i.e., at the point of initial penetra-
tion). Rather, the offense does not end until all of the acts that constitute the
rape have ceased. Furthermore, the unknowing defendant who happens on
the scene of a rape after the rape has been initially committed and aids the
perpetrator in the continuing criminal acts is an accomplice under this con-
cept of 'commission,' because he formed his intent to facilitate the commission
of the rape during its commission.
Id. at 1164 n.7, 811 P.2d at 747 n.7, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455 n.7.
13. Id. at 1165, 811 P.2d at 747, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455. California Penal Code section
211 defines robbery as "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by
means of force or fear." CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1988).
14. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1165, 811 P.2d at 747-48, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56. See gen-
erally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Property § 641 (2nd ed.
1988).
15. See, e.g., People v. Estes, 147 Cal. App. 3d 23, 194 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1983) (robbery
continues until perpetrator reaches "temporary safety"); People v. Kent, 125 Cal. App.
3d 207, 178 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1981) (striking victim following taking); People v. Perhab, 92
Cal. App. 2d 430 (1949) (escape achieved by force or fear).
16. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1165, 811 P.2d at 748, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 456. Although the
majority acknowledged that "slight movement" satisfies the asportation element of
robbery, it is not definitive as to the duration of the commission of the crime. Id,
Compare People v. Beal, 3 Cal. App. 2d 251, 253, 39 P.2d 504, 506 (holding that a rob-
bery is complete upon the unlawful gaining of possession of personal property). See
also People v. Scott, 170 Cal. App. 3d 267, 215 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1985); People v. Gordon,
136 Cal. App. 3d 519, 186 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1982).
17. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1165, 811 P.2d at 748, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
tion 21118 does not imply that a robbery ends once the stolen prop-
erty is removed from the victim.19 The court reasoned that section
211 is "spatially rather than temporally, descriptive." 20 Therefore,
the court determined that the "immediate presence" language of sec-
tion 211 is applicable only to the first element of robbery and not to
the asportation component.2 '
3. Rejection of the "Escape Rule"
The majority also refused to extend the "escape rule" for the pur-
pose of establishing aider and abettor liability.22 Although the escape
rule originated with the felony-murder doctrine, the court noted that
it has also been applied "to several other ancillary consequences of
robbery." 23 The court rationalized, however, that the policy of deter-
rence would not be advanced by imposing aider and abettor liability
to a getaway driver where that driver had no previous knowledge of
the robbery.24 Moreover, because escape is not a requisite element of
robbery, it should not be considered in a durational analysis for es-
tablishing aider and abettor liability.25 Finally, the court warned
against an overly broad application of the escape rule and emphasized
several courts of appeal decisions that refused to adopt the escape
rule in determining aider and abettor liability.26
18. Id. at 1166, 811 P.2d at 749, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 457. See supra note 13.
19. Id,
20. Id. See, e.g., People v. Hayes, 52 Cal. 3d 577, 802 P.2d 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 874
(1990) (immediate presence is area over which victim has control); People v. Bauer, 241
Cal. App. 2d 632, 50 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1966) (immediate presence found where robber
took keys from victim inside house, then went outside and took car).
21. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1166, 811 P.2d at 748, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
22. Id. Although the majority admitted that the commission of a robbery could
overlap with escape to a safe place, this will not always be the case. For example, sto-
len property might be abandoned before the escape is effected or an alternative get-
away car could be employed. Id.
23. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1166, 811 P.2d at 749, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 457. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Laursen, 8 Cal. 3d 192, 200, 501 P.2d 1145, 1152, 104 Cal. Rptr. 425, 431 (1972)
(robbery is ongoing during "the robber's escape to a place of temporary safety"); Peo-
ple v. Carroll, 1 Cal. 3d 581, 586, 463 P.2d 400, 405, 83 Cal. Rptr. 176, 181 (1970) (robbery
does not end with merely gaining possession of the stolen property).
24. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1167-68, 811 P.2d at 749, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 457 ("A getaway
driver, whose intent to aid in the escape is formed after asportation has ceased, cannot
facilitate or encourage commission of the robbery.") Id at 1168, 811 P.2d at 750, 282
Cal. Rptr. at 458. The court, however, noted that the situation would be different if
the getaway driver had agreed to be the driver prior to the commission of the robbery.
ICl
25. Id. at 1169, 811 P.2d at 750, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
26. Id. The court analogized robbery with burglary for purposes of applying the
escape rule, asserting that "one who forms the intent to aid a burglar after the acts
constituting the burglary have ceased cannot be liable as an aider and abettor to the
burglary." Id (citing People v. Macedo, 213 Cal. App. 3d 554, 261 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1989);
People v. Brady, 190 Cal. App. 3d 124, 235 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1987)).
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B. Dissenting Opinion
In her dissent, Justice Kennard criticized the majority for ignoring
the time honored legislative intent of assigning less culpability to one
who merely aids the perpetrator after the offense.27 Justice Kennard
stressed that the majority's adoption of the "temporary safety" test
had no basis in law.28 She questioned the majority's analysis, noting
that the effect of the "temporary safety" test closely resembled that
of the "escape rule" which the majority soundly rejected.29 More-
over, Justice Kennard asserted that case law has held that "only
slight asportation is necessary to make the crime of robbery com-
plete."30 Finally, Justice Kennard set forth several hypothetical situ-
ations to illustrate the inherent "anomalies" that might occur as a
result of the majority's holding.31
III. CONCLUSION
By determining that the crime of robbery continues so long as the
stolen property is being carried away to a place of temporary safety,
the California Supreme Court has taken a significant step in enlarg-
ing the scope of aider and abettor liability. The majority's premise
that the commission of robbery must be viewed as a temporal contin-
uum is logical; however, the practical effect may lead to inconsistent
determinations of the accused's culpability.
ANDREA L. WILSON
27. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1171, 811 P.2d at 752, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 459 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). "Merely aiding in the escape of a principal does not result in liability as a
principal, but only as an accessory under Penal Code sections 32 and 33." 1& at 1172,
811 P.2d at 753, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Hoover,
12 Cal. 3d 875, 879, 528 P.2d 760, 763, 117 Cal. Rptr. 672, 675 (1974)). See supra notes 3-5
and accompanying text.
28. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1173-74, 811 P.2d at 753-54, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62 (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting). See People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 957-58, 544 P.2d 1335,
1338, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (1976) (a person who aids the escape of a robbery is merely
an accessory after -the fact, even if the perpetrator had possession of the stolen goods at
the time the aid was given).
29. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1173, 811 P.2d at 753, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennard asserted there is no tangible difference between the "es-
cape" rule and the majority's wording of "a place of temporary safety." Consequently,
she argued that "[a]n escaping felon who is carrying stolen property is still an escaping
felon, and a person who aids an escaping felon is an accessory after the fact." Id
30. 1I at 1174, 811 P.2d at 755, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 462 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See
also supra note 16.
31. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1176-77, 811 P.2d at 756, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
C. A patient found not guilty by reason of insanity and
committed to a state hospital may not demand a jury
trial to determine whether the patient is eligible for
supervised outpatient placement in a community mental
health program: People v. Tilbury.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Tilbury,' the California Supreme Court held that a pa-
tient found not guilty by reason of insanity is entitled to a jury trial
only at the second stage sanity-restoration hearing, not at the first
stage outpatient placement hearing. Section 1026.2(e) of the Califor-
nia Penal Code requires that a patient committed to a state hospital
after being found not guilty by reason of insanity must be adjudged
no longer dangerous in a superior court hearing and must spend a
year in an approved community mental health program as a super-
vised outpatient before the patient may apply for a sanity restoration
trial.2 Although the court affirmed its prior holding in In re Frank-
lin3 that the sanity restoration hearing, where the patient's recovery
is pronounced and unconditional release is granted, must be by jury
unless waived, the Tilbury court held that neither the legislature nor
constitutional principles mandate a jury trial at the antecedent outpa-
tient placement hearing.4
In April 1984, appellant Michael Tilbury, a former mental hospital
patient, engaged in a shooting spree while under delusions that he
was being attacked by secret organizations, microwaves, and poisoned
water supplies. 5 Tilbury plead guilty to six counts of attempted mur-
der, three counts of assault with a firearm, and three counts of as-
saulting a police officer with a firearm,6 but maintained that he was
1. 54 Cal. 3d 56, 813 P.2d 1318, 284 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1991). Justice Panelli authored
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard, Arabian
and Baxter concurred. Justice Mosk dissented in an opinion in which Justice Kennard
joined in part.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). See also 41 AM. Jun.
2D Incompetent Persons § 39 (1968) (discussing proceedings for commitment and not-
ing that such proceedings are not designed to be adversarial to the extent of criminal
proceedings).
3. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 148, 496 P.2d 465, 479, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 567 (1972).
4. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 70, 813 P.2d at 1327, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 297. Section
1026.2(e) of the California Penal Code provides, in pertinent part:
The court shall hold a hearing to determine if the person applying for restora-
tion of sanity would no longer be a danger to the health and safety of others,
including himself or herself, if under supervision and treatment in the com-
munity. If the court at the hearing determines the applicant [meets this stan-
dard], the court shall order the applicant placed with an appropriate local
mental health program for one year.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
5. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 59, 813 P.2d at 1319, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
6. Id Tilbury attempted to kill several people, including police officers, with a
.22-caliber rifle, but fortunately succeeded in injuring only one person. Id
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insane at the time of the incidents. 7 The court found him not guilty
by reason of insanity and sentenced him to serve a maximum term of
23 years and 8 months at Patton State Hospital. 8 Three times in 1986
and 1987 the director of the hospital recommended that Tilbury was
ready for supervised outpatient treatment, but each time the county
mental health director refused to endorse the recommendation to the
court.9 Accordingly, outpatient placement was denied in each in-
stance.10 Finally, Tilbury applied for supervised outpatient place-
ment on his own behalf, and requested a jury trial on the issue."
The trial court judge denied Tilbury's request for a jury trial, and
based upon Tilbury's testimony that he had recently experienced a
delusion similar to one which preceded his 1984 shooting binge, the
judge denied Tilbury's application for supervised outpatient
treatment.12
The court of appeal reversed the decision and remanded the matter
for a jury trial.i3 The supreme court reversed, superseding the court
of appeal's decision.14
7. Tilbury bore the burden of raising the question of, and proving, his insanity.
See People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 564, 268 P.2d 705, 714 (1954); People v. Daugherty,
40 Cal. 2d 876, 900-01, 256 P.2d 911, 925 (1953). See also 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 4
(1945) (discussing general rule that the party alleging insanity bears the burden of
proving it). See generally Michelle M. Gee, Annotation, Modern Status of Test of
Criminal Responsibility-State Cases, 9 A.L.R. 4TH 526 (1981) (discussing the theory of
insanity as an excuse for conduct which would otherwise constitute a crime).
8. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 59, 813 P.2d at 1319, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 289. Based on psy-
chiatric evaluations, the trial court determined Tilbury's insanity at the time of the
crimes without submitting the question to a jury since Tilbury waived his right. Id.
Approximately a month and a half later, the court reviewed further psychiatric re-
ports and determined that Tilbury had not regained sanity. Id. The court's 23-year
and eight-month maximum term of commitment represented the longest term of im-
prisonment which could have been imposed for the offenses committed by Tilbury.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(a)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). See In re Moye, 22 Cal.
3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978) (recommitment is required if the insane
offender is to be kept in confinement past the maximum term for underlying offense).
However, if Tilbury recovered his sanity he need not remain confined for the maxi-
mum term. Tilbury could be released any time after a mandatory 180-day commit-
ment period, if he demonstrated his fitness for release during one year spent in a
supervised community mental health program and then in a sanity restoration trial.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(d)&(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
9. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 59-60, 813 P.2d at 1319, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
10. Section 1602 of the California Penal Code requires that the court disapprove
outpatient status in situations where the county mental health director does not advise
the court that the patient will benefit from the status. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 1601(a), 1602(a)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
11. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 60, 813 P.2d at 1319, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
12. Id. at 60, 813 P.2d at 1319-20, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
13. 1d. at 60, 813 P.2d at 1318, 284 Cal. Rptr. 288.
14. Id at 70, 813 P.2d at 1327, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Tilbury argued that although the legislature did not
explicitly provide for jury trials on the issue of outpatient placement,
its intent to grant the right should be implicitly inferred.15 Tilbury
noted that in the 1972 case In re Franklin 16 the California Supreme
Court held, under a previous section 1026 which used the word "hear-
ing," a patient could require jury adjudication of sanity-restoration.17
Tilbury argued the term "hearing" used by the legislature in the 1984
amendment to section 1026, which created the outpatient phase,
should accordingly be interpreted to mean "jury trial."18 The
supreme court rejected Tilbury's reasoning.19 The court character-
ized the term "hearing" as "generic" and maintained that it could
find no compelling evidence that the legislature intended the term to
read as a requirement for a jury trial at the outpatient placement
phase.2 0 The court argued that had the legislature intended jury tri-
als at the outpatient placement phase "it knew how to say so
clearly." 21
The supreme court next addressed whether constitutional law gave
Tilbury the right to a jury trial at the outpatient phase. Examining
the equal protection concern that criminal patients receive compara-
ble treatment to civil patients, the court held that equal protection
15. Id. at 61, 813 P.2d at 1321, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
16. 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972). The court in Franklin
held that committed persons had a constitutional right to require jury adjudication of
sanity restoration under the then ambiguous wording of section 1026, stating in perti-
nent part:
[We are convinced ... that petitioner is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial
on the question of his (sanity restoration] release, should he request it. It is
noteworthy that section 1026a does not, by its terms, preclude a jury trial, and
at least one court has assumed that [the section provides for constitutional
rights at the section 1026a hearing.]
Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d at 149, 496 P.2d at 479, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 567 (citing In re Jones, 260
Cal. App. 2d 906, 911 n.3, 68 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36 n.3 (1968)).
17. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 61, 813 P.2d at 1321, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 62, 813 P.2d at 1321, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The court found Tilbury's rea-
soning defective because the Franklin decision rested solely on a due process analysis,
rather than interpretation of the statutory term "hearing." Id. See Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d
at 148-49, 496 P.2d at 479-80, 101 Cal. Rptr. 567-68.
20. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 62, 813 P.2d at 1321, 284 Cal. Rptr. at.291.
21. Id. at 61, 813 P.2d at 1320, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 290. The court also stated that the
1984 legislative amendment of section 1026 attempted to make release requirements
"stricter." Id. at 62-63, 813 P.2d at 1321, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The court thus viewed
its position as consistent with the apparent legislative attitude. Id Accord James W.
Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-acquittal
Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 961, 961-62 (1986); Janet L. Polstein, Note,
Throwing Away The Key: Due Process Rights Of Insanity Acquittees in Jones v.
United States, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (1985) (describing widespread attempts to
reform and constrict the insanity defense in the wake of the acquittal of John Hinkley
Jr. for the attempted assassination of President Reagan).
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principles did not require jury trials since both "civil and criminal
committees enjoy the right to jury trials at the same stages of the
commitment process."22 Similarly, the court examined Tilbury's
rights under due process principles, weighing three factors: (1)
whether the private interest in liberty required a jury trial,23 (2)
whether the risk of erroneous decision by a judge required a jury
trial, and (3) whether the government's interest in avoiding the bur-
den of a jury trial was significant.24 The court concluded that a judge
would be capable of reliably protecting a patient's interest in liberty
while protecting the state's valid interest in avoiding the cost of un-
necessary jury trials.25 In the remote chance that a superior court
judge unfairly extended a patient's commitment, the court noted the
patient would retain the recourse of direct appeal and writ of habeas
corpus.26 Thus, denying Tilbury jury trial did not offend due
process. 2 7
In dissent, Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that the use of
the term "hearing" in section 1026 is generic in the sense that it does
not specify whether a jury or a judge is to adjudicate the proceed-
ing.28 However, using the same logic as the majority, he argued that
had the legislature intended that only a judge should hear petitions
for outpatient placement it could have expressly "specified that only
a judge would hear the case."29 Justice Mosk further argued that Til-
22. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 68, 813 P.2d at 1325, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 295. See also Jones
v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 n.10 (1983) (equal protection was not offended where
an insanity acquittee enjoyed the right to jury trials in both the criminal trial and civil
commitment hearings).
23. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 69, 813 P.2d at 1326, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 296. On this point
the court noted that juries have been found unnecessary in analogous proceedings hav-
ing the potential to remove liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89
(1972) (discussing the due process requirements in parole revocation hearings); McK-
eiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541-51 (1971) (juries not required in juvenile
proceedings).
24. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 69, 813 P.2d at 1326, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
25. Id,
26. Id at 70 n.11, 813 P.2d at 1327 n.11, 284 Cal. Rptr. 297 n.11. The court empha-
sized that there is no reason to believe that judges will maliciously manipulate the
commitment proceedings. IdA. The court labeled a comparison of California's commit-
ment system to a "gulag," as "vastly overstated" in light of the inherent mechanisms to
ensure procedural integrity. Id. (citing Barnes v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 969,
977, 231 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1986)) (Poche, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 70, 813 P.2d at 1326-27, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97.
28. Id at 75-76, 813 P.2d at 1330-31, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 300-01 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. Id at 76, 813 P.2d at 1331, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk supported his position by stating that the legislature was aware of the supreme
court's decision in Franklin that section 1026(a) did not preclude a jury trial. Further,
the legislature knew that Franklin required a jury trial at the sanity-restoration
bury had a constitutional right to a jury trial, declaring the majority
opinion offended equal protection principles because a criminally
committed patient may be required to wait decades3 0 for jury deter-
mination of outpatient placement, while a civilly committed patient
may be entitled to a jury trial in a matter of months.31 He also as-
serted the majority opinion offended due process principles because it
supported jury adjudication at the sanity-restoration stage while,
ironically, making the ability to reach the sanity-restoration stage de-
pend upon a judge's decision at the antecedent outpatient stage.32
Consequently, Justice Mosk contended the decision "arbitrarily" de-
nied Tilbury the right to a jury trial at the most critical point on the
road to his freedom. 33
III. CONCLUSION
This decision indicates that since a criminal committee is given the
right to jury trial at the ultimate sanity-restoration hearing, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court is willing to grant the legislature wide license
to decide proper collateral procedures for evaluating sanity. Where
the legislature has indicated unwillingness to allow a patient to ob-
tain a jury at a placement hearing, the court announced it will re-
phase. Thus, the legislature's refusal to modify its wording in its 1984 amendment of
section 1026 means at least that it had no intention of requiring that a judge "necessar-
ily" decide a patient's sanity at an outpatient placement hearing. Id.
30. Justice Mosk poetically described the plight of Tilbury waiting for a chance to
a jury trial, saying that "[a] becalmed ship sails not a league closer to land because the
winds may someday blow; nor does Tilbury move an inch closer to freedom because a
jury may theoretically hear him out someday during his 23-plus-year sentence." Id. at
80, 813 P.2d at 1333-34, 284 Cal. Rptr. 303-04 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
31. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5302-5304 (West Supp. 1991). Justice Mosk
declared that unless criminally committed patients can be shown less able to attain
restoration of sanity than civilly committed patients, it offends equal protection princi-
ples to treat them differently. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 78, 813 P.2d at 1332, 284 Cal. Rptr.
at 302 (Mosk, J. dissenting). See also 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Con-
stitutional Law § 678 (9th ed. 1988) (criticizing the rationality of treating civilly and
criminally committed patients differently when "the issue is whether the person is
mentally ill at all").
32. Justice Mosk described as "Kafkaesque" the patient's "[ilnability to reach a
jury because a judge declines to advance the case." Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 79, 813 P.2d
at 1333, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 303 (Mosk, J. dissenting). Similarly, the court of appeal criti-
cized as a "classic Catch-22 situation" the fact a patient must satisfy a judge that he or
she is no longer dangerous to qualify for first stage outpatient status; a patient may
progress to the second stage sanity-restoration hearing, where a jury trial is allowed,
only after completing the first stage. Thus, reaching a jury depends on a judge's deci-
sion. People v. Tilbury, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1431, 263 Cal. Rptr. 173, 175-6 (1989).
33. Justice Mosk further argued that the current system arbitrarily conditions
freedom not on the current dangerousness of a patient, but instead on the nature of
the criminal act committed. Tilbury, 54 Cal. 3d at 78, 813 P.2d at 1333, 284 Cal. Rptr. at
303 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Thus, although Tilbury might regain sanity at the same
time as a fellow patient, he could be forced to wait decades for a jury determination,
while the fellow patient receives a jury decision immediately. Id& at 78-79, 813 P.2d at
1333, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 303 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
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frain from requiring one unless it finds "the clearest constitutional
necessity." 34 This vow of judicial self-restraint in the area of insanity
commitment seems to reflect the court's view that the legislature is
better equipped to decide issues of proper treatment of the mentally
ill, because such issues involve evaluations of medical opinions, scien-
tific uncertainties, and empirical data.35 The decision also reveals the
court's deference to the legislature's apparent attempts to stiffen the
burden of proving sanity and increase the actual length of an acquit-
tee's mandatory commitment.36
KURT M. LANGKOW
VI. DEATH PENALTY LAW
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale.
I. INTRODUCTION
Between December 1990 and June 1991, the California Supreme
Court decided sixteen death penalty cases.' The Lucas court upheld
34. Id. at 70, 813 P.2d at 1327, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
35. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the
need for judicial nestraint in deciding issues of criminal commitment in areas where
the legislature has spoken, saying "'When [a legislative body] undertakes to act in ar-
eas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be espe-
cially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.'" Id. at 70, 813
P.2d at 1327, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370
(1983) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974))).
36. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
1. This survey addresses death penalty opinions rendered between December 20,
1990 through June 27, 1991. The survey includes the following case, listed alphabeti-
cally by the defendant's name: People v. Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d 68, 806 P.2d 1311, 279
Cal. Rptr. 276 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 449 (1991); People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d
754, 802 P.2d 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 336 (1991); People v.
Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 809 P.2d 865, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 664
(1991); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 809 P.2d 351, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 945 (1992); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 802 P.2d 906, 277 Cal. Rptr.
122 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 145 (1991); People v. Deere, 53 Cal. 3d 705, 808 P.2d
1181, 280 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 954 (1992); People v. Duncan, 53
Cal. 3d 955, 810 P.2d 131, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1991), cert. denied, No. 91-6690, 1991 WL
277S92 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1991); People v. Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 730, 808 P.2d 1197, 280 Cal.
Rptr. 440 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 994 (1992); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115,
802 P.2d 169, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 337 (1991); People v. Has-
each of the sixteen convictions, generally finding either no error or
harmless error in the trial court proceedings.2 The lack of reversal in
this six month period is characteristic of the Lucas Court, which has
the highest death penalty affirmance rate of any state court in the
nation.3
The court continues to face the challenges of an ever-increasing
backlog of death penalty cases. 4 This forced preoccupation with the
death penalty results in an unproductive use of judicial resources.5
Some observers feel that the overwhelming volume of death penalty
cases paralyzes the supreme court, and prevents efficient manage-
kett, 52 Cal. 3d 323, 801 P.2d 210, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 83
(1991); People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 807 P.2d 1009, 279 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 443 (1991); People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 811 P.2d 757, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 465 (1991), petition for cert. filed, (Jan. 17, 1992) (No. 91-7037); People v. Mason,
52 Cal. 3d 909, 802 P.2d 950, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 225 (1991);
People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 807 P.2d 949, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1991), cert denied, 112
S. Ct. 421 (1991); People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 805 P.2d 899, 278 Cal. Rptr. 640
(1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 351 (1991); People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 809 P.2d
290, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1992). For ease of reference,
subsequent histories are hereinafter omitted.
2. Because of the harmless error doctrine, the Lucas court rarely overturns death
sentences, focusing "on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually
inevitable presence of immaterial error." People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 47, 753 P.2d 1,
11, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 220 (1988). The court will reverse a conviction only where the
error clearly resulted in prejudice. See Howard S. Fallman & Charles Eskridge, Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 451 (1989); John
A. Mayers & Susan S. Seemiller California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty
Law, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 1165 (1989); James D. McGinley, California Supreme Court Sur-
vey-Death Penalty Law, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 537 (1990); Stathy Pamopolous & Robert J.
Mills, California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 1095
(1990); Cori L. MacDonneil, California Supreme Court Survey - Death Penalty Law,
18 PEPP. L. REv. 716 (1990); Denise R. Harrington, California Supreme Court Survey
- Death Penalty Law, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 690 (1990) [hereinafter Death Penalty Law I,
II, III, IV, V & VI, respectively]; see generally 9 B. WITIGN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Appeal § 324 (1985) (discussing the harmless error approach); 6 B.WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAw, Reversible Error §§ 3279-80 (1989) (summarizing the history of the
harmless error doctrine); TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLEss ERROR (1970).
3. Gerald F. Uelmen, The Disappearing Dissenters, CAL. LAw., June 1991, at 35,
37. This astounding affirmance rate indicates a potential for unfair results for the de-
fendant, where the court gives "short shrift... to very substantial claims of error." Id.
As one observer noted, the Lucas court "'has clearly reflected what may be a national
conservative mood of downplaying the procedural rights of criminal defendants and
emphasizing the interests of society in efficiency and certainty and relying heavily
upon notions of harmless error to affirm convictions ......."Bill Blum, Toward a Radi-
cal Middle: Has a Great Court Become Mediocre, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 48, 50. In ad-
dition, the great amount of unanimity definitive of the Lucas court has perhaps
created "an anemic institution that rarely reexamines its assumptions." Uelman,
supra, at 39.
4. From 1987 through 1990, the Lucas court's backlog of death penalty cases has
gradually increased from 187 to 193. Uelman, supra note 3, at 37. While the court
needs to decide approximately 40 cases each year to prevent an increase in its backlog,
the court decided only 30 death penalty appeal cases in 1990. Id. See also Death Pen-
alty V, supra note 2, at 715 (discussing the court's backlog of death penalty cases).
5. Blum, supra note 3, at 51.
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ment of its remaining caseload.6 Nevertheless, the justices have yet
to support the constitutional amendment presented by Senator Ken
Maddy (R-Morro Bay), which would route death penalty cases
through the courts of appeal rather than referring them automati-
cally to the supreme court.7 The court seems resigned to continue
spending much of its time dealing with the growing pool of death
penalty cases.8
This survey will address the significant defense arguments raised
on automatic appeal, focusing on new developments in death penalty
law. For ease of reference, this survey is divided into the following
categories: Guilt Phase,9 Special Circumstances,10 Penalty Phase,1 '
Issues Relating to Counsel,12 and Proportionality Review.13
II. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
Exhibiting great deference to the trial court's discretion, the
Supreme Court of California resolved all guilt phase issues in favor
of the People during this period. The court grounded its position in
the "harmless error doctrine" 14 and the "unlikely change in verdict"
test.15 The court also continued to follow the rule announced in
6. The observers include former Justice Otto Kaus and Gerald Uelman, Dean of
Santa Clara University School of Law. Blum, supra note 3, at 51.
7. Uelmen, supra note 3, at 116. Uelmen proposes a similar reform, which would
randomly allocate death penalty cases to various courts of appeal, rather than concen-
trating death penalty review at the supreme court level. Gerald F. Uelmen, Losing
Steam, CAL. LAW., June 1990, at 44, 116. The supreme court would maintain discre-
tionary review over guilt and special circumstances determinations, and would con-
tinue to review the proportionality of the death sentence. Id. at 116. See Gerald F.
Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Courts of California: A
Tale of Two Courts, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 237, 292-95 (1989) (discussing a reform of the
automatic review of death penalty judgments in California); see also Death Penalty VI,
supra note 2, at 718-19 (summarizing the supreme court's proportionality review).
8. Chief Justice Lucas denies that the supreme court is overburdened by the
death penalty backlog. Death Penalty V, supra note 2, at 717 (citing The Exodus of
California's High Court, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 1990, at 29).
9. See infra notes 14 to 65 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 66 to 71 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 72 to 99 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 100 to 122 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 123 to 127 and accompanying text.
14. Chapman v. 'California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1966) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)) ("whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the conviction"). See TRAYNOR, supra note 2.
James C. Scoville, Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740 (1987). See also Death Penalty I, supra note 2, at p.452 nn.5-9.
15. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 255 (1956) ("whether it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been
People v. Green,'6 that if the defendant failed to object to any error
that the trial judge could have cured by an admonition, the defendant
waived all claims of that error on appeal. The Lucas court continues
to espouse the position that no trial proceeds error-free. In order to
reverse a first degree murder verdict, the court must find substantive
violations of a defendant's rights rather than technical
misapplication.
A. Pre-trial Issues
In four of the sixteen cases, appellant claimed error for failure to
change venue.17 The court used the WilliamslS standard as the
framework for determining whether the defendant is entitled to a
change in venue.19 Under the Williams standard, when the defend-
ant shows a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of a change in
venue, he cannot receive a fair trial, the trial court must move the
trial to another jurisdiction.20 In each instance, the court found that
the appellant's right to a fair trial was sufficiently protected without
moving the trial.21
In two cases the appellant claimed Miranda2 2 violations.23 The
court dismissed these allegations with little discussion. 24 The court
reached in the absence of error"). See generally 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Appeal § 324 (1985). See Death Penalty I, supra note 2, at p.452 n.1 1.
16. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 33, 609 P.2d 468, 488, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 20 (1980). See B.L
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, § 13.2(b) (1988).
17. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 802-07, 809 P.2d 865, 880-84, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90,
105-09 (1991); People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 359-63, 807 P.2d. 1009, 1024-27, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 780, 795-98 (1991); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 802 P.2d 906, 919-22, 277 Cal.
Rptr. 122, 135-38 (1991); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 166-68, 802 P.2d 169, 192-93,
276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 702-03 (1990).
18. People v. Williams, 48 Cal. 3d 1112, 1125, 774 P.2d 146, 153, 259 Cal. Rptr. 473,
480 (1989)(trial court erred in failing to grant change of venue).
19. Id The court reviews five factors in making its determination, 1) the nature
and gravity of the offense, 2) the nature and extent of the news coverage, 3) the size of
the community, 4) the status of the defendant in the community and 5) the popularity
and prominence of the victim.
20. Williams, 48 Cal. 3d at 1125, 774 P.2d at 152, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
21. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 807, 809 P.2d at 884, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 109; Jennings, 53
Cal. 3d at 363, 807 P.2d. at 1027, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 798; Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d at 854, 802
P.2d at 922, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 138; Galego, 52 Cal. 3d at 168, 802 P.2d at 202, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 703.
22. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-75 (1966) (fifth amendment requires an
interrogating officer to inform a person in custody prior to interrogation that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything said can be used against him in court, that he
has the right to consult with a lawyer, and that if he is indigent, he has the right to an
appointed lawyer). See Death Penalty III, supra note 2, at 541-42 nn.32-35, Death Pen-
alty V, supra note 2, at 717-18 nn.10-18, Death Penalty VI, supra note 2, at 702-03
nn.89-95. See generally 5 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, § 2679
(2d ed. 1989).
23. People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 807 P.2d 949, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1991); People
v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 802 P.2d 330, 278 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1991).
24. In Morris, the court found the appellant's statement in part pre-custodial and,
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also dismissed the additional claimed pre-trial errors of failure to or-
der a competency hearing2 5 and failure to order the severance of
multiple murders.2 6
B. Jury Issues
1. Witherspoon/Witt Error
In three of sixteen cases,27 the appellant claimed Witherspooni
Witt error.28 The court found no error in dismissing a juror for his
views on capital punishment that would conflict with the juror's du-
ties.29 Furthermore, the court summarily dismissed claims of a bi-
ased jury as a result of this dismissal.30
thus, not subject to Miranda. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d at 198, 807 P.2d at 974-75, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 745-46. Th1e rest of the statements were subject to a valid waiver of Miranda
rights. Id. at 200, 807 P.2d at 975-76, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 746-47, or harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 203, 807 P.2d at 978, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
In Benson, the defendant claimed the confession was coerced. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d at
770, 802 P.2d at 339, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The court found the confessions voluntary
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 780, 802 P.2d at 345, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
25. Galiego, 52 Cal. 3d at 162, 802 P.2d at 189, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 699. In Gallego, the
trial court expressed some concern about the defendant's competency to stand trial.
Because there was no substantial evidence of the defendant's incompetence, determi-
nation was properly left to the trial court's discretion. See Death Penalty II, supra
note 2, at 1199 nn. 230-33. See also 21 CAL. Jun. 3D Criminal Law § 2888 (1988).
26. People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909, 933, 802 P.2d 950, 962, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 178
(1991). Multiple offenses in the same class meet the statutory requirement for joinder.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985). The defendant can defeat consolidation "only on
clear showing of prejudice." Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 683 P.2d
699, 702, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 703 (1984) (jury may have viewed evidence of two separate
murder charges cumulatively). In Mason, the court dismissed all defendant's conten-
tions out of hand. 52 Cal. 3d at 935, 802 P.2d at 964, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
27. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 809-10, 809 P.2d 865, 884-85, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90,
109-10 (1991); People v. Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 730, 742-43, 808 P.2d 1187, 1203, 280 Cal.
Rptr. 440, 446 (1991); People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1254, 805 P.2d 899, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 640, 661 (1991).
28. In Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the United States Supreme Court re-
fined its earlier decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Under Witt, a
prospective juror may be excused for cause if that juror's views on capital punishment
would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a jury in ac-
cordance with his instructions and his oath." 469 U.S. at 424.
29. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 809, 809 P.2d at 885, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 110; Frierson, 53 Cal.
3d at 743, 808 P.2d 1203, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 446. For an in-depth look at the WittiWither-
spoon analysis, see sources at DEATH PENALTY II, supra note 2, at 1182 n.104. See also,
Death Penalty VI, 4mpra note 2, at 697-98 nn.50-63. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 331, 398-405, 412 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D,
Criminal Law §§ 2998, 3004, 3009, 3020 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D, Criminal
Law § 3345 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE,
§§ 81.01(1), 87.05(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).
30. Pensinger, 53 Cal. 3d at 1254, 805 P.2d at 920, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
2. Denial of Challenge for Cause
In three of sixteen cases,31 the appellant claimed error for the
court's failure to accept a defendant's challenge to a prospective juror
for cause.32 In all three cases, the defendant failed to support any
claim of prejudice.33 The court noted in two cases that the defendant
failed to exhaust his available peremptory challenges thus refuting
any possible claim of prejudice.34
3. Additional Jury Issues
Two of the cases reviewed claimed Wheeler3 5 error, a denial of the
right to a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the com-
munity.3 6 In both cases, counsel for the defense failed to establish a
prima facie case for error.3 7 The court summarily dismissed a claim
of impermissible restrictions on the content of voir dire.38 Finally,
the court dismissed the single claim of error as a result of jury
31. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 808, 809 P.2d 865, 884, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 109
(1991); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 648-89, 809 P.2d 351, 364-65, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692,
705-06 (1991); People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 184-86, 807 P.2d 949, 965-66, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 720, 736-37 (1991).
32. In order to claim error on a trial court ruling denying a challenge for cause, a
defendant must show: "1) he used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in ques-
tion; 2) he exhausted his peremptory challenges or can justify his failure to do so; and
3) he was dissatisfied with the jury as selected." Morris, 53 Cal. 3d at 184, 807 P.2d at
965, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 736. See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (no error
when counsel fails to challenge empaneled juror for cause).
33. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 808, 809 P.2d at 884, 289 Cal. Rptr. 104; Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at
648, 809 P.2d at 365, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 706; Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 184, 807 P.2d at 965, 279
Cal. Rptr. 736.
34. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 808, 809 P.2d at 884, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 109; Morris, 53 Cal.
3d at 184, 807 P.2d at 965, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
35. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902
(1978). See Death Penalty IV, supra note 2, at 1100 nn.42-49 and Death Penalty VI,
supra note 2, at 695-96 nn.37-49 for an expanded discussion of Wheeler error.
36. People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909, 802 P.2d 950, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1991); People
v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 802 P.2d 169, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1990). The prima facie case
for systematic exclusion of a certain subsection of the community is determined using
the three-prong Duren test:
1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the commu-
nity; 2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the members of such persons
in the community; and 3) that this under representation is due to the system-
atic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986) (jury discrimination based on race unconstitutional).
37. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d at 936-39, 802 P.2d at 964-66, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 180-82; Gallego,
52 Cal. 3d at 166, 802 P.2d at 192, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 702. In Gallego, the court noted that
the defendant had failed to raise the issue at trial and was, thus, precluded from rais-
ing the issue on appeal. Id.
38. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d at 939, 802 P.2d at 966, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 182. See generally B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 410-415 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law, §§ 2997-2998 (1985); 22 CAL. JUR 3D Criminal Law, pt. 1, § 3345
(1985); 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.05(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1988).
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misconduct.3 9
C Evidentiary Issues
In three of the sixteen cases, appellant claimed that the prosecu-
tion produced insufficient information to support the verdict of first
degree murder.40 In each instance, the court found sufficient infor-
mation for a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.4' Other claimed evidentiary error included spoliation
of evidence by the State,42 admission of jailhouse tape recordings,43
admission of photos of the victim while alive,44 and admission of evi-
39. A juror's proved misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. The
State must rebut the presumption or lose the verdict. See generally 6 B. WITKIN & N.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, § 3069 (2d ed. 1989); 2 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, § 8-3.7, comments at 8.58 (2d ed. 1980).
In People v. Daniels, the court stated that in the case of serious and wilful juror mis-
conduct, the trial court may exercise its discretion and substitute an alternate juror. 52
Cal. 3d 815, 864, 802 P.2d 906, 928, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 144. The court specifically disap-
proved dicta in People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963),
which stated that the only remedy for juror misconduct was a mistrial. Daniels, 52 Cal.
3d at 866, 802 P.2d at 931, 277 Cal. Rptr. 147. See also Death Penalty I, supra note 2, at
454 n.19; Death Penalty I, supra note 2, at 1182-84 nn.105-21; Death Penalty V, supra
note 2, at 726-28 m.85-107; Death Penalty VI, supra note 2, at 699 nn.68-69.
40. People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 546, 809 P.2d 290, 302-03, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631,
643-44 (1991); People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1236-37, 805 P.2d 899, 908, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 640, 649 (1991); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 802 P.2d 169, 207-208, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 679, 717-18 (1.991).
41. Id The court will "view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent
and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact
could reasonably deduce from the evidence." Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d at 1236-37, 805 P.2d
at 908-09, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50 (quoting People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 395, 461
P.2d 659, 669, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 389 (1969)). See Death Penalty I, supra note 2, at 455
n.22, Death Penalty II, supra note 2, at 1184-86 n.122-36. See generally B. WITKIN, CAL-
IFORNIA CRIMINAL PROcEDuRE, §§ 683-685 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 21 CAL. Jun. 3D Crimi-
nal Law §§ 3248-3268 (1985 & Supp 1988).
42. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 810-12, 809 P.2d 865, 885-86, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90,
110-11 (1991)(finding no error); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 855, 802 P.2d 906, 923,
277 Cal. Rptr. 122,139-40 (1991)(same). Destruction of material evidence requires that
the additional evidence 1) would have served more to exculpate than to inculpate the
defendant, and 2) that the investigators had acted in bad faith. See California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) (police acted in good faith in failing to preserve
breath samples); and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (no bad faith in fail-
ing to preserve semen samples).
43. People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 169-70, 802 P.2d 169, 194, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679,
704 (1990) (finding no error). In Gallego, the defendant's status as a jailhouse security
risk warranted the recordings. Id
44. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 821, 809 P.2d 865, 893, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 118 (finding no
error); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 663-64, 809 P.2d 351, 375, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 716
(1991)(finding harmless error; photos not prejudicial).
dence of prior killings.45 In every instance, the court found no error,
harmless error, lack of prejudice, or waiver by virtue of failure to
preserve an objection.46
D. Instructional Error
In nine of sixteen cases the appellant claimed guilt phase instruc-
tional error.47 The claims covered a broad range of purportedly im-
proper instructions including: failure to instruct on lesser included
offenses,48 the anti-sympathy instruction,49 the pre-meditation in-
struction,5 0 the malice instruction,5 ' the jury notetaking instruc-
tion,52 the flight instruction,53 the mental condition instruction,5 4 the
"theory of defense" instruction,5 5 and the aiding and abetting instruc-
45. Gal/ego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 171-72, 802 P.2d 169, 195-96, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 705-06
(finding no prejudice; proof of additional crimes necessary to prove intent).
46. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
47. People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 811 P.2d 157, 282 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1991); People
v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 810 P.2d 131, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1991); People v. Cooper, 53
Cal. 3d 771, 809 P.2d 865, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1991); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 809
P.2d 351, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1991); People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 809 P.2d 290, 280
Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991); People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 807 P.2d 949, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1991); People v. Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d 68, 806 P.2d 1311, 279 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1991); Peo-
ple v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 805 P.2d 899, 278 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1991); People v. Dan-
iels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 802 P.2d 906, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1991); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d
115, 802 P.2d 169, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1990).
48. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 825-32, 809 P.2d at 896-901, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 121-26;
Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d at 968-971, 810 P.2d at 137-39, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 279-81 (failure to ask
for instructions on lesser included offenses a tactical choice).
49. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d at 972, 810 P.2d at 139, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 281 ("not reason-
ably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in
the absence of error").
50. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d at 869-70, 802 P.2d at 933-34, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (jury
instructions based on People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 26-27, 447 P.2d 942, 949, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 557 (1968) analysis for premeditation unwarranted).
51. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d at 973-74, 810 P.2d at 140-41, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 282-83 (in-
structions viewed together were clear); Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 809 P.2d at 322,
280 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (read together instructions were adequate); Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d
at 1215-16, 805 P.2d at 914-15, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56 (instruction "as a whole" was
proper).
52. People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 381-82, 807 P.2d 1009, 1039, 279 Cal. Rptr.
780, 810 (1991) (instruction not required absent request); People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d
152, 214-15, 807 P.2d 949, 985, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 756 (1991) (no prejudice).
53. People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 1144-45, 811 P.2d 757, 775, 282 Cal. Rptr. 465,
483 (1991) (instruction proper if flight relied on as tending to show guilt); Pensinger, 52
Cal. 3d at 1243-45, 805 P.2d at 913-14, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 654-55 (jury could legitimately
infer consciousness of guilt by defendant's flight).
54. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1145, 811 P.2d at 775, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (instructions
proper if mental state and specific intent an element of the crime); Wharton, 53 Cal.
3d at 573-74, 809 P.2d at 320-22, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63 (considering instructions as a
whole, error was "manifestly harmless").
55. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d at 571, 809 P.2d at 320, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (finding in-
structional harmless error); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 870-71, 802 P.2d 906, 933,
277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 149 (1991) (finding no error; specific factors do not equate to theory
of defense).
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tion.56 In each of these instances, the court found harmless error or
the reasonable likelihood of a similar verdict in spite of the error.5 7
E. Defendant's Absence from Proceedings
In five of sixteen cases, the appellant claimed error because the
trial judge did not include him at side-bar or in-chamber discus-
sions.58 The court noted that the appellant carried the burden of
demonstrating prejudice and that he had failed to do so in each in-
stance he alleged the error.59
F. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The appellant alleged prosecutorial misconduct in seven of the six-
teen cases reviewed. In four of the cases, the alleged misconduct
took place during the body of the trial.60 In three of the cases the
alleged misconduct took place during the prosecution's closing argu-
ment.61 The court found no substance to any of these claims. 2 The
56. People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 668-69, 809 P.2d 351, 378-79, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692,
719-20 (1991) (murder was a natural consequence of contemplated crime); People v.
Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d 68, 91, 806 P.2d 1311, 1322, 279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287 (1991) ("instruc-
tions given covered any valid defense along these lines"); Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d at 871-72,
802 P.2d at 935, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (no error as defendant was sole perpetrator); Peo-
ple v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 181-82, 802 P.2d 169, 202, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 712 (1990)
(defendant's intent established beyond a reasonable doubt). See Death Penalty II,
supra note 2 at 1176-79 nn.74-79.
57. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
58. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1140-41, 811 P.2d at 772, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81 (in-cham-
bers discussion of attorney compensation); People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 974-76, 810
P.2d 131, 141-42, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 283-84 (1991) (jury selection streamlining proce-
dures); People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 210, 807 P.2d 949, 982-83, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720,
753-54 (1991) (informal instructions conference preceding formal instructions hearing);
Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 802 P.2d at 191, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02 (court's informal
discussion with defendant's previous attorney). See generally B.WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 388-392 (1963 & Supp.1985); 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§§ 2095-2109 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
59. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1140-41, 811 P.2d at 772, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81; Duncan,
53 Cal. 3d at 975-76, 810 P.2d 141-42, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 283-84 ; Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152,
210, 807 P.2d 949, 932-83, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 753-54 ; Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 802
P.2d at 191, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
60. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1145, 811 P.2d at 774, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (failure to object
waives the issue on appeal); People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 822-23, 809 P.2d 865, 893-
95, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 118-20 (1991) (prosecutor's cross-examination fell within the very
wide scope permissible); People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909, 945-47, 802 P.2d 950, 970-71,
277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 186-88 (1991) (prosecutor's diligent efforts insured no prejudice
arose); Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 187, 802 P.2d at 206, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (failure to object
waives the issue on appeal).
61. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d at 976-77, 810 P.2d at 142-43, 281 Cal. Rptr. 284-85; People v.
Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 566, 809 P.2d 290, 316, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 657 (1991) (failure to
court supported its position by finding either no error or waiver on
the part of the defense by failing to object during the trial63
The court also dismissed other claims of error including physical
restraint during trial,64 and the assertion of psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 65
III. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ISSUES
At the guilt stage, the State must prove one or more of the statuto-
rily enumerated special circumstances along with first-degree mur-
der, in order for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty.66
Appellants argued trial court error in the special circumstances de-
terminations in seven of the sixteen cases.67 Appellants enjoyed
some success in this line of argument, with the court reversing indi-
vidual trial court determinations of special circumstances in four of
the seven cases.68 However, none of the special circumstances errors
required reversal of the death penalty. In each case the court found
one or more additional special circumstances to support the death
penalty.6 9
object waives the issue on appeal). See Death Penalty II, supra note 2, nn.158-80; Death
Penalty IV, supra note 2, nn.56-59, 69-70; Death Penalty VI, supra note 2, nn.72-79.
62. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
63. Id. See Death Penalty II, supra note 2, at 1188-90 nn.158-169; Death Penalty III,
supra note 2, at 1101-03 nn.56-70; Death Penalty VI, supra note 2, at 699-700 nn.72-79.
See generally F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985).
64. People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 651, 809 P.2d 351, 366, 280 Cal. Rptr 692, 707
(1991) (harmless error in spite of lack of record showing necessity for shackles). See
Death Penalty V, supra note 2, nn.96-99.
65. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d at 552-53, 809 P.2d at 306-07, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48 (de-
fendant waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his mental state at
issue).
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991). Special circumstances
which satisfy the statute include: multiple murder, murder-robbery, murder-arson,
murder-burglary, and murder-rape. Id See also 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES
§ 1026C (Supp. 1985); Death Penalty IV, supra note 2, at 543-44.
67. See People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 1147, 811 P.2d 757, 777, 282 Cal. Rptr. 465,
485 (1991); People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 386, 807 P.2d 1009, 1042, 279 Cal. Rptr.
780, 813 (1991); People v. Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d 68, 95-96, 806 P.2d 1311, 1325, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 276, 290 (1991); People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1254, 805 P.2d 899, 921, 278
Cal. Rptr. 640, 662 (1991); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 876, 802 P.2d 906, 938, 277
Cal. Rptr. 122, 154 (1991); People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 784-85, 802 P.2d 330, 348,
276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 845 (1990); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 191, 802 P.2d 169, 208,
276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 718 (1990).
68. See Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1147-49, 811 P.2d at 777-78, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 465-66 (va-
cating one of two multiple-murder special circumstances findings); Pensinger, 52 Cal.
3d at 1255, 805 P.2d at 921, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (reversing torture-murder special cir-
cumstance finding); Benson, 52 Cal. 3d at 785, 802 P.2d at 348, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (re-
versing finding of two witness killing special circumstances); Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 202,
802 P.2d at 215, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 725 (setting aside multiple-murder special
circumstance).
69. Only one special circumstance must be upheld on appeal to support affirma-
tion of the death penalty. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
§ 1566 (1989).
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In Gallego and Jones, the court clarified that it is always error to
charge a defendant with two multiple-murder special circumstances
where the defendant has only killed two people. 70 The court rea-
soned that using two special circumstance allegations in such situa-
tions "artificially inflates the seriousness of the defendant's
conduct."71
IV. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A. Factor (7c) Error
At the penalty phase, the same jury that determined guilt usually
decides whether a defendant will receive a sentence of death or life
in prison without the possibility of parole.72 The court instructs the
jury to evaluate 7 3 certain aggravating and mitigating factors enumer-
ated in Section 190.3 of the California Penal Code.7 4 In the penalty
70. See Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1145, 811 P.2d at 777, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (citing Gal-
lego, 52 Cal. 3d at 201, 802 P.2d at 215, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 725; People v. Caro 46 Cal. 3d
1035, 1051, 761 P.2d 680, 689, 251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 767 (1988) ; People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d
1222, 1273, 729 P.2d 115, 146, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 880 (1986)).
71. The defendant in Jones argued that the trial court's error in charging him with
two double-murder special circumstances prejudicially affected the outcome of the
penalty determination, but the court deemed the error harmless. Jones at 1146, 811
P.2d at 779, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (citing Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 201, 802 P.2d at 215, 276
Cal. Rptr. at 725).
72. In just one of the sixteen cases surveyed did the court empanel a different jury
for the penalty phase based on a pretrial stipulated arrangement. See People v.
Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d 68, 98, 806 P.2d 1311, 1326-27, 279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 291-92 (1991).
73. The jury's evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors must not be a
mathematical tally. In People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 541, 726 P.2d 516, 531-32, 230
Cal. Rptr. 834, 849-50 (1985), the court held that error will be found where a jury be-
lieves it can simply count and add the factors. In Brown, CALJIC 8.84.2 (West 4th ed.
1979) provided the jury instruction: "If you conclude that the aggravating circum-
stances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death.
However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole." Md
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). Section 190.3, which provides the
framework for penalty phase jury instructions, provides:
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in
the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found
to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which in-
volved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied
threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
phase, the defense commonly argues that the court improperly in-
structed the jury in accordance with section 190.3.
In five of the cases surveyed, appellants unsuccessfully asserted er-
ror based on claims that the trial judge issued overly narrow factor
(k) instructions.75 Factor (k) of section 190.3, along with the concom-
itant jury instruction CALJIC number 8.85(k), allows a jury to take
into account unenumerated mitigating evidence of character or rec-
ord which a defendant may assert "as a basis for a sentence less than
death."76 In each case reviewed, if the court found that the trial
judge gave improperly narrow factor (k) instructions, it looked to the
presence of other properly given instructions and counsel's argu-
ments as a whole to find that the jury was not misled as to its ability
to consider and act on defendants mitigating evidence.77
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal
conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the
defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for
his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the sub-
stantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the
affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his
participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence .... the trier of fact shall consider,
take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances re-
ferred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact con-
cludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If
the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating
circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison
for a term of life without the possibility of parole.
H. See generally 3 B. WITKIN & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, § 1597 (2d ed.
1989).
75. See People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1219, 1263, 805 P.2d 899, 927, 278 Cal. Rptr.
640, 668; Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1146, 811 P.2d at 776, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 484; People v. Cox,
53 Cal. 3d 618, 673-74, 809 P.2d 351, 376, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 723 (1991); People v. Mason,
52 Cal. 3d 909, 965, 802 P.2d 909, 933, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 200 (1991); Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d
at 199, 802 P.2d at 213, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
76. CALJIC No. 8.85(k) (5th ed. 1988). This instruction expands the litigating fac-
tors of California Penal Code section 193.3(k), including "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id. CALJIC No. 8.85(k) was de-
rived from language in People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 878 n.10, 671 P.2d 813, 825 n.10,
196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 321 n.10 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)),
where the California Supreme Court held that to avoid confusion the trial court
should instruct a jury that it may consider as mitigating "'any aspect of [the] defend-
ant's character ... "
77. See supra note 75, and cases cited therein.
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B. Factor (b) and (c) Error
Similarly, in five cases where defendants alleged factor (b) or fac-
tor (c) error, the court found no reversible impropriety.78 Factor (b)
allows the jury to consider prior criminal conduct involving the use
or threat of force, and factor (c) allows the jury to consider any prior
felony convictions in making the penalty decision.79 In general, the
court quickly dismissed each factor (b) and (c) claim based on a broad
concept of the admissibility of prior violent acts or felony convictions,
regardless of contrary considerations such as the length of time
passed since the criminal act.8 0
C. Victim and Family Impact Evidence
Under the ]Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, the Unmted States Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland and
South Carolina v. Gathers held that introducing evidence regarding
such matters as the victim's personal characteristics, or the impact of
the crime on the victim's family, generally violates a defendant's
rights.8 In five cases where the court discussed victim and family
78. People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 595-96, 802 P.2d 290, 336, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631,
677 (1991) (harmless error to allow doctor's improper opinion as to factor (b) eligibil-
ity); People v. Jerings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 388, 807 P.2d 1009, 1043, 279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 814
(1991) (no error under factor (b) to allow jury to hear evidence of crime for which stat-
ute of limitations on prosecution has run); People v. Morris, 53 Cal. 3d 152, 224, 807
P.2d 949, 992, 279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 763 (1991) (no error to reject request by defendant to
omit factor (a) instruction); Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d at 1258-60, 805 P.2d at 924-26, 278 Cal.
Rptr. at 665-67 (no error to allow crimes of other jurisdictions for factor (b) purposes);
People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 787, 802 P.2d 330, 349, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 846 (1990)
(no error under factors (a) and (b) to allow jury to hear evidence of conduct underly-
ing felony convictions). See also Death Penalty VI, supra note 2, at 713-14 (discussing
in more detail factors (a) and (b)).
79. Section 190.3 provides in relevant part:
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the
following factors if relevant:... (b) The presence or absence of criminal activ-
ity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or vio-
lence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (c) The
presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
80. See, e.g., Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d at 1258-60, 805 P.2d at 924-26, 278 Cal. Rptr. at
665-67. The court. in Pensinger cursorily dispensed with a potentially complex argu-
ment regarding admissibility of an Oregon crime under factor (b) when the Oregon
crime would not have qualified as a crime in California. Id, at 1260, 805 P.2d at 926, 278
Cal. Rptr. at 667. The court summarily observed "[n]othing in the language of Penal
Code section 190.3, factor (b) suggests that violation of a penal statute of another state
... should be inacimissable as a factor in aggravation." Id
81. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-509 (1987) (victim and family impact in-
formation is irrelevant to jury's decision on death penalty); South Carolina v. Gathers,
impact evidence objections, it found either no violation of the Booth/
Gathers standard, or harmless error in admitting victim and family
evidence.8 2 In People v. Mason,83 the court held that the prosecutor's
comment that the jury members should "put [themselves] behind the
eyes and in the mind and in the memories of the [victim's] relatives
and friends" offended the Booth/Gathers rule. However, in view of
the number and nature of defendant's crimes, the court considered
the error harmless.8 4 In the sixteen cases surveyed here, the evi-
dence consisted primarily of testimony of the victim's relatives or
friends, although commonly victim and family impact appeals also
address the introduction of photographs of the victim while alive, the
victim's corpse, and the crime scene.85
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The court discussed contentions of prosecutorial misconduct at the
penalty phase in eleven of the sixteen cases surveyed.8 6
Prosecutorial misconduct arises as one of the most commonly
claimed errors in the penalty phase.8 7 But as with most other penalty
490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989) (case following Booth concluding prosecution's presentation
of argument is violative).
82. See People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 298, 810 P.2d 131, 145-46, 281 Cal. Rptr.
273, 287-88 (1991) (no prejudicial error to allow victim's friend to testify after motion
for modification of verdict had been made by defendant); Morris, 53 Cal. 3d at 221-22,
807 P.2d at 990-91, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21 (statements by prosecutor that one surviving
victim lived with "anguish and emotional scars" and that another victim's mother "felt
her son did not deserve the death penalty" harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Peo-
ple v. Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d 68, 113-14, 806 P.2d 1311, 1337, 279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 302 (1991)
("fleeting" remarks about "unbearable pain" inflicted on friends and relatives of vic-
tim harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Mason, 52 Cal. 3d 909 931-32, 802
P.2d at 963-65, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 198-99 (requesting jury to empathize with the vic-
tim's friends and family was error, but harmless in light of the overwhelming callous-
ness of defendant's crimes); Benson, 52 Cal. 3d at 796-98, 802 P.2d at 356-55, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 853-54 (no error for prosecutor to say "I can't prove ... [victim's] pain").
83. 52 Cal. 3d 909, 963-64, 802 P.2d 950, 982-83, 277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 198-99 (1991).
84. Id. at 964, 802 P.2d at 983, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
85. See Death Penalty V, supra note 2, at 715 (citing People v. Gonzales, 51 Cal.
3d 1179, 1236-37, 800 P.2d 1159, 1189-90, 275 Cal. Rptr. 372, 759-60 (1990) (photographs
of victim's corpse) and People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 962-63, 800 P.2d 516, 535-36, 275
Cal. Rptr. 160, 179 (1990) (photographs of crime scene and victim)).
86. See Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d at 976-977, 810 P.2d at 142, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 284 (1991);
People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 841, 809 P.2d 865, 906, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 133 (1991);
People v. Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 730, 748, 808 P.2d 1197, 1206, 280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 450
(1991); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 682, 809 P.2d 351, 382, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 729
(1991); People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 523, 595, 809 P.2d 290, 326, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 677
(1991); Beardslee, 53 Cal. 3d at 113, 806 P.2d at 137, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 302; People v.
Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1269-70, 805 P.2d 899, 931-32, 278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 672-73
(1991); Mason, 52 Cal. 3d at 965, 802 P.2d at 943, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 200; People v. Dan-
iels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 888-89, 802 P.2d 906, 946-47, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122 162-63 (1991); Benson,
52 Cal. 3d at 793-94, 802 P.2d at 354, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 851; People v. Haskett, 52 Cal. 3d
210, 244, 801 P.2d 210, 230, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 100 (1990).
87. See Death Penalty II, supra note 2, at 1188 (discussing prosecutorial miscon-
duct arguments made in 21 of the 26 death penalty cases surveyed in the article).
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phase contentions, the Lucas court rarely rewards such allegations
with reversible error.88 Generally, the court disposes of claims of
prosecutorial misconduct by failing to find the alleged misconduct,8 9
finding that the defendant waived objections to prosecutorial miscon-
duct by failing to object at trial,90 or finding any harmless error.91 In
one instance the prosecutor made several questionable comments in-
cluding: "[t]his crime is perhaps the most brutal, atrocious, heinous
crime certainly that's been committed in San Luis Obispo County...
and very likely this state."92 The court remarked that such sweeping
statements "should be avoided in the future," but in light of the ac-
tual crimes committed, the statement was reasonable.93
E. Motion for Modification of the Verdict
In all cases resulting in a death sentence, section 190.4(e) of the Pe-
nal Code requires the court to consider, sua sponte, a motion to mod-
ify the verdict.94 Section 1385(a) of the Penal Code empowers the
court to render a modification.95 The court must review the applica-
tion for modification, weigh the mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances, and render a modification if it holds the jury's finding
"contrary to law or the evidence presented."96 Of the cases surveyed,
88. See, e.g., id, (only one of the 21 allegations of prosecutorial misconduct resulted
in reversal). None of the eleven allegations of prosecutorial misconduct made in the
cases surveyed resulted in reversal.
89. See, e.g., Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d at 1270, 805 P.2d at 932, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 673 (no
misconduct error in allowing prosecutor to argue "where's the remorse [by defend-
ant]?" as counter to defense request for pity).
90. See, e.g., Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d at 595, 809 P.2d at 336, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (stat-
ing "[b]ecause defendant failed to object to the questions he now condemns, he waived
the issues for appeal").
91. See, e.g., Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d at 889-90, 802 P.2d at 941, 722 Cal. Rptr. at 163
(harmless error that "prosecutor's argument improperly weighted the penalty calcula-
tion in favor of a death verdict" when overall weakness of mitigating evidence and de-
fendant's many prior convictions for assault are considered).
92. People v. Benson, 52 Cal. 3d 754, 794, 802 P.2d 330, 354, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 851(1990).
93. Id. at 795, 802 P.2d at 355, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
94. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988). Section 190.4(e) provides in perti-
nent part that "[i]n every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or find-
ing imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an
application for modification of such verdict ... ." Id. (emphasis added). See generally
3 B. WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, § 1618 (2d ed. 1989).
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West Supp. 1991). Section 1385(a) provides in
pertinent part, "[tihe judge or magistrate may .... in furtherance of justice, order an
action be dismissed." Id.
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988). See also Death Penalty VI, supra
note 2, at 717.
only three appeals claimed improper consideration of the motion for
modification. 97 In two cases where the court agreed with the appel-
lant that consideration error existed, the court declined to reverse
the trial court's ruling by quickly finding no reasonable probability
that the error affected the ruling.9 8
V. ISSUES RELATING TO DEFENSE COUNSEL
A. Fffective Assistance of Counsel
In eleven cases of sixteen cases, the appellant claimed that ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at various phases of trial warranted rever-
sal.99 To determine the adequacy of counsel's performance, l0 0 the
court applied the Strickland 101 standard, requiring the appellant to
demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness,10 2 and that counsel's actions resulted in prej-
97. See People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 844-45, 809 P.2d 865, 909-10, 281 Cal. Rptr.
90, 136-37 (1991); People v. Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 739, 751-52, 808 P.2d 1197, 1209-10, 280
Cal. Rptr. 440, 452-53 (1991); Benson, 52 Cal. 3d at 811-13, 802 P.2d 366-67, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 863-64.
98. See Benson, 52 Cal. 3d at 813, 802 P.2d 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. 864 (improbable that
court took into account improperly introduced evidence in its decision on verdict modi-
fication; assuming it did, it "was not a reasonable probability that the error affected
the ruling"); Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d at 752, 808 P.2d at 1210, 280 Cal. Rtpr. at 453 (same).
99. People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 1130-41, 1149-52, 811 P.2d 757, 765-72, 778-80,
282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 472-79, 486-88 (1991); People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 966-68, 810
P.2d 131, 135-37, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277-279 (1991); Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 824, 809 P.2d
865, 895-96, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 120-21 (1991); Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 730, 746-49, 808 P.2d
1197, 1206-08, 280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 449-51 (1991); People v. Deere, 53 Cal. 3d 705, 713-17,
808 P.2d 1181, 1185-89, 280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428-32 (1991); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618,
653-63, 808 P.2d 351, 368-374, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 709-15 (1991); People v. Jennings, 53
Cal. 3d 334, 375-81, 391, 807 P.2d 1009, 1034-39, 1045-46, 279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 805-10, 816-17
(1991); People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1251-53, 1271, 1275-81, 805 P.2d 899, 919-20,
932, 935-39, 278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 660-61, 673, 676-80 (1991); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d
815, 841-45, 874, 802 P.2d 906, 914-16, 936, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 130-32, 152 (1991); People
v. Haskett, 52 Cal. 3d 210, 248-51, 801 P.2d 210, 232-34, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 102-04 (1990);
People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 205-07, 802 P.2d 169, 218-19, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 728-29
(1990).
100. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution creates the right to
effective assistance of counsel for the accused during trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (states must afford the defendant the right to
effective assistance of counsel); see generally 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2167
(1985 & Supp. 1991) (explaining the right to effective assistance of counsel).
101. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the United States
Supreme Court created the standard for determining whether counsel's performance
was inadequate, resulting in a violation of defendant's constitutional right to counsel.
Id. at 687-88. For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to prevail, Strickland re-
quires that the lawyer's performance fell below a reasonable professional standard,
and that this inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant. Id For a thorough
discussion of the California Supreme Court's evaluation of effective assistance of coun-
sel claims, see Death Penalty II, supra note 2, at 1191-96.
102. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 656, 808 P.2d at 369-70, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11 (citing People
v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 425, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979)). See 2
A.L.R. 4TH 1.
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udice.' 0 3 Applying this standard, the court found that the appellant
failed to meet this burden in every case.104 In general, the court
demonstrated great deference to trial counsel's decisions, attempting
"to avoid second-guessing his or her tactical choices and to avoid dis-
couraging vigorous advocacy."105
B. Conflict qf Interest
The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel includes
the right to conflict-free counsel.106 In two cases, the appellant
sought reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel resulting
103. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 656, 808 P.2d at 370, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (citing People v.
Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d 171, 216-17, 729 P.2d 839, 867-68, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 432-33 (1987)
(citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687-88)). To demonstrate that counsel's actions resulted
in prejudice, defendant must establish a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different ......
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
104. People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 1134-36, 1149-52, 811 P.2d 757, 768-69, 778-80,
282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 476-77, 486-88 (1991); People v. Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d 955, 968, 810 P.2d
131, 136-37, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278-79 (1991); People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 824-25,
809 P.2d 865, 895-96, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 120-21 (1991); People v. Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 730,
747, 749, 808 P.2d 1197, 1206, 1207, 280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 449, 450 (1991); People v. Deere,
53 Cal. 3d 705, 717, 808 P.2d 1181, 1189, 280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 432 (1991); Cox, 53 Cal. 3d
618, 662, 808 P.2d 351, 374, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 715 (1991); People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d
334, 375-81, 391, 807 P.2d 1009, 1034-39,1046, 279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 805-10, 817 (1991); Peo-
ple v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d 1210, 1251-53, 1271, 1275, 805 P.2d 899, 919-20, 932, 935-36,
278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 660-61, 673, 676-77 (1991); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 874, 802
P.2d 906, 936, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 152 (1991); Pepple v. Haskett, 52 Cal. 3d 210, 249-51,
801 P.2d 210, 231-34, 276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 103-04 (1990); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115,
205-07, 802 P.2d 169, 218-19, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 728-29 (1990).
105. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 3d at 1275, 805 P.2d at 936, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (1991). See
also Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1149-51, 811 P.2d at 778-79, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87 (noting
that reasonable trial tactics support counsel's alleged inadequacy); Duncan, 53 Cal. 3d
at 966, 810 P.2d at 135, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 277 (noting that court must give great defer-
ence to trial counsel's actions); Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d at 749, 808 P.2d at 1207-08, 280 Cal.
Rptr. at 451-52 (stressing that trial counsel can best determine the appropriate tactics
because of the jury's presence); Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 656, 808 P.2d at 370, 280 Cal. Rptr. at
711 (stating that tactical errors alone are not grounds for reversal); cf Goodpaster, The
Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 299, 343 (1983) (demonstrating that one can provide effective assistance of counsel
in many different ways); see generally 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2171 (1985 &
Supp. 1991) (summarizing the treatment of tactical decisions with respect to effective
assistance of counsel).
106. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1134, 811 P.2d at 767, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 475 (citing Wood v.
Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); People v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 834, 765 P.2d 460, 474,
254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 312 (1989)). See Death Penalty II, supra note 2, at 1192 (summariz-
ing the right to counsel free from conflict of interest); see generally 19 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 2179 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (explaining conflict of interest between the
defendant and his counsel).
from conflict of interest.10 7 The court required a showing that a po-
tential or actual conflict of interest existed which negatively affected
counsel's performance. 08 In addressing the conflict of interest
claims, the court found that neither case warranted reversal because
the records did not indicate a conflict of interest between defendant
and counsel. 0 9
C. Faretta Issues
The criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-represen-
tation,110 and must explicitly waive his right to counsel before the
court grants a motion for self-representation."' The strict waiver
standard, known as the Faretta standard, ensures that the defendant
"'knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' "112
In one case, the court rejected the appellant's claim that denial of his
motion for self-representation was error, deferring to the trial court's
broad discretion to refuse an untimely Faretta motion." 3 In two
cases, the appellant unsuccessfully argued that inadequate waiver of
107. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1133-39, 811 P.2d at 767-71, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 475-79. See
Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 653-55, 808 P.2d at 368-69, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
108. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 653-54, 808 P.2d at 368, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (citing Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980); People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 105, 672 P.2d 835,
846, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 63 (1983)). Typically, conflicts of interest arise where "an attor-
ney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to
another client or a third person or by his own interests." Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1134, 811
P.2d at 768, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (citing Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d at 835, 765 P.2d at 475, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 313).
109. See Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 654, 808 P.2d at 368-69, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10; Jones, 53
Cal. 3d at 1134-36, 811 P.2d at 768-69, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
110. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1989). See Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1141, 811 P.2d
at 765, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (discussing defendant's right to self-representation).
111. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. For a waiver to be effective, the accused must know-
ingly and intelligently renounce the benefits of right to competent counsel. Id. There
is a burden on the trial judge to make the defendant "aware of the dangers and disad-
vantages of self-representation" and then to inquire into the defendant's awareness of
the disadvantages of waiving right to counsel. Id. See generally 5 B. WrrKIN, CALIFOR-
NIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial §§ 2816-19 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (summarizing the con-
stitutional right to self-representation established in Faretta).
112. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317
U.S. 270, 279 (1942)).
113. People v. Frierson, 53 Cal. 3d 730, 742, 808 P.2d 1197, 1202-03, 280 Cal. Rptr.
440, 445-46 (1991). The court reemphasized that the defendant's right to self-represen-
tation, in order to be unconditional, must be invoked "within a reasonable time prior
to the commencement of trial." Id. See generally People v. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843, 771
P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989).
Additionally, a request for self-representation need not be treated automatically as a
motion for substitution of counsel. People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 802 P.2d 169, 276
Cal. Rptr. 679 (1990). See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr.
156 (1970) (a defendant who wishes to replace appointed counsel on the grounds of in-
adequate representation must be given adequate opportunity to present evidence in
support of the claim). Finally, a complaint about counsel's performance without a re-
quest for replacement counsel is insufficient to trigger a Marsden hearing. Frierson,
53 Cal. 3d at 741, 808 P.2d at 1202, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
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right to counsel warranted reversal.114
Most notably, the court held that the trial court need not procure a
Faretta waiver prior to granting the defendant co-counsel status."X5
The court reasoned that where the defendant has limited co-counsel
status, he has not waived his right to counsel because his "attorney
retains control over the case and can prevent the defendant from tak-
ing actions that may seriously harm the defense."1x6 Therefore, be-
cause the defendant is still represented by counsel, the trial court is
not required to give Faretta warnings."*7
D. Change from Self-representation to Counsel Representation
In Gallego, the court formulated the inquiry required when a self-
represented defendant requests appointed counsel at mid-trial. 1 1 s
The court adopted a multi-factored approach,"19 and added that " 'in
the final analysis it is the totality of the facts and circumstances
which the trial court must consider in exercising its discretion as to
whether or not to permit a defendant to again change his mind re-
garding representation mid-trial.' ,120 After applying this new stan-
114. People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1143, 811 P.2d at 774, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 482; People
v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 161, 802 P.2d 169, 188-89, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 698-99 (1990).
115. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at 1142, 811 P.2d at 773, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 481. The California
Supreme Court had never before determined whether a defendant must be given
Faretta warnings prior to assuming a limited co-counsel status. Id at 1141, 811 P.2d at
773, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
116. Id at 1142, 811 P.2d at 773, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
117. Id
118. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 163-65, 802 P.2d at 190-91, 276 Cal. Rptr. 700-01.
119. Id at 163-64, 802 P.2d at 190, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The court first adopted this
multi-factored approach in People v. Windham, where the court addressed the opposite
issue of a change from counsel-representation to self-representation mid-trial. Id at
163, 802 P.2d at 190, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (citing People v. Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121,
128, 560 P.2d 1187, 1191-92, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 12-13 (1977)). A court of appeal decision
addressed the issue in the instant case, and enumerated relevant factors to be consid-
ered in a request to change from self-representation to counsel-representation mid-
trial. Id at 163-64, 802 P.2d at 190, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (citing People v. Elliott, 70 Cal.
App. 3d 984, 993-94, 139 Cal. Rptr. 205, 211 (1977)). The factors include:
(1) defendant's prior history in the substitution of counsel and the desire to
change from self-representation to counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set
forth for the request, (3) the length and stage of the trial proceedings, (4) dis-
ruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the grant-
ing of such motion, and (5) the likelihood of defendant's effectiveness in
defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attor-
ney ....
Id at 164, 802 P.2d at 190, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (quoting Elliott, 70 Cal. App. 3d at 993-
94, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 211).
120. Id. at 164, 802 P.2d at 190, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (quoting People v. Smith, 109
Cal. App. 3d 476, 484, 167 Cal. Rptr. 303, 306 (1980)).
dard, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the defendant's request.121
VI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
The United States Supreme Court definitively established that the
Eighth Amendment does not require intercase proportionality re-
view, or comparison of the death penalty imposed in a particular case
to penalties imposed in similar cases.122 However, three defendants
raised the issue on appeal.123 The court quickly disposed of all three
claims, stating that the federal Constitution does not mandate inter-
case .proportionality review. 124
Additionally, the court addressed the claim of intracase proportion-
ality review; the disproportionality of the death penalty to the de-
fendant's individual culpability.125 The court summarily rejected all
three claims because in each case, the record substantiated a sentence
of death.'26
VII. CONCLUSION
During the period covered in this survey, the California Supreme
Court affirmed all sixteen death sentences. This evidences the Lucas
court's continued reluctance to overturn a conviction absent actual
prejudicial error. Yet, this high affirmance rate, in conjunction with
the large volume of death penalty decisions, exposes potential
problems associated with automatic death penalty appeals.
Death penalty cases have placed an unmanageable burden on the
121. Id at 165, 802 P.2d at 191, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
122. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-54 (1984). The Court explained that intercase
proportionality review may ensure against an arbitrary death sentence, yet is not con-
stitutionally mandated. Id. at 50. See Death Penalty V, supra note 2, at 741-42 (explain-
ing proportionality review); Death Penalty VI, supra note 2, at 718-19 (same).
123. People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115, 1155, 811 P.2d 757, 782, 282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 490
(1991); People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618, 690, 808 P.2d 351, 394, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 735
(1991); People v. Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d 115, 203, 802 P.2d 169, 216, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 726
(1990).
124. Id
125. The supreme court defined intracase proportionality review in People v. Dil-
lon, where the death sentence imposed was disproportionate to the defendant's individ-
ual culpability because he was "an immature 17-year-old ... who shot and killed his
victim out of fear and panic." Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 691, 808 P.2d at 395, 280 Cal. Rptr. at
736 (citing People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 482-90, 668 P.2d 697, 722-27, 194 Cal. Rptr.
390, 415-20 (1983)). The court has acknowledged that the death penalty may violate
the state constitution if "it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." In
re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (1972) (required
felony holding on second conviction for indecent exposure is cruel and unusual
punishment).
126. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 690, 808 P.2d at 394, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 735; Jones, 53 Cal. 3d at
1155, 811 P.2d at 782, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 490; Gallego, 52 Cal. 3d at 203, 802 P.2d at 216-17,
276 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27.
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supreme court. The court has foresworn all notions of judicial effi-
ciency in order to afford the death penalty cases appropriate due pro-
cess. Presumably, the appellant's constitutional rights require a
meticulous review of the record. However, the court must efficiently
dispose of death penalty cases in an attempt to reduce an extensive
backlog and manage its remaining caseload. This demanding sched-
ule may force the court to compromise the appellant's due process
rights, as well as leaving important questions in other areas of law
unanswered.127
Nevertheless, the supreme court refuses to seriously consider al-
lowing the courts of appeal to review capital cases. 128 As one ob-
server noted, "[p]erhaps the greatest failing of the Lucas Court to
date is its unwillingness to acknowledge that a serious problem exists
and to put court reform at the top of its agenda."'129 Until there is a
reformation of the death penalty system, one can expect a continued
backlog of death penalty appeals, to the detriment of the court's
treatment of non-capital issues.130 Thus, it is urgent that the state
remedy the situation immediately, because "'the state undertakes no
more awesome a responsibility than when it deliberately sets about
to excise the life of one of its citizens. Every protection must be ac-
corded innocent and guilty alike, regardless of delay, lest a mistake
be made for which there can be no remedy.' "131
CHRISTINA KATRIS
KURT M. LANGKOW
ARTHUR S. MOREAU III
127. See Uelmen, supra note 3, at 38. Uelman notes that the overwhelming pace of
death penalty cases facing the court raises concern. "Does the rate [of death penalty
cases] evoke confidence in the fairness of the results? And does it allow the court suf-
ficient time to address the other pressing issues of civil and criminal law that demand
resolution? Many observers of the court, including former justices, are ready to an-
swer no to both questions." Id.
128. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing rerouting death penalty
cases through the courts of appeal to relieve the overwhelming caseload of the
supreme court).
129. Uelmen, supra note 7, at 116.
130. Uelmen argues that "death penalty cases usurp the docket of the supreme
court, reducing the justices to performing like a badly overworked intermediate appel-
late court, unable to give other issues the attention they deserve." Gerald F. Uelmen,
Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Courts of California: A Tale of
Two Courts, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 237, 295 (1989).
131. Id at 239-40 (quoting BARRETT PRETTYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT
251 (1961)).
VII. FAMILY LAW
In a child support enforcement action brought by the
district attorney on behalf of the custodial parent, a trial
court may allocate the federal tax dependency exemption
to the noncustodial parent. This procedure does not
violate the custodial parent's due process rights, even
though that parent is not a party to the proceeding:
Monterey County v. Cornejo.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Monterey County v. Cornejo,1 the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a trial court may give the tax dependency exemp-
tion to a noncustodial parent in a child support modification
proceeding initiated by the district attorney on behalf of the custodial
parent.2 The majority based its analysis on two findings. First, the
court found that the amended section 152(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code3 confers jurisdiction on a state court to allocate the dependency
exemption to the noncustodial parent by ordering the custodial par-
ent to waive the exemption.4 Second, the court held that the trial
court's allocation of the exemption did not violate the custodial par-
ent's due process rights, even where the custodial parent was not a
party to the action.5 The court concluded that the trial court's alloca-
tion of the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent was
proper in a child support enforcement action brought by the district
attorney. 6
A. Background
Congress amended the Federal Tax Dependency exemption, sec-
tion 152(e) of the Internal' Revenue Code,7 to its present form in
1984. The pre-1985 version of section 152(e)S allocated the depen-
dency exemption to the noncustodial parent where that parent paid
child support exceeding the threshold amount, if the custodial parent
did not provide more child support than the non-custodial parent in
that year.9 Although it did not preclude courts from allocating the
1. 53 Cal. 3d 1271, 812 P.2d 586, 283 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1991). Justice Arabian au-
thored the majority opinion, in which Justices Lucas, Broussard, Panelli, and Baxter
concurred. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Kennard joined.
2. Id. at 1273, 812 P.2d at 587, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
3. I.R.C. § 152 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (amending I.R.C. § 152 (1982)).
4. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1280, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
5. Id. at 1285, 812 P.2d at 595, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
6. Id at 1273, 812 P.2d at 587, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
7. I.R.C. § 152(e) (West 1986).
8. I.R.C. § 152(e) (West 1982), amended by I.R.C. § 152(e) (West 1986).
9. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1275, 812 P.2d at 588, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (citing I.R.C.
§ 152(e)(2)(B) (West 1982)). Prior to January 1, 1985, a noncustodial parent could
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exemption to noncustodial parents,'0 this pre-1985 section caused
great problems for the IRS where it attempted to determine which
parent deserved the exemption." This administrative inconvenience
caused the IRS to modify the dependency tax exemption section. 12
As amended, section 152(e) basically provides that "the custodial par-
ent is always entitled to the exemption unless he or she signs a writ-
ten declaration disclaining the child as an exemption and the
noncustodial parent attaches the declaration to his or her return."13
B. Statement of the Case
The respondent, Robin Joseph Cornejo, was the natural father of
Jason A. Dina G., the natural mother, and the respondent never
married, and the respondent separated from Dina prior to the birth
of their child.14 Dina began receiving welfare benefits in January,
1980, through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).15
In April, 1980, the district attorney of Monterey County (County)
filed an action on behalf of the mother and child for child support
claim the exemption if 1) he or she paid more than $1,200 in child support in a given
year, 2) the custodial parent did not give more child support than the noncustodial par-
ent, and 3) there was neither an alternate agreement between the parties nor a con-
trary court decree. Id.
10. Id. The following cases concluded that state courts have jurisdiction to allo-
cate the dependency exemption under the pre-1985 version of section 152(e): Grider v.
Grider, 376 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Pettitt v. Pettitt, 261 So. 2d 687, 690
(La. Ct. App. 1972); Westerhof v. Westerhof, 357 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
Greeler v. Greeler, 368 N.W.2d 2, 4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Niederkorn v. Niederkorn,
616 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 443 A.2d 1017, 1018-
19 (N.H. 1982).
11. Cornei, 53 Cal. 3d at 1275, 812 P.2d at 588, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407. The pre-1985
exemption forced the IRS to become highly involved in dependency exemption actions
because of proof problems regarding child support. Id. at 1276, 812 P.2d at 589, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 408. This extensive involvement of the IRS increased costs to both the gov-
ernment and the parties, while the tax revenue in question was de minimus. IE (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 1498-99 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1140).
12. Id. at 1275-76, 812 P.2d at 588-89, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
13. Id. See 33 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation § 1147 (1991) (explaining the release
of the dependency exemption by the custodial parent). The present version of § 152(e)
removes the IRS from the dependency exemption dispute, providing "'more certainty
by allowing the custodial spouse the exemption unless the spouse waives his or her
right to claim the exemption.'" Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1276, 812 P.2d at 589, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 408 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 1498-99 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1140).
14. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d 1271, 1273-74, 812 P.2d 586, 587, 283 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406.
15. Id. at 1274, 812 P.2d at 587, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
and public assistance reimbursement.' 6 The respondent agreed to
pay child support,17 and stipulated that Dina retain full custody of
Jason. In 1983, the district attorney brought two more actions seek-
ing to modify child support.'s
The district attorney initiated the present case in 1988, seeking yet
another child support modification. 19 At this proceeding, the respon-
dent prayed for the dependency exemption. After the parents
agreed on child support modification, the trial court granted the de-
pendency exemption to the respondent. 20 The court of appeal af-
firmed, finding that the trial court "possessed the statutory authority
to allocate the tax deduction, and that Dina's interests were ade-
quately protected in the enforcement proceeding." 21 The California
Attorney General sought review on behalf of the County based on
the statutory and due process claims which the court of appeal ad-
dressed. In addition, the attorney general alleged that the new ex-
emption section stripped the trial court of its jurisdiction to assign
the deduction to the noncustodial spouse.22 The California Supreme
Court granted review because of the "important jurisdictional issue
of first impression in this state."23 The supreme court affirmed and
modified the court of appeal's ruling, specifying that on remand the
superior court must condition child support on the custodial parent's
waiver of the dependency exemption.2 4
II. TREATMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. State Court Allocation of the Dependency Exemption
The first issue the majority addressed was whether state courts
have jurisdiction to allocate the dependency exemption to a noncus-
todial parent under the new version of section 152(e). 25 The court
noted that most courts interpreted the pre-1985 exemption section as
16. Id. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for an explanation the proce-
dure involved in child support enforcement actions which the County initiates.
17. Corn&, 53 Cal. 3d at 1247, 812 P.2d at 587, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 406. The father
initially agreed to pay $100 each month in child support. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id, at 1274, 812 P.2d at 588, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407. According to the new agree-
ment, the father would pay $272 each month in child support and arrearages totaling
$2,546.32. Id.
21. Id
22. Id. at 1275, 812 P.2d at 588, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1275-81, 812 P.2d at 588-92, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407-11.
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giving state courts the equitable power to do so. 26 In addition, a great
majority of courts have interpreted the present section 152(e) as al-
lowing state courts to allocate the exemption to the noncustodial par-
ent.2 7 The court stressed that "'the amendment was merely
intended to enhance the administrative convenience of the IRS, not
to interfere with state court prerogatives.' "28 In addition, the court
noted that the majority of courts acknowledge that they themselves
may not allocate the exemption through court order, but instead may
accomplish the allocation by requiring the custodial parent to waive
his or her right to the exemption. 29
The court observed that the intent of Congress in amending the
tax code was to decrease litigation for the IRS, rather than to limit
26. Id. at 1275, 812 P.2d at 588, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 407. See supra note 10 and accom-
panying text.
27. Cornejo, M3 Cal. 3d at 1276-77, 812 P.2d at 589, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 408. The fol-
lowing cases concluded that state courts have the power to allocate the dependency ex-
emption under the present version of section 152(e): Gamble v. Gamble, 562 So. 2d
1343, 1346 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Lincoln v. Lincoln, 746 P.2d 13, 17 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987); Serrano v. Serrano, 566 A.2d 413, 418 (Conn. 1989); In re Einhorn, 533 N.E.2d 29,
37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Ritchey v. Ritchey, 556 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); In
re Kerber, 433 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455, 457
(Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Rovira v. Rovira, 550 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Wassif
v. Wassif, 551 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Bailey v. Bailey, 540 N.E.2d 187,
188-89 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 779 (Miss. 1989); Corey v. Corey, 712 S.W.2d
708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Milesnick, 765 P.2d 751, 754 (Mont. 1988); Babka v.
Babka, 452 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Neb. 1990); Gwodz v. Gwodz, 560 A.2d 85, 88 (N.J. Super
Ct. App. Div. 1989); Zogby v. Zogby, 158 A.D.2d 974, 974, 551 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (1990);
Cohen v. Cohen, 396 S.E.2d 344, 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Fleck v. Fleck, 427 N.W.2d
355, 359 (N.D. 1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 518 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (1988), cert denied, 488
U.S. 846 (Ohio 1988); Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); In re Peacock, 771 P.2d 767, 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989);
Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 459 (W. Va. 1987); Pergolski v. Pergolski, 420 N.W.2d
414, 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
28. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1277, 812 P.2d at 589, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (quoting Motes
v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). See also Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390
N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (state court allocation of the dependency exemp-
tion is not contrary to congressional intent because it does not increase IRS involve-
ment in the determination).
29. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d 1277-78, 812 P.2d at 590, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 409. See, e.g., Lin-
coln v. Lincoln, 746 P.2d 13, 17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); In re Einhorn, 533 N.E.2d 29, 37
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Wassiff v. Wassiff, 551 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989);
Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Nichols v. Tedder, 547
So. 2d 766, 772-80 (Miss. 1989); In re Milesnick, 765 P.2d 751, 754 (Mont. 1988); Motes v.
Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 236-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 457 (W.
Va. 1987); Pergloskd v. Pergolski, 420 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). Cf Jensen
v. Jensen, 753 P.2d 342, 345 (Nev. 1988) (the court may order the custodial spouse to
execute the waiver only if modifying alimony and child support will not achieve a simi-
lar economic result).
state courts' ability to require the noncustodial parent to waive the
exemption.3 0 The court concluded that "it is eminently reasonable to
infer that if Congress had intended to forbid state courts from allo-
cating the exemptions by ordering the waiver to be signed, it would
plainly have 'said so.' "31 Thus, the absence of any contrary statutory
language convinced the court that section 152(e) allowed state courts
to allocate the dependency exemption through their traditional equi-
table power.3 2
The supreme court emphasized that only a small minority of courts
have ruled that the new tax code prevents state courts from ordering
custodial parents to involuntarily waive the exemption.33 The court
stated that these decisions were without merit.3 4 Yet, the court
noted that section 152(d) "is absolutely silent as to whether or not a
state court may direct the custodial parent to execute the declara-
tion"35 waiving the dependency exemption.
The court demonstrated the reasonableness of allowing a state
court to allocate the dependency exemption by directing a waiver.3 6
The court explained that the exemption is more valuable to those
taxpayers with a higher income, because it gives them greater income
tax reduction.3 7 Therefore, where the noncustodial parent has a
30. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1278, 812 P.2d at 590, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (citing Cross,
363 S.E.2d at 457).
31. Id. (quoting Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 458).
32. Id. at 1280, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
33. Id. at 1278, 812 P.2d at 590-91, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10 (citing McKenzie v. Kin-
sey, 532 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548 (S.D.
1989); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D. 1989)). The court also noted that only
one court held that the new dependency exemption section totally divested trial courts
of their jurisdiction to allocate the exemption. Id. at 1279, 812 P.2d at 591, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 410. See Lorenz v. Lorenz, 419 N.W.2d 770, 771 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). The
court discredited this opinion, stating that the opinion lacked analysis and relied on
the mere fact that no express statutory language authorized state jurisdiction. Cormejo,
53 Cal. 2d at 1279, 812 P.2d at 591, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 410. The court noted that as long as
"the federal goal of administrative clarity and convenience is served, the statute
manifests utter indifference to whether the declaration was signed voluntarily or pur-
suant to court order." Id.
34. Cornepo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1279, 812 P.2d at 591, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (citing McKen-
zie, 532 So. 2d at 100 n.3; Brandriet, 444 N.W.2d at 459). In McKenzie, the Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that section 152(e) precluded state courts from procuring an
involuntary waiver from the custodial parent because this action exceeded the lan-
guage of the code. McKenzie, 532 So. 2d at 100 n.3. In Brandriet, the South Dakota
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion based on its opinion that section 152(e)
intends a voluntary waiver. Brandriet, 444 N.W.2d at 459.
35. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1279, 812 P.2d at 591, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (emphasis in
original). See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
36. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1279-80, 812 P.2d at 591-92, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11.
37. Id. at 1280, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (citing Cross v. Cross, 363
S.E.2d 449, 459 (W. Va. 1987) (the progressivity of federal income tax causes the ex-
emption to be more valuable to a person with a higher income)). Accord Nichols v.
Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 766-77 (Miss. 1989); Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
[Vol. 19: 733, 19921 California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
higher adjusted gross income than the custodial parent,3 8 "the effect
of awarding the exemption to the noncustodial parent is to increase
the after-tax spendable income of the family as a whole, which may
then be channeled into child support or other payments."3 9 Thus,
the court concluded that the minority decisions were without merit,
and held that section 152(e) does not preclude state courts from allo-
cating the exemption to the noncustodial parent by directing the cus-
todial parent to waive the exemption.40
2. Due Process
The court next addressed whether the trial court's allocation of the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent violated the custo-
dial parent's due process rights, where the custodial parent was not a
party to the proceeding. 41 The County initiated the proceeding on
behalf of the custodial parent according to sections 11475.142 and
11350.143 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Section
11475.1(a) provides that the district attorney must enforce child sup-
port obligations through appropriate judicial action, 4 while section
11350.1 limits the actionable issues in these proceedings to paternity
38. The court noted that the noncustodial parent often has a higher adjusted gross
income than the custodial parent. Cornijo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1280, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 411. See Nichols, 547 So. 2d at 775 (the court's allocation of the exemption to
the noncustodial parent is logical because that parent usually has the higher income).
39. Corneja, 53 Cal. 3d at 1280, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (citing Nichols,
547 So. 2d at 774-75).
40. Id. at 1280-81, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The court remanded the
present case, allowing the trial court to order the custodial parent to waive the exemp-
tion in exchange for increased child support. Id at 1281, 812 P.2d at 592, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 411.
41. Id
42. CAL. WEL.. & INST. CODE § 11475.1 (West 1991). This provision carries out the
federal mandate requiring a state to provide child support collection services to all in-
dividuals prior to participating in the federal AFDC program. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d 1271,
1281, 812 P.2d 586, 592-93, 283 Cal. Rptr. 405, 411-12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(A)
(1988)). See generally 10 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child
§§ 300, 306 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (explaining the duty of the district attorney to
initiate child support enforcement proceedings on behalf of the custodial parent ac-
cording to section 11475.1); 4 JOHN L. GODDARD, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, Family Law
Practice § 323, at 534-39 (3d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the procedural aspects
of child support enforcement proceedings which the government brings on behalf of
the custodial parent).
43. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350.1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1991). See generally, 4
JOHN L. GODDARD, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, Family Law Practice § 323 at 533-34 (3d ed.
1981 & Supp. 1991) (summarizing section 11350.1).
44. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1281, 812 P.2d at 593, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (citing
§ 11475.1(a)). See supra note 42.
and child support.45 Considering these limits, the court first deter-
mined whether the trial court appropriately addressed the allocation
of the dependency exemption.48 The court noted that section
11476.1(g) allows courts to consider any of the factors listed in Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 24647 in determining child support, includ-
ing earning capacity, obligations of the parents, and "any other
factors the court deems just and equitable."48 The court found that
income tax was an obligation of the parents, and that allocation of
the dependency exemption was a "just and equitable" factor in dis-
cerning child support.49 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial
court properly considered allocation of the exemption according to
the limits of section 11350.1, because "'[d]ependency deductions are
connected directly with the requirements of a noncustodial parent to
provide support and the allocation of the allowance has a direct effect
on the financial resources available to the child.' 50
The court held that the child support enforcement action did not
violate the custodial mother's due process rights, even though she
was not a party to the action.5 ' First, the custodial mother assisted
45. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1282, 812 P.2d at 593, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 412. See supra
note 47.
46. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1282, 812 P.2d at 593, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 246 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). Section 246 provides that:
[w]hen determining the amount due for support the court shall consider the
following circumstances of the respective parties:
(a) The earning capacity and needs of each party.
(b) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each.
(c) The duration of the marriage.
(d) The ability of the obligee to engage in gainful employment without un-
duly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the
obligee.
(e) The time required for the obligee to acquire appropriate education,
training, and employment.
(f) The age and health of the parties.
(g) The standard of living of the parties.
(h) Any other factors which it deems just and equitable.
Id,
48. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1282, 812 P.2d at 593, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (citing CAL.
Civ. CODE § 246). See Van Diest v. Van Diest, 266 Cal. App. 2d 541, 545, 72 Cal. Rptr.
304, 307 (1968) (enumerating factors the trial judge considers in child support
determinations).
49. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1282, 812 P.2d at 593, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (citing CAL.
CIV. CODE § 246; In re Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 847, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157, 165 (1979) (in-
come tax is an obligation of the parents which courts can consider in determining child
support); Fuller v. Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d 405, 409, 152 Cal. Rptr. 467, 469 (1979) (de-
pendency exemption is a "just and equitable" factor)).
50. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1282-83, 812 P.2d at 593-94, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13 (quot-
ing In re Lovetinsky, 418 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987)). See also Baird v. Baird,
760 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (the allocation of the exemption may have has
a direct financial effect on the parties); Sarver v. Dathe, 439 N.W.2d 548, 551 (S.D.
1989) (noting that the allocation of the exemption factors into the determination of
child support because of its financial effect on the family).
51. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1283, 812 P.2d at 594, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
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the district attorney by providing financial statements and availing
herself as a witness.52 Second, she presented evidence concerning the
exemption through the district attorney's argument.53 This participa-
tion convinced the court that the trial court had not violated the cus-
todial mother's due process rights in allocating the exemption.5 4
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that section 152(e) does not
surrender state courts' equitable powers to allocate the dependency
exemption by requiring the custodial parent to waive the exemp-
tion.55 He dissented, however, stating that the trial court should not
allocate the exemption without affording the custodial parent notice
and an opportunity to be heard.5 6 Justice Mosk believed that the cus-
todial parent in this case did not receive due process under Article I,
section 7(a) of the state constitution,57 although she cooperated in the
proceeding and could have later brought an independent action con-
cerning the exemption.58
Justice Mosk relied upon the analysis set forth in Anderson v.
Superior Court.59 In that case, the California Court of Appeal ap-
52. Id.
53. Id
54. Id. Further, the court emphasized that the custodial mother could initiate an
independent action regarding the exemption under section 11350.1, and that decision
would substitute the former court order. Id. at 1283-84, 812 P.2d at 594, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 413. Section 11350.1 states: "[n]othing contained in this section shall be construed to
prevent the parties from bringing an independent action..... In that event, the court
in those proceedings shall make an independent determination on the issue of support
which shall supersede the support order made pursuant to this section." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11350.1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1991). See 10 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 339 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991) (a custodial parent
can initiate an independent action).
55. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1285, 812 P.2d at 595, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
56. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk argued that because a court cannot or-
der the noncustodial parent to pay child support without notice and an opportunity to
be heard, then it equally cannot order the custodial parent to waive the exemption
without the same due process requirements. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). It should be
noted, however, that the exemption itself may not be a constitutionally protected in-
terest. See Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 773 (Miss. 1989) (the dependency exemp-
tion is not a constitutionally guaranteed property right). Thus, it may be argued that
deprivation of the exemption does not require due process.
57. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). This section states that "[a] person may not be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id.
58. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1285, 812 P.2d at 595, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting) (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a)). See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying
text.
59. Id. at 1285-86, 812 P.2d at 595-96, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
plied a four-pronged analysis to determine whether the trial court
had violated a custodial parent's due process rights.6 0 The court
considered:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirements would entail.61
The fourth consideration was "that persons subjected to deprivatory
governmental action be treated with respect and dignity."6 2
Justice Mosk applied this analysis to the case at hand, and found
that the trial court deprived the custodial parent of her due process
rights.63 First, the action of allocating the exemption affected her
private economic interest.64 Second, because the district attorney had
not represented the custodial parent, there was a threat of errone-
ously depriving the parent of this private economic interest.65 In
fact, the district attorney argued that the court need not consider the
allocation issue in the enforcement proceeding, and never presented
the custodial parent's position against the reallocation.66 Third, al-
lowing a custodial parent an opportunity to be heard would not bur-
den the government interest in providing adequate child support and
(citing Anderson v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1321, 262 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1989)).
In Anderson, the California Court of Appeal considered whether the trial court vio-
lated a custodial parent's due process rights, where the custodial parent served as a
witness without counsel in a child support reimbursement action brought by the
county against the custodial parent's spouse. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Ander-
son, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1323-27, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 407-09). Because of this testimony,
the trial court found that the custodial parent's child support payments were deficient
and threatened to reduce the AFDC benefits. Id. at 1286, 812 P.2d at 596, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 415 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1324-27, 262
Cal. Rptr. at 407-09).
60. Anderson, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1329-31, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
61. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1286, 812 P.2d at 596, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting) (citing Anderson, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1330, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (quoting Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))).
62. Id. at 1286, 812 P.2d at 596, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing
Anderson, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1330, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (citing People v. Ramirez, 25
Cal. 3d 260, 267-68, 599 P.2d 622, 626, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (1979))). In Anderson, the
court of appeal held that the trial court had violated the custodial mother's due process
rights where it had not required notice of the family law procedure which jeopardized
her welfare benefits. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson, 213 Cal. App. 3d at
1331, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 412).
63. Id. at 1288, 812 P.2d at 597, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1286, 812 P.2d at 596, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk stressed the majority's clear statement that the exemption affects the financial
position of the family as a whole. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text. Therefore, there is a property interest at stake where the trial
court allocates the dependency exemption. Id. at 1286, 812 P.2d at 596, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 415 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
65. 1d. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1286-87, 812 P.2d at 596, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 415 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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reimbursement to the county.67 The trial court could have allowed
the district attorney or the custodial parent to present the argument
on the exemption issue without undue burden.68 Fourth, by depriv-
ing the custodial parent of the exemption without an opportunity to
be heard, the trial court treated her with neither respect nor dig-
nity.69 Therefore, Justice Mosk concluded that the trial court's real-
location of the dependency exemption violated the custodial parent's
due process rights.70
III. CONCLUSION
The Cornejo decision complements the intent of Congress in its
amendment of the pre-1985 dependency tax exemption section.71
Cornejo removes the IRS from dependency disputes by allowing trial
courts to allocate the exemption to the noncustodial parent and mod-
ify child support payments accordingly. This implementation of sec-
tion 152(d) "provide[s] admirable simplicity, if not 'equity' "72 in
determining which parent is entitled to the exemption, while avoid-
ing "considerable controversy, litigation, and uncertainty."7 3 In addi-
tion, by allowing the court to compel the custodial parent to waive
the exemption, Cornejo will aid higher-income noncustodial parents,
who "may not be able to persuade former spouses to sign waivers."74
Yet, while Cornejo eases the administrative burden on the IRS
caused by divorce disputes, it may increase due process violations by
depriving custodial parents of an opportunity to be heard. Accord-
ingly, California trial courts must proceed cautiously in allocating the
dependency exemption, and must not "lightly allow a summary dep-
rivation of [a custodial parent's] interests" 75 by allocating the exemp-
tion without affording that parent such opportunity to be heard.76
CHRISTINA KATRIS
67. Id. at 1287, 812 P.2d at 596-97, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1287, 312 P.2d at 597, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1288, 812 P.2d at 597, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
71. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
72. Patricia L. Lewis & Julie W. Davis, Act Alters Tax Provisions for Divorcing
Couples, LEGAL TimEs, Aug. 27, 1984, at 19.
73. Id. See supra notes 10-12 & 28 and accompanying text.
74. Laurie Cohen, Few Shake-ups in '85 Rules, CHI. TRIB., March 9, 1986 at 4.
75. Cornejo, 53 Cal. 3d 1271, 1287, 812 P.2d 586, 597, 283 Cal. Rptr. 405, 416 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
76. In Solberg v. Wenker, the California Court of Appeal suggested that courts
can ensure due process by voiding judgments where both the district attorney failed to
VIII. LABOR LAW
A. The explicit language, structure and purpose of the
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
demonstrates a congressional intent to preempt Civil
Code section 3111, which creates liens on property in
favor of trust funds established pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements: Carpenters Southern California
Administrative Corporation v. El Capitan Development
Corporation.
The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),' is a
comprehensive federal statute designed to promote the interest of
employers and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.2 Con-
gress created many safeguards to preclude interference with rights
protected by ERISA.3 One prominent safeguard is ERISA's broad
preemption provision,4 which supersedes all state laws insofar as they
"relate to any employee benefit plan."5
In Carpenters v. El Capitan,6 the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether the preemption provision of ERISA applies to state
lien laws, specifically California Civil Code section 3111 [hereinafter
section 3111].7 Section 3111 allows a trust fund to record a lien
inform an unrepresented parent of the right to trial on certain issues, and where the
parent establishes that he or she would not have executed a child support agreement
absent this failure to inform. 163 Cal. App. 3d 475, 478-79, 209 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548
(1985). This approach could be effective if applied to dependency exemption proceed-
ings, and would ensure that the custodial parent received due process where the court
reallocated the exemption in that parent's absence.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Agency and Employment § 341 (9th ed. 1987).
2. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). "The statute imposes par-
ticipation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans. It also sets various uni-
form standards, including rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
responsibility, for both pension and welfare plans." Id. at 91.
3. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990). "As part of
this closely integrated regulatory system Congress included various safeguards to pre-
clude abuse and 'to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into being
by this landmark reform legislation.'" Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-127, at 36 (1973)).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). In the preemption provision of ERISA, Congress
provided: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all state laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title." Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Section 1144(c) defines the terms used in section
1144(a). To emphasize its intent that courts liberally apply ERISA's preemption provi-
sion, Congress used broad language in defining "state law." Such laws include "all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state action having the effect of law." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1988).
6. 53 Cal. 3d 1041, 811 P.2d 296, 282 Cal. Rptr. 277, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 430(1991). Justice Panelli authored the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas
and Justices Kennard, Arabian and Baxter concurred. Justice Broussard wrote a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice Mosk joined.
7. Id. at 1045, 811 P.2d at 297, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3111
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against real property if an employer fails to make the requisite con-
tributions.8 The court followed a trend of recent United States
Supreme Court decisions dealing with ERISA's preemption provision
applicability to various state laws9 by deferring to the federal stat-
ute's perceived congressional intent.' 0 By analyzing the explicit lan-
guage, structure and purpose of ERISA, the court held that ERISA
preempted section 3111.11
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
In his majority opinion, Justice Panelli stressed that ERISA ex-
pressly preempts all state laws that "relate" to employee benefit
plans,x2 as opposed to the petitioner's contention that a state law
must "regulate" an ERISA plan in order to be preempted.'3 The
court held that; section 3111 is not only "specifically designed to affect
(West 1974 & Supp. 1992)). Section 3111 provides that: "[A]n express trust fund estab-
lished pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to which payments are required
to be made on account of fringe benefits supplemental to a wage agreement for the
benefit of a claimnt on particular real property shall have a lien on such property in
the amount of the supplemental fringe benefit payments owing to it pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement." Id
8. Carpentent, 53 Cal. 3d at 1046, 811 P.2d at 298, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 279. See supra
note 7. See also 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment
§ 340 (9th ed. 1987).
9. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (a state law re-
lates to a benefit plan if it has a connection or reference with the plan); Ingersoll Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990) ("t]he key to § 514(a) is found in the
words 'relate to' "); Franchise Tax Board v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24,
n.26 (1988) (describing section 514(a) of ERISA as a "virtually unique preemption pro-
vision"); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) (describing ERISA's preemp-
tion provision as being "conspicuous for its breadth").
10. Carpenteri, 53 Cal. 2d at 1048-49, 811 P.2d at 299-300, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81
(1991). The California Supreme Court granted review of Carpenters in light of the de-
cision in Pilot Lifr. Id at 1046, 811 P.2d at 298, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 279 (citing Pilot Life,
481 U.S. 41). In Pilot Life, the Supreme Court held that ERISA's preemption provi-
sion was designed to "establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal con-
cern." Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 523 (1981).
11. Carpentenr, 53 Cal. 3d at 1056, 811 P.2d at 305, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
12. Id. at 1049, 811 P.2d at 300, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 281. See also upra note 9.
13. Carpenterm, 53 Cal. 3d at 1050, 811 P.2d at 300, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 281. Peti-
tioner's argument was based on 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2), which preempts laws which
"[purport] to regulate" plans. Id, (quoting 42 U.S.C § 1144(c)(2)). See also Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 484 (1990) (if congressional intent were to pre-
empt only those slate laws that "regulate" plan terms, then Congress would not have
placed this restriction in an obscure section while using "relate to" language in the
preemption section itself).
employee benefit plans,"'14 it also regulates ERISA plans by providing
an additional method of funding, which ERISA does not allow.'5 The
majority rejected the argument that section 3111 merely provided an
additional enforcement method.16 Instead, the court determined that
section 3111 creates new substantive rights by allowing a trust fund
to enforce a debt against a third party not a party to the original col-
lective bargaining agreement. 17 The court reasoned that if state-
based actions were allowed to develop different substantive standards
than those provided under ERISA, then consistent application of ER-
ISA might be undermined.' 8
The court also dismissed the petitioner's claim that ERISA should
not preempt section 3111 because section 3111 embodied a tradition-
ally recognized state power.19 To avoid preemption, it must be estab-
lished that section 3111 merely affects ERISA plans in a "tenuous,
remote, or peripheral" manner,20 rather than having a substantive ef-
fect.21 Finally, the court concluded that even if section 3111 provided
an additional remedy consistent with ERISA'S requirements, this is
irrelevant in a federal preemption analysis.22
14. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1049, 811 P.2d at 300, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
15. Id. at 1051, 811 P.2d at 301, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 282. The court stated that because
section 3111 creates an additional funding mechanism, it "regulates" ERISA plans, and
consequently "relates to" ERISA plans, which constitutes grounds for preemption. Id
See also Iron Workers Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548, 549 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3272 (1990) (because a Louisiana state law created an additional
method of enforcing funding requirements of employee benefit plans, it was pre-
empted by ERISA).
16. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1054-55, 811 P.2d at 304, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 285. Peti-
tioners relied on the decision in Mackey that "state law methods for collecting money
judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA." Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency and Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 834 (1988). However, the California
Supreme Court rejected this analysis because ERISA "expressly provides remedies for
recovery of delinquent contributions to employee benefit plans." Carpenters, 53 Cal.
3d at 1055, 811 P.2d at 304, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
17. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1055, 811 P.2d at 304, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
18. Id. at 1053, 811 P.2d at 303, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 284. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1987) (ERISA remedies are exclusive and override state
laws which purport to create similar remedies). In his dissent, Justice Broussard ar-
gued that section 3111 did not create substantive rights because the lien did not create
personal liability of the owner. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1065-66, 811 P.2d at 311, 282
Cal. Rptr. at 292.
19. Id at 1055-56, 811 P.2d at 304-05, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
20. Id. at 1056, 811 P.2d at 304-05, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
21. Id. "IT]he strength of the state interest is of no consequence where the state
law clearly 'purports to regulate' an employee benefit plan." Id at 1056, 811 P.2d at
304, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
22. Id See Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30
(1988) (ERISA's preemption provision overrides even state laws consistent with ER-
ISA's substantive requirements); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 739 (1985) (state legislative "good intentions" do not immunize state laws from
ERISA's broad preemption provision).
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B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard's dissent recognized ERISA's broad preemption
clause but admonished the majority for failing to recognize preemp-
tion's necessary limitations.23 He argued that the majority misinter-
preted the congressional intent of ERISA by relying on a preemption
provision which was not part of ERISA as was originally enacted. 24
Moreover, Justice Broussard asserted that Congress clearly intended
for state law to apply in certain types of delinquency actions.25 The
majority's holding would ultimately violate the rule prohibiting spe-
cial treatment of ERISA plans.26 Finally, Justice Broussard con-
cluded that ERISA, as originally enacted, did not provide a federal
mechanism for recovering delinquent payments,27 and therefore, if
state actions were preempted, congressional intent would be
stymied.28
III. CONCLUSION
In Carpenters, the California Supreme Court stated that ERISA
need only "relate" to a state law to validly preempt that law. The de-
cision should lead to consistency where future courts apply ERISA
23. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1057, 811 P.2d at 305, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 1059, 811 P.2d at 307, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (Broussard, J., dissenting)
(" 'It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] ... that controls.' "). Md
(quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354
(1977)). Justice Broussard believed that because the provisions of 29 U.S.C. 1145 were
added to ERISA in 1980, they do not reflect the original congressional intent. Id. The
majority argued, however, that even in 1974, ERISA contained a cause of action for the
enforcement of collecting delinquent contributions, namely 29 U.S.C. section 1132. Id.
at 1053, n.8, 811 P.2d at 302, n.8, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 283, n.8.
25. 1& at 1059, 811 P.2d at 307, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard argued that ERISA section 1132(g) expressly provided for state
based actions for the recovery of delinquent contributions. Id See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g); Mackey, 486 U.S. 825 (establishing three classes of state law not preempted).
26. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1060, 811 P.2d at 307-08, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 288-289
(Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard argued that those employees who are
not members of ERISA can obtain liens for the entire amount of unpaid compensation
while ERISA members can obtain a lien for only part of their compensation, because
they initially received partial compensation from ERISA. Id See also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3110 (West 1974) (describing persons entitled to lien).
27. Carpenters, 53 Cal. 3d at 1067, 811 P.2d at 312, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (Broussard,
J., dissenting). Justice Broussard concluded that the 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (civil enforce-
ment of ERISA) only provides for equitable relief and not for the recovery of money
judgments. In addition, he argued that Congress's later enactment of 29 U.S.C. § 1145
illustrates that, as originally enacted, ERISA did not provide federal enforcement rem-
edies. Id
28. Id,
provisions to state laws, and will prevent conflicts of interest from di-
vergent state and federal substantive standards. It is still unan-
swered, however, whether ERISA can be used to enforce money
judgment collection. If future courts determine that state law liens
cannot be enforced through ERISA, substantial funding invested in
ERISA plans will be seriously jeopardized. Moreover, a lack of en-
forcement power by ERISA would discriminate against employees
belonging to ERISA plans by denying them lien rights, which contra-
dicts the congressional intent of protecting plan employees.
ANDREA L. WILSON
B. Under the National Bank Act, a terminated national
bank officer is precluded from filing a state law action
for wrongful termination only where the board of
directors removed the officer or the directors approved or
ratified the removal: Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Bank Act' (hereinafter NBA) was enacted in 1864.2
Title 12, section 24, paragraph 5 of the NBA (hereinafter section 24)
authorizes a national banking association "[t]o elect or appoint direc-
tors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice presi-
dent, cashier, and other officers."3 Moreover, directors may "dismiss
such officers or any of them at pleasure."4 Where a national banking
association terminates an employee within the scope of section 24,
the NBA preempts all other state law actions for breach of an em-
ployment contract.5
In Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court,6 the California Supreme
Court interpreted section 24 of the NBA. The court established a
four-part test 7 to determine when branch managers and other em-
ployees of national banking associations qualify as "other officers"
under section 24.8 The court opined that a national bank may termi-
1. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1988).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1988).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 24, 5 (1988) (emphasis added). See generally Robert H. Platt,
Wrongful Termination in the Banking Industry, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 971 (1985) (dis-
cussing wrongful termination in light of the National Bank Act).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 24, 5 (1988) (emphasis added).
5. Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524-26 (9th Cir. 1989).
6. 53 Cal. 3d 1082, 811 P.2d 1025, 282 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1991). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion with Justices Panelli, Arabian and Puglia concurring. Jus-
tice Puglia, of the Third District Court of Appeal, was sitting under assignment. Jus-
tice Kennard wrote a separate concurring opinion which was joined by Justice
Broussard. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Mosk joined Justice Kennard's
concurring opinion by reference.
7. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
8. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1091, 811 P.2d at 1030, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
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nate a branch manager at pleasure where the manager meets the
four-part definition of "other officers." 9 In addition, the court deter-
mined that the NBA preempts state law actions for wrongful termi-
nation10 only where a board of directors terminates an officer or
directors approve or ratify a termination."
In Wells Fargo, Barbara Wertz, Wilma Botelho, and Thomas
Moore were employed by Wells Fargo, a national banking association.
Each employee held both branch manager and vice-president posi-
tions. In 1985, a senior vice-president discharged all three employ-
ees1 2 without approval or ratification by the board of directors.
Botelho and Moore filed a joint action,' 3 and Wertz filed an action on
her own behalf. Both suits alleged various common law actions in-
cluding wrongful termination based on age discrimination.'4 Wells
Fargo moved for summary judgment in both suits, asserting that all
state common law causes of action were preempted by the NBA. 1
The trial court denied the motion.'6 Subsequently, the two actions
were consolidated and heard by the court of appeal pursuant to a
writ of mandate.17 The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's rul-
ing because the employees were not discharged by the board of
9. Id. at 1094, 811 P.2d at 1032, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
10. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Em-
ployment § 163 (9th ed. 1987); 29 CAL. JuR. 3D Employer and Employee §§ 62-65 (1986
& Supp. 1991); Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Em-
ployer May Discharge At-Will Employee For Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4TH 544 (1982)
(discussing state law actions for wrongful termination).
11. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1103, 811 P.2d at 1038, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
12. Id. at 108647, 811 P.2d at 1027, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 843. Wells Fargo's bylaws au-
thorized the directors to delegate the power to discharge "other officers" at pleasure.
The directors delegated this power to the chief executive officer, who in turn delegated
the power to the executive vice-president. Id.
13. Id. at 1087, 811 P.2d at 1027, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 843. Botelho and Moore filed an
action with ten other Wells Fargo branch managers. However, at the time of trial,
only Botelho and Moore remained. Id.
14. Id. The plaintiffs also alleged breach of an implied agreement, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and
Employment §§ 171-77 (9th ed. 1987); 29 CAL. JUR. 2D Employer and Employee §§ 72-73
(1986 & Supp. 1991); 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 60 (1970 & Supp. 1991) (dis-
cussing specific wrongful termination actions).
15. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1087, 811 P.2d at 1027, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
16. Id. The trial court held, however, that Wells Fargo was entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Moreover, the
court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo on the age discrimination claim filed
by Wertz. Id. Therefore, the remaining actions were for breach of an implied agree-
ment and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In addition,
Botelho and Moore retained their claims for age discrimination. Id.
17. Id. at 1087, 811 P.2d at 1028, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
directors.18
The supreme court faced two issues: (1) whether the term "other
officers" in section 24 of the NBA includes branch managers; 19 and
(2) whether the NBA permits directors to delegate the power to ter-
minate officers.2O The court held that although the branch managers
were "other officers," the NBA did not authorize the directors to
delegate the power to terminate at pleasure.2 ' Therefore, the termi-
nation of the plaintiffs was not within the scope of the NBA, and the
state law actions were not barred.22
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority O pinion
The California Supreme Court first interpreted the definition of
"other officers." The court noted that the purpose of the NBA is to
promote stability, 23 safety,2 4 and public trust2 5 among national bank-
ing associations. 26 Thus, the court argued that to accomplish this
purpose, officers who possess great authority within a national bank-
ing association must be removable at pleasure.27
The court set forth a four-part test to determine which employees
qualify as "other officers." The employee must: (1) hold "an office
created by the board of directors and listed in the bank's bylaws[;]" 28
(2) be "appointed by the board of directors, either directly or pursu-
ant to a delegation of board authority set forth in the bylaws[;]"2 9 (3)
have "express legal authority to bind the bank in its transactions...
[;]"30 and (4) have "decision-making authority ... [which] relates to
fundamental banking operations . . . ."31 The court held that the
plaintiffs, who were branch managers, met the above-mentioned
test,3 2 and therefore, were within the section 24 meaning of "other
18. Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 288 Cal. App. 3d 288, 291, 267 Cal. Rptr.
49, 50 (1990).
19. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1086, 811 P.2d at 1026, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
20. Id, at 1086, 811 P.2d at 1026-27, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
21. Id. at 1086, 811 P.2d at 1027, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
22. Id. at 1103, 811 P.2d at 1038, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
23. Id. at 1089, 811 P.2d at 1029, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citing Alegria v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 111 Idaho 314, 316, 723 P.2d 858, 860 (1986)).
24. Id. at 1089, 811 P.2d at 1029, 282 Cal.Rptr. at 845 (citing Werstervelt v. Mohren-
stecher, 76 F. 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1896)).
25. Id. (citing Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 529 (9th Cir. 1989)).
26. Id.
27. Id. (citing Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122).
28. Id, at 1091, 811 P.2d at 1030, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988)).
29. Id
30. Id. (citing Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 46, 70 (1828)).
31. Id. (citing Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118, 122).
32. Id. The court noted that the position of branch manager was created by the
directors and listed in the bylaws. Moreover, the plaintiffs were authorized to act on
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officers." 33
The court then analyzed the authority of the board of directors to
delegate their power to terminate an officer at pleasure.3 4 The court
noted that directors cannot usually delegate authority given by a stat-
ute,35 unless statutory law expressly provides for such delegation.36
Accordingly, the court explained that because the NBA does not ex-
pressly grant directors the authority to delegate their power to termi-
nate at pleasure,37 this power is not delegable.38
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that directors may not
delegate their power to terminate at pleasure.3 9 Contrary to the ma-
jority, however, Kennard argued that branch managers are not
within the section 24 definition of "other officers."40 One basis for
her conclusion was that the position of branch manager was not suffi-
ciently similar to those expressly stated in section 24 of the NBA.41
Justice Kennard's opinion emphasized that branch managers are not
engaged in critical day-to-day management.42 Kennard concluded,
therefore, that allowing directors to remove branch managers at plea-
the bank's behalf. Last, the plaintiffs were engaged in fundamental banking opera-
tions. Id.
33. Id at 1094, 811 P.2d at 1032, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
34. Id The power of directors to terminate "other officers" at pleasure is derived
from the NBA. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. Wells Fago, 53 Cal. 3d at 1095, 811 P.2d at 1033, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (citing
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPoRAnTIoNs § 248 (1982)).
36. I& at 1095-96, 811 P.2d at 1033, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 849 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 300, 309, 311 (West 1990) (examples of statutes which expressly authorize the dele-
gation of power given by statute)).
37. Id at 1096, 811 P.2d at 1033, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 849. See also 12 U.S.C. 24 (1988).
38. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1095, 811 P.2d at 1032, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 848. The
court did not address whether delegations under Wells Fargo regulations were permis-
sible. Id. at 1096, 811 P.2d at 1032-33, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
39. IS at 1105, 811 P.2d at 1039, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 855 (Kennard, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard also asserted that the major-
ity's conclusion violated "basic principles of federal preemption law." Id. at 1106, 811
P.2d at 1039-40, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56 (Kennard, J., concurring).
41. I& at 1106-07 811 P.2d at 1040-41, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring). See generally 7 B. WrImN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law§§ 94, 96 (1988); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 155-60 (1974); Romualdo D. Eclavea, Anno-
tation, Supreme Court's Application of the Rules of Fusdem Generis and Noscitur A
Sociis, 46 L. ED. 2D 879 (1977) (discussing the doctrine of ejusdem generis).
42. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1108, 811 P.2d at 1041-42, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58
(Kennard, J., concurring). Additionally, branch managers do not create policy, they
merely apply it. Id (Kennard, J., concurring). Finally, branch managers are not the
"critical control" employees targeted by the statute. Id (Kennard, J., concurring).
sure is beyond the scope of the NBA.4S
III. CONCLUSION
In Wells Fargo, the court held that although branch managers
qualify as "other officers," the NBA does not authorize directors to
delegate their power to terminate at pleasure." Therefore, the plain-
tiffs' state law actions for wrongful termination were not barred be-
cause the directors did not authorize or ratify the plaintiffs'
removal.45 The court did not rule whether the NBA would bar a
state cause of action for wrongful termination based on age discrimi-
nation.48 Thus, where directors terminate an officer at pleasure, the
association may remain liable for age discrimination, notwithstanding
the NBA.47
If the situation in Wells Fargo is indicative of the number of
branch managers who are terminated by national banking associa-
tions, then requiring directors to approve the discharge of "other of-
ficers" under section 24 should not be overly burdensome.48
Accordingly, banking associations should attempt to take advantage
of section 24's broad protection 49 by requiring directors to approve an
employee's removal if the employee might meet the court's definition
of "other officers."50
RICHARD JOHN BERGSTROM III
43. Id. at 1114, 811 P.2d at 1046, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (Kennard, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 1086, 811 P.2d at 1027, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
45. Id. at 1103, 811 P.2d at 1038, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
46. Id. at 1104, 811 P.2d at 1039, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
47. Id. But see Aalgaard v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 3d 674, 686-
95, 274 Cal. Rptr. 81, 87-94, cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 278 (1990) (wrongful termination
claim based on age discrimination is preempted by the NBA).
48. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1099-100, 811 P.2d at 1036, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 852. The
court noted that from 1984 through 1985, thirteen branch managers were terminated.
Hence, the court concluded that requiring directors to review thirteen dismissals was
not overly burdensome. Id.
49. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
50. The court indicated that employees such as janitors and tellers do not come
within section 24's scope. Wells Fargo, 53 Cal. 3d at 1094, 811 P.2d at 1032, 282 Cal.
Rptr. at 848.
[Vol. 19: 733, 1992] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IX. PROPERTY LAW
A. After spousal separation but before dissolution
proceedings, because the marriage is still in effect, the
character of community property remains unchanged.
During this period (1) both spouses must consent to any
sale, conveyance, encumbrance or lease greater than one
year involving community property, and (2) a
nonconsenting spouse, who brings suit during the
marriage, may invalidate the transfer in its entirety:
Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross
I. INTRODUCTION
In Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross,' the California Supreme
Court addressed two community property issues: (1) whether section
5127 of the California Civil Code2 allows a spouse to encumber a one-
half interest in community property without the other spouse's con-
sent,3 and (2) if the approval of the other spouse is required and if
the transfer is challenged during the marriage, whether the appropri-
ate remedy is voiding the entire transfer or only the nonconsenting
spouse's one-half interest?4
Confusion over these issues resulted from legislative reforms in
1975, giving spouses equal managerial rights in community property.5
Formerly, the nonconsenting spouse's remedy was clear and de-
pended upon when the suit was initiated. If a suit were brought after
the dissolution of the marriage or after the iransferor-spouse's death,
the court would set aside the transfer only as to the nonconsenting
spouse's one-half interest.6 On the other hand, if a suit were brought
1. 54 Cal. 3d 26, 812 P.2d 931, 283 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1991). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion in which Justices Lucas, Mosk, Broussard, Arabian and Baxter con-
curred. Justice Kennard dissented.
2. Section 5127 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as provided in Sections 5110.150 and 5128, either spouse has the man-
agement and control of the community real property,... but both spouses...
must join in executing any instrument by which such community real prop-
erty or any interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is
sold, conveyed, or encumbered.
CAL CIV. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1991). For convenience, the actions to which section
5127 applies (leases greater than one year, sales, conveyances, and encumbrances) are
collectively referred to in this article as "transactions" or "transfers."
3. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 30 n.3, 812 P.2d at 932 n. 3, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 585 n. 3.
4. Id at 35-36, 812 P.2d at 936, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
5. Id. at 35, 812 P.2d at 936, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 589. See infra notes 20-27 and ac-
companying text.
6. For suits brought after the divorce, see Pretzer v. Pretzer, 215 Cal. 659, 12 P.2d
during the marriage, the court would void the transfer in its en-
tirety.7 After the statutory amendments of 1975, however, one line of
cases limited the nonconsenting spouse's remedy to voiding a one-
half interest, regardless of the action's timing.S Another line of cases
permitted the entire transfer to be set aside if the action was brought
during the marriage. 9 To resolve this conflict, the California
Supreme Court held in Droeger that a community property transfer
pursuant to section 5127 requires the consent of both spouses, and the
nonconsenting spouse can void the transaction in its entirety.' 0
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Joanna Droeger retained the law firm of Friedman, Sloan & Ross
(appellees) to file an action dissolving her marriage with John
Droeger (appellant)." After the family law court granted only part
of her pendente lite motion for attorneys fees and costs,' 2 Joanna
unilaterally executed a promissory note payable to the appellees, se-
cured by a deed of trust on her interest in two parcels of community
real property.' 3 Before the dissolution proceedings were complete,
however,14 John brought suit in Superior Court for quiet title in the
encumbered community realty,'5 arguing he had not joined in exe-
cuting the note or deed of trust.
The Superior Court sustained appellee's demurrer, finding the
deed of trust enforceable as to Joanna's one-half interest in the com-
munity property,16 and denied John's motion for reconsideration.17
429 (1932) and Heuer v. Heuer, 33 Cal. 2d 268, 201 P.2d 385 (1949). For suits brought
after the transferor-spouse's death, see Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477
(1933) and Lahaney v. Lahaney, 208 Cal. 323, 281 P. 67 (1929). The rationale for a suit
brought after death is the decedent spouse's right to testamentary disposition of a one-
half interest.
7. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 35, 812 P.2d at 936, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 589. The main pre-
1975 authority for voiding transfers completely when the nonconsenting spouse sues
during the marriage is Britton v. Hammell, 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1936). See infra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Mitchell v. American Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 220, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 760 (1980). See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Andrade Dev. Co. v. Martin, 138 Cal. App. 3d 330, 187 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1983). See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
10. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 30, 812 P.2d at 932, 283 Cal. Rptr. 585.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 30, 812 P.2d at 932-33, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 585-86. The pendente lite motion
requested an award of attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $50,000. The court
awarded only $9,600, retaining the right to consider the issue further at trial. See gen-
erally 11 B. WITHIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Husband and Wife §§ 82, 185-95
(9th ed. 1990).
13. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 47-48, 812 P.2d at 945, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 598 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
14. Id. at 30, 812 P.2d at 933, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 586,
15. Id.
16. Id. at 31, 812 P.2d at 933, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 586. Appellees relied on Mitchell v.
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The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section 5127 prevented
division of community real property except by marital dissolution, or
upon one spouse's death, or upon both spouses' agreement.'8 The
California Supreme Court granted review.19
III. Tim COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Panelli's Majority Opinion
1. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 5127 reveals the development of
California community property law in acknowledging the equal sta-
tus of husband and wife.20 In 1917, the legislature enacted the prede-
cessor of section 512721 which continued to give husbands sole
management and control of community real property, but also re-
quired the wives' signatures on instruments which "sold, conveyed or
encumbered" community real property or created a lease for longer
than a one-year period.22 In 1927, the legislature (without aug-
menting the managerial power of wives) gave wives a "present, ex-
isting, and equal interest."23 Finally, in 1975, the legislature gave
spouses identical rights to manage and control community property2 4
American Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 220, 167 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1980). See infra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
17. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 31, 812 P.2d at 933, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
18. Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, 228 Cal. App. 3d 301, 305, 267 Cal. Rptr.
178, 181 (1990), certfied for partial publication. In reaching its conclusion, the appel-
late court relied on Andrade, discussed infra notes 34-38. Droeger, 228 Cal. App. 3d at
305, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 180-181.
19. Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, 269 Cal. Rptr 767, 791 P.2d 337 (1990)
20. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 31, 812 P.2d at 933, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 586. See generally 11
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Prope §§ 1-2 (9th ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1991).
21. 1917 Cal. Stat. 829.
22. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 33, 812 P.2d at 934, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
23. Id. (citing 1927 Cal. Stat. 484; Byrd v. Blanton, 149 Cal. App. 3d 987, 992, 197
Cal. Rptr 190, 193 (1983), rehg denied, 210 Cal. Rptr. 458, (1984)). This abrogated the
concept of a wife's having no more than a mere expectancy in community property.
For instance, that a wife's rights would not accrue unless "she survived the termina-
tion of the marriage." Id. at 812 P.2d at 933, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 586 (citations omitted).
See generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property
§§ 103-04 (9th ed. 1990).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1991). See generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORN[A LAW, Community Property §§ 105-06 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1991);
32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law § 454 (1977 & Supp. 1991). This general rule is subject to
a limited number of exceptions and restrictions. See generally 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family
Law § 455 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
and made section 5127 equally applicable to both spouses.25 Although
the rights and remedies of nonconsenting spouses were clear before
the statutory amendments of 1975, thereafter, a split of authority de-
veloped in the California Courts of Appeal.26
2. Interpretive decisions
a. Transfer void as to nonconsenting spouse's one-half interest
The leading post-1975 appellate case holding that nonconsenting
spouses who sue during the marriage can free only a one-half interest
in community property encumbered in violation of section 5127 is
Mitchell v. American Reserve Insurance Company.2 7 The Mitchell
court reasoned that because the community is liable for both spouses'
contracts made after marriage, debts contracted during marriage can
also be satisfied with community realty.2 8 However, the Droeger
court criticized the Mitchell court's reliance on Gantner v. Johnson,29
which was premised on the husband's being the sole manager of com-
munity property.3 0 Since the 1975 reforms to section 5127 gave both
spouses equal managerial control, this premise was no longer valid3l
and the court overruled Mitchell and its progeny.3 2
b. Transfer void in its entirety
In the second line of post-1975 cases, the leading authority for the
nonconsenting spouse's ability to void transfers entirely was Andrade
Development Company v. Martin.3 3 Andrade relied on the pre-1975
California Supreme Court case Britton v. Hammell.34 The Britton
25. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 35, 812 P.2d at 936, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (citing 1974 Cal.
Stat. 2610).
26. Both lines of appellate court cases agreed that one spouse, acting alone, cannot
create a valid lien on the entire property. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 31, 812 P.2d at 933, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 586.
27. 110 Cal. App. 3d 220, 167 Cal. Rptr, 760 (1980) (husband executed a promissory
note secured by a trust deed in order to obtain a bail bond for a third party). Id. at 222,
167 Cal. Rptr. 760.
28. Id. at 223, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
29. 274 Cal. App. 2d 869, 79 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1969).
30. Id. at 876-877, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
31. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 37, 812 P.2d at 937, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (quoting An-
drade, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 337, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 863).
32. Id. at 37, 812 P.2d at 937, 283 Cal. Rptr. at-590. Even before the state supreme
court decided Droeger, at least two commentators asserted that the Mitchell decision
was incorrect. See WILLIAM M. BASsETT, CALIFORNIA COMMuNITY PROPERTY LAw
§ 8.03[A](7) (1988); William A. Reppy, Jr., Debt Collection from Married Californians:
Problems Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse Management and Invalid Mar-
riage, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 143 (1981).
33. 138 Cal. App. 3d 330, 187 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1982). In this case, a wife nullified a
contract between her husband and a buyer of certain community property because
only her husband had signed the contract. Id. at 332, 335, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 864, 866.
34. 4 Cal. 2d 690, 52 P.2d 221 (1935). Britton involved property transfers from a
husband to his purported second wife, from the second wife back to her husband, and
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holding was preserved because the 1975 reforms brought only one of
the Britton rationales into question without invalidating its5 and be-
cause the remaining three rationales survived the 1975 reforms in-
tact.36 The state high court concluded that Britton was still good law
and controlled the present situation. The court then reaffirmed the
entire Andrade line of cases.3 7
3. Policy Considerations
Two policy arguments were explored concerning the "economically
weak spouse." 38 First, a spouse who lacks liquid funds or separate
property to sell or mortgage may be able to pay legal fees only by us-
ing an interest in the community property.3 9 The court pointed out,
however, that. statutory provisions, however imperfect, already ex-
isted to protect spouses in such situations.4 o
then from the husband to a third party. However, because (1) the first marriage still
existed at the time of the conveyances, and (2) the first wife brought suit before the
husband's death, she was able to void the transfers completely. Id at 691-92, 52 P.2d
222. See supra note 6 for cases brought after divorce or death.
The complexity of the present case arises from the fact that, although a marriage
continues until entry of a dissolution judgement, separation changes the nature of the
parties' relationship in that they live apart and are legal adversaries. Droeger, 54 Cal.
3d at 52, 812 P.2d at 949, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 4501 & 5125(e)(West 1987)). See generally 33 CAL. Jun. 3D Family Law
§ 560 (termination of marriage in general), § 668 (effect of interlocutory judgment),
§ 670 (separation of parties), and § 691 (effect of final judgment) (1977 & Supp. 1991).
35. At the time of the Britton decision, a court could award an innocent wife more
than one-half the community property where the husband's extreme cruelty or adul-
tery led to the divorce. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 34, 37-38, 812 P.2d at 935, 937, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 588, 590. A wife was able, therefore, to get an entire transaction set aside. Id.
36. The remaining three rationales were: (1) the husband retained complete con-
trol of the commumity property, therefore, recovery of only one-half would not protect
the wife's interests; (2) if one-half the community property was made the wife's sepa-
rate property, it would lead to the undesirable partition of the community property
during the marriage; and (3) all cases allowing recovery of only one-half the commu-
nity property involved suits brought qfter the marriage and were based on the hus-
band's right to testamentary disposition. Id. at 34, 812 P.2d at 935, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
37. Id at 36, 812 P.2d at 937, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
38. Id. at 40, 812 P.2d at 939, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4041, 812 P.2d at 939-40, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93 (noting CAL. CIv. CODE§§ 4370, 4370.5 & 5125.1(e)). Section 4370 authorizes pendente lite orders for costs and
attorneys fees and section 4370.5 states that in apportioning the litigation costs equita-
bly between the parties, the court must consider the "relative circumstances" of the
parties. Moreover, the fact that a party has the financial resources to pay attorneys
fees does not automatically prohibit a court award; it is only a factor to consider. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 4370-4370.5 (West Supp. 1991). Section 5125.1(e) provides, in pertinent
part, that
[i]n any transaction affecting the community property in which the consent of
Second, section 412.21(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure41 cre-
ates an exception to Civil Code section 5127,42 eliminating the need
for the other spouse's consent where community property is used to
pay attorney fees. Noting, however, that the wife in this case exe-
cuted the trust deeds encumbering the community property more
than three years before the effective date of section 412.21(a)(2), 43
the court reasoned the provision was inapplicable. 44 Moreover, ac-
cording to the majority,
section 412.21(a)(2) ... merely frees a party from the prohibitions of the auto-
matic restraining order [of section 412.21] so that community property may be
used to pay reasonable attorney's fees. The statute does not ... address the
substantive issue of the legality of unilateral sales, leases, conveyances, or en-
cumbrances of community real property.4 5
Thus, section 412.21(a)(2) may apply only to liquid community prop-
erty, such as a bank account, rather than realty.46
B Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
After noting the disadvantaged position in which the majority opin-
both spouses is required, the court may, upon the motion of a spouse, dispense
with the requirement of the other spouse's consent if ... (1) The proposed
transaction is in the best interest of the community, [and] (2) Consent has
been arbitrarily refused or cannot be obtained due to the physical incapacity,
mental incapacity or prolonged absence of the nonconsenting spouse.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125.1(e) (West Supp. 1991).
The majority acknowledged, however, that these statutes may be illusory remedies
in that the spouse may have difficulty hiring an attorney to enforce such rights.
Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 41, 812 P.2d at 940, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
41. The relevant portion of section 412.21(a) provides that "in an action for disso-
lution of marriage.... the summons shall ... contain temporary restraining orders set
forth in this section. However, nothing in the restraining order shall preclude the par-
ties from using community property to pay reasonable attorney's fees in order to re-
tain legal counsel in the action." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 412.21(a) (West Supp. 1991).
42. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 40, 812 P.2d at 939, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
43. Section 412.21(a)(2) became effective July 1, 1990. Id. at 42-43, 812 P.2d at 941,
283 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
44. Id. Statutes are not retroactive unless explicitly stated. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 3 (West 1982). The dissent argued, however, that section 412.21(a)(2) reveals the leg-
islature's understanding of the statutory limitations on community real property trans-
actions. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 55, 812 P.2d at 949, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). But the majority rebutted, "[a] subsequent expression of the legislature as
to the intent of a prior statute is not binding." Id. at 44 n.14, 812 P.2d at 942 n.14, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 595 n.14 (citations omitted).
45. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 43, 812 P.2d at 941, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 594 (emphasis ad-
ded). Additional reasons why section 412.21 does not create an express or implied ex-
ception to section 5127 are that (1) section 412.21 pertains to procedure while section
5127 pertains to substantive law, and (2) neither section 412.21 nor its legislative his-
tory refers to section 5127. Id. at 43-44, 812 P.2d at 941-42, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 594-95.
46. Id. Justice Kennard disagreed that section 412.21(a)(2) pertains only to per-
sonal property stating that if the legislature wanted to distinguish personal from real
property, it would have done so expressly. Id at 51-52, 812 P.2d at 600, 283 Cal. Rptr.
at 947. (Kennard, J., dissenting) (comparing the first sentence in section 412(a)(2),
which refers to both real and personal property, with the second sentence, which re-
fers to community property in general).
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ion placed spouses who do not have substantial funds,47 Justice Ken-
nard argued that the plain meaning rule4s is not the only tool for
interpreting statutes.49 Another canon of statutory construction is
that statutes relating to the same subject should be construed to-
gether.50 Since both California Civil Procedure Code section
412.21(a)(2) 5 1 and California Civil Code section 512752 relate to com-
munity property, the court should read them together when ascer-
taining legislative intent.53 Justice Kennard then reasoned that the
last sentence in section 412.21(a)(2), which expressly approves the
use of community property to secure attorneys' fees in dissolution
cases, would be pointless unless the legislature specifically intended
to give spouses the power to encumber community real property to
the extent of their interests in such circumstances.54 Under this rea-
soning, the encumbrance would be valid as to the wife's interest.55
47. The only alternative for such spouses may well be to proceed without any legal
representation whatsoever, especially in cases that normally require substantial legal
work, such as contested child custody or property valuations, both of which typically
require extensive discovery and motion work. Id. at 48-49, 812 P.2d at 945, 283 Cal.
Rptr. at 598. Furthermore, a survey conducted in 21 California counties revealed that
court-ordered attorney fees in marital dissolution proceedings are often inadequate.
This, in turn, handicaps the spouse with little or no income, most often women, in re-
taining counsel. Id. at 49, 812 P.2d at 946, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
48. See generally 58 CAL. JuR. 3D Statutes §§ 123, 125, 133 (1980) (concerning plain
meaning, technical meaning and legislative intent); 7 B. WrruaN, SUMMARY OF CALI.
FORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 94 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1991) (general rules of
statutory interpretation).
49. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 50, 812 P.2d at 946, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 599 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). Husband-Appellant relied on the plain meaning rule when arguing that
the term "any interest" in section 5127 means that "both spouses must join in an in-
strument encumbering that interest, or the instrument is entirely void." Id. The ma-
jority agreed with this argument. Id. at 38, 812 P.2d at 938, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
50. Id. at 50, 812 P.2d at 946-947, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 599-00 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(citing Hunstock v. Estate Dev. Corp., 22 Cal. 2d 205, 210, 138 P.2d 1, 4 (1943)). See
generally 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes §§ 108, 109, 124, 127, 160 (1980).
One who questions the application of the plain meaning rule to the provision
of an act must show either that some other section of the act expands or re-
stricts its meining, that the provision itself is repugnant to the general pur-
view of the act, or that the act considered in pari materia with other acts, or
with the legislative history of the subject matter, imports a different meaning.
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992)
(footnote omitted). Compare Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo, 19
Cal. 3d 152, 561 P.2d 244, 137 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1974) (plain meaning rule) with Leroy T.
v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals. Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 434, 525 P.2d 665, 115 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1974) (act considered in pari materia with other acts).
51. See supra note 41 for statutory text.
52. See supra note 2 for statutory text.
53. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 52, 812 P.2d at 949, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
54. Id. at 51, 812 P.2d at 947, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 54, 312 P.2d at 949, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 602. Accord CALIFORNIA FAMILY
IV. IMPACT
As a result of the decision in Droeger, economically weak spouses
are not able to encumber their one-half interest in community real
property for any reason, including the need to pay attorneys fees and
costs associated with a marital dissolution proceeding. The majority
did leave spouses the ability to unilaterally encumber interests in
community personal property pursuant to section 412.21. 56 However,
the impact of this decision is not limited to economically weak
spouses.57 The entire real estate industry is affected,58 including buy-
ers, real estate brokers and escrow companies 59 in addition to anyone
who takes a deed of trust to secure a debt.60 Thus, even debt collec-
tion from married persons is affected.61 The debt remains valid, but
the mortgagee will not able to satisfy that debt by going against the
property itself.
It appears the majority treats gifts of community real property the
same as transactions for consideration.6 2 There are a few issues
which the court did not address. One is waiver or estoppel as a bar to
a nonconsenting spouse's challenge to set aside the transfer.6 3 An-
other is whether a bona fide purchaser's6 4 rights prevail over those of
the nonconsenting spouse. If prior law remains valid, the noncon-
LAW SERVICE, TERMINATION OF MARITAL RELATIONSHIP § 21:18 (1986) ("ITihe right to
place a lien on the client's property (in dissolution actions] is often created in the fee
agreement to provide security for the payment of fees. Typically, such a lien may be in
the form of a second deed of trust on the client's real property"); 3 CHRISTIAN E. MAR-
KEY, JR., CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE § 40.32[4] (rev. ed. 1991)
("If the money (to pay the attorney a retainer in a dissolution proceeding] cannot be
obtained from community bank accounts, the spouse should consider borrowing the
money using community property as security").
56. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
57. According to the dissent, the majority opinion makes it "virtually impossible
for many economically weaker spouses to obtain adequate legal representation in con-
tested divorce proceedings." Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 47, 812 P.2d at 944, 283 Cal. Rptr. at
597 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
58. FiRm Picks Top Real Estate Cases for the Year; Environmental Issues Domi-
nate Legal Decisions on Real Estate in 1990, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 4, 1991, available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRNT File.
59. See, e.g., Andrade, 187 Cal. Rptr. 863, 138 Cal. App. 3d 330 (1987) (buyer, real
estate broker and escrow company involved).
60. For example, institutional banks and attorneys.
61. REPPY, supra note 32 at 204-05.
62. Presumably, this remains unchanged from pre-1975 cases involving inter vivos
gifts. See, e.g., Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933); Spreckels v.
Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 158 P. 537 (1916); Lahaney v. Lahaney, 208 Cal. 323, 281 P. 67
(1929). See generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Community Prop-
erty §§ 112-114, 118 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1991). The outcome would still depend upon
when the nonconsenting spouse initiated the action. See infra notes 6-7 and accompa-
nying text.
63. See generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Community Prop-
erty § 113 (1990); 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law § 426 (1977). Since these are equitable
remedies, they would still appear to be valid.
64. Andrade did not involve a bona fide purchaser. The buyer had knowledge of
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senting spouse would still be able to recover, but only if the action
were brought within one year.65 An innocent purchaser would then
be entitled to restoration of consideration6 6 and married persons who
concealed their married status would be subject to criminal liabil-
ity.6 7 Droeger also did not address the one-year statute of limitations,
which appears to operate when (1) the transaction involves a bona
fide purchaser, or (2) the instrument is recorded in the name of only
one spouse.65
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the majority nor the dissent diminishes the effect of the
last sentence in section 412.21(a)(2). The disagreement concerns in-
terpretation. 'Courts can only construe statutes; they cannot create
them. The legislature is free to create exceptions if it chooses.69 For
example, it could treat the separation period differently from an
ongoing marriage for purposes of spousal consent concerning commu-
nity property. This would destroy the premise that the character of
community real property remains unchanged between separation and
entry. of final dissolution judgment.70 Another option is to expressly
provide that section 412.21(a)(2) pertain to both personal and real
property. 71 In the meantime, both spouses must sign the trust
deed.72
LORRAINE A. MUSKO
the seller's marriage because the contract had a signature line for the wife. Andrade,
138 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
65. Mark v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 122 Cal. App. 301, 9 P.2d 839 (1932). See gen-
erally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 124 (1990).
66. Mark, 112 Cal. App. 301, 9 P.2d 839.
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 534 (West 1988) (wilfully entering transaction with false
representation is a felony). See generally 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law § 470 (1977).
68. See generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALUFORNIA LAW, Community Prop-
erty §§ 123-24 (1990).
69. Droeger, 54 Cal. 3d at 41, 812 P.2d at 940, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
70. The legislature has done exactly this in California Civil Code sections 5118
(providing that the earnings and accumulations of either spouse during separation are
the separate property of that spouse), 5120.140(a)(2) (providing debts incurred after
separation, other than debts for the necessaries of life, are the separate obligation of
the spouse who incurred the debt) and 4359(a) (providing that during the pendency of
a dissolution proceeding, the court may issue ex parte protective orders restraining any
person from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, concealing or disposing of any
property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community, or separate). CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 5118, 5120.140(a)(2) and 4359(a)(West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
71. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
72. Because it is retroactive, section 5127 pertains to all transactions, regardless of
B. In an action against a title insurer for breach of the duty
to defend, the limitation period provided in section 339(1)
of the Civil Procedure Code accrues upon discovery of
loss or harm, but is equitably tolled until entry of final
judgment in the underlying action: Lambert v.
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company,' the
California Supreme Court resolved a split in the courts of appeal 2 re-
garding the effect of section 339(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter section 339(1)).3 The court concluded that in an action
against a title insurer for breach of the duty to defend,4 the two-year
limitation period provided in section 339(1) commences upon discov-
ery of loss or harm,5 but is equitably tolled6 until entry of a final
when the property was transferred. See generally 11 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW, Community Property § 123 (1990).
1. 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 811 P.2d 737, 282 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1991). In Lambert, Common-
wealth Land Title Insurance Company [hereinafter Commonwealth] issued a title in-
surance policy to Lambert covering a purchase of real property. Thereafter, a
neighboring property owner instituted a claim against Lambert, asserting an easement
by implication. On April 26, 1985, Commonwealth refused to defend the third-party
claim and denied coverage under the title insurance policy. Lambert subsequently suc-
cessfully defended the claim, and judgment was entered for Lambert on October 26,
1987. On October 24, 1988, Lambert instituted a claim against Commonwealth for
breach of the duty to defend. The trial court sustained Commonwealth's demurrer
without leave to amend and the court of appeal affirmed, holding that the action was
barred under the Cede of Civil Procedure section 339(1). I& at 1075, 811 P.2d at 738,
282 Cal. Rptr. at 446. See infra note 3.
2. Compare Central Bank v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 859, 866,
149 Cal. Rptr. 822, 826 (1978) (the two-year limitation period of section 339(1) accrues
after the insured incurs attorneys' fees) with Israelsky v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 212
Cal. App. 3d 611, 623, 261 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1989) (the two-year limitation period of
section 339(1) accrues after entry of final judgment on the underlying litigation.) For
an historical perspective, see HOSACK, CALIFORNIA TITLE INSURANCE PRACTICE § 5.11
(Supp. 1990).
3. Section 339(1) states that a two-year limitation period will be applied to actions
involving title insurance, "providedi that the cause of action upon a... policy of title
insurance shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or dam-
age suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West
1982 & Supp. 1991).
4. See generally 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1136, 1140
(9th ed. 1988); 1 CAL. JuR. 3D Abstracters and Title Insurers §§ 22, 25 (1972 & Supp.
1991); Annotation, Limitation of Action Against Insurer for Breach of Contract to De-
fend, 96 A.L.R. 2D 1193 (1979).
5. Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1072, 1077, 811 P.2d
737, 739, 282 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1991). The court indicated that discovery of loss or
harm occurs when the insurer refuses to defend an insured in the underlying litiga-
tion. Id. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions § 351 (3rd ed.
1985 & Supp. 1991); 1 CAL. JUR. 3D Abstracters and Title Insurers § 25 (1972 & Supp.
1991); 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 107 (1970 & Supp. 1991).
6. Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1077-78, 811 P.2d at 739-40, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48.
Courts may apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to statutory limitations to avoid un-
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judgment in the underlying litigation.7
II. ANALYSIS
The court stated three reasons for equitably tolling the statutory
limitation period in the present case: (1) the duty to defend is a con-
tinuing obligation;8 (2) inequity results when the underlying litiga-
tion proceeds beyond the two-year limitation period of section
339(1);9 and (3) the insurer is not prejudiced by tolling the statutory
limitation period.'0
III. CONCLUSION
By equitably tolling the statutory period in actions for breach of
the duty to defend, the court allows the insured the option of imme-
diately pursuing an action against a title insurer or waiting until the
duty to defend expires." This application of the equitable tolling
doctrine is reasonable since other courts have applied the doctrine to
fair technical forfeitures. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 86 (1987). See Prudential-
LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 687-93, 798 P.2d 1230, 1238-42,
274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 395-99 (1990) (discussing policy and application of the equitable toll-
ing doctrine).
7. Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1080, 811 P.2d at 741-42, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50. Justice
Arabian authored the unanimous opinion.
8. Id. at 1077-78, 811 P.2d at 739-40, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48. The court noted that
where a continuing obligation had been breached, California courts consistently al-
lowed plaintiffs the option of filing actions after the duty had expired. Id. See Israel-
sky v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 212 Cal. App. 3d 611, 261 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1989) (insurer's
duty to defend); Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co., 3 Cal. 2d 740, 47 P.2d 273
(1935) (continuing beet farming contract); Horacek v. Smith, 33 Cal. 2d 186, 199 P.2d
929 (1948) (contract for services over fifteen years); Brooks v. Van Winkle, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 734, 327 P.2d 151 (1958) (services of attorney). See generally 3 B. WrrKiN, CAL.
IFORNIA PROCEDuRE, Actions §§ 376, 441 (3rd ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990).
9. Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1077-78, 811 P.2d at 739-40, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48. The
court indicated that where the underlying action continues beyond two years, the in-
sured must either defend the underlying litigation and institute an action against the
insurer or forfeit his right to bring an action against the insurer. Id at 1077, 811 P.2d
at 739, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 447. It is unfair to require the insured to simultaneously bear
the cost of proceeding with both actions. Id. at 1078, 811 P.2d at 740, 282 Cal. Rptr. at
448. See also Israelsky, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 619, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
10. Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1079, 811 P.2d at 740-41, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49. The
court noted that when an insured submits a third-party action to an insurer, the in-
surer becomes aware of a potential duty to defend and must preserve records to pre-
pare for subsequent litigation with the insured. Id See also Prudential, 51 Cal. 3d at
691, 798 P.2d at 1231, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 398. See generally 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Ac-
tions § 86 (1987) (discussing prejudice as a factor for application of the equitable tolling
doctrine).
11. Lambert, 53 Cal. 3d at 1080, 811 P.2d at 741, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
similar actions involving a continuing obligation.12
RICHARD JOHN BERGSTROM III
X. TAX LAW
Charter city taxation of financial corporations is a
matter of statewide concern, cannot be considered a
"municipal offair," and is subject to preemption by the
State: California Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
City of Los Angeles.
I. INTRODUCTION
In California Federal Savings and Loan Association V. City of Los
Angeles' (hereinafter CalFed), the city challenged the constitutional-
ity of Revenue and Taxation Code section 231822 which created a
statewide unitary tax regime for all financial corporations3 and re-
moved financial corporations from municipal tax rolls. The city
claimed this violated its express right as a charter city4 to raise local
12. See supra note 8.
1. 54 Cal. 3d 1, 812 P.2d 916, 283 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1991). Justice Arabian wrote the
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Broussard, Panelli, Ken-
nard, and Baxter concurred. Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment.
2. Revenue and Taxation Code § 23182 states, in pertinent part, "The tax im-
posed under this part upon banks and financial corporations is in lieu of all other taxes
and licenses, state, county and municipal, upon the said banks and financial corpora
tions .... CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23182 (West Supp. 1991). This effectively ex-
tended the "in lieu" taxation shield, formerly available only to commercial banks, to
all financial corporations. See 9 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation
§ 267 (9th ed. 1989 and Supp. 1991). Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references in
the text are to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
3. Under the California Revenue and Taxation Code, there is no statutory defini-
tion of "financial corporations." However, the California Supreme Court recognized
the federal definition of financial corporations as those corporations dealing in "mon-
eyed capital." Crown Fin. Corp. v. McColgan Washington Fin. Co., 23 Cal. 2d 280, 284-
85, 144 P.2d 331, 333 (1943). See also Marble Mortgage Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 241
Cal. App. 2d 26, 31-34, 50 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348-51 (1966). See generally Roger J. Traynor
and Frank M. Keesling, Recent Changes in Franchise Tax Act, 22 CAL. L. REV. 499,
509-25 (1934).
Revenue and Taxation Code section 23183(b) exempts leasing companies from as-
sessment as "financial corporations," stating "(Trhe term 'financial corporation' does
not include any corporation, including any wholly owned subsidiary of a bank or bank
holding company, if the principal business activity of such entity consists of leasing
tangible personal property." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23183(b) (West Supp. 1991).
4. The 1896 amendment to the California Constitution provided for municipal
home rule. The state constitution now states:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to gen-
eral laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede
any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all
laws inconsistent therewith.
[Vol. 19: 733, 1992] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
revenue under the "municipal affairs" clause of the California Con-
stitution.5 Adding another dimension to the "municipal affairs" doc-
trine,6 the California Supreme Court held that the Legislature's
preemption of municipal taxes was, in this instance, entirely constitu-
tional.7 The court reasoned that the taxation of financial corpora-
tions had acquired a " 'supramunicipal' dimension," and was a matter
of "statewide concern," rather than a "municipal affair."S
In CalFed, the petitioner paid its city business license tax for 1982-
84 under protest and filed a refund action citing section 23182. The
Court of Appeal rejected the trial court finding that taxation of fi-
nancial corporations was a subject of "statewide concern," and held
that charter city tax measures were immune from state legislative
enactment.9 The Supreme Court of California reversed the appellate
court, stating that the perceived distinction between charter city reg-
ulatory enactments and taxation measures was "illusory."1O The is-
sue became one of defining "municipal affairs."
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The court began its analysis by reviewing California's tax treat-
ment of commercial banks and savings banks." State taxation of na-
tional commercial banks was dictated, in great part, by a number of
United States Supreme Court holdings in the 1920s.12 Responding to
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
5. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 6, 812 P.2d at 918, 288 Cal. Rptr. at 571. See supra note 4.
See also Ex Parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209, 74 P. 780, 782 (1903) ("That the power of
taxation is a power appropriate for a municipality to possess is too obvious to merit
discussion.")
6. For an exhaustive study of the development of home rule in California, see
Sho Sato, "Munici pal Affairs" in California, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1972).
7. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 7, 812 P.2d at 918, 288 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6, 812 P.2d at 918, 288 Cal. Rptr. at 571. In holding that the tax measures
were immune from legislative enactment, the appellate court relied heavily on the tax-
ation/regulatory distinction first enunciated in Weeks v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d
386, 398-409, 579 P.2d 449, 455-463, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558, 564-572 (1978) (Richardson, J.,
concurring).
10. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 14, 812 P.2d at 923, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
11. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 7-10, 812 P.2d at 918-921, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 571-74. The
petitioner, a federally chartered thrift institution, was chartered under the Home
Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. 1461-70 (1978). See generally 13 AM. Jun. 2D Building
and Loan Associations §§ 10, 88 (1986). Commercial banks are chartered nationally
under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21-42 (1978). See generally 19 Am. JUR. 2D
Corporations § 151 (1986); 9 CAL. JUR. 3D Banks and other Financial Institutions
§§ 46-48 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
12. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 8, 19 & n.14, 812 P.2d at 919, 926 & n.14, 283 Cal. Rptr. at
this framework, California created an "in lieu" tax on net income ap-
plicable to both state and nationally chartered commercial banks.' 3
To keep state and federal savings banks competitive with commercial
banks, California implemented an "offset system" where municipal
taxes were credited against a savings bank's net state tax.' 4
The Court of Appeal relied heavily on Ex Parte Braun,Z5 a seminal
home rule case, to support its position that taxation, as a municipal
power, was "beyond the reach of legislative enactment."' 6 Rejecting
the appellate court's distinction between municipal regulatory enact-
ments and municipal tax concerns, the supreme court revisited Ex
Parte Braun. While reaffirming the soundness of the Braun holding,
the court noted that Braun was an incomplete analysis that could not
reflect the development of the "municipal affairs" doctrine over the
past 75 years.17
In its affirmation of charter city sovereignty over matters conceded
to be "municipal affairs," Braun implicitly recognized the legisla-
ture's right to dictate matters falling outside the "municipal affairs"
schemes.'8 To address those areas that had not been reserved to the
state by statute, the courts developed "statewide concern" doctrines.
This "statewide concern" analysis is used to determine whether the
subject of conflicting state and municipal enactments is properly a
"municipal affair."19
The breadth of "municipal affairs" has been determined on a case
by case basis with little guidance from the supreme court.2 0 In
CalFed, the court provided an analytical framework for resolving the
572, 579 & n.14. See Western States Bankcard Assoc. v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 19 Cal. 3d 208, 215-16, 561 P.2d 273, 277, 137 Cal. Rptr. 183, 187 (1977). See also 9
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL'woRNiA LAW, Taxation §§ 265-68 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp.
1991); 11 CAL. JUR. 3D Business and Occupation Licenses § 40 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
13. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 8, 812 P.2d at 919, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 572. The "in lieu" tax
was a statewide unitary tax which preempted all other taxation of national and state
banks. Id
14. Id.
15. 141 Cal. 204, 74 P. 780 (1903).
16. Braun, 141 Cal. at 207, 74 P. at 781. Braun and its companion case, Ex Parte
Helm, 143 Cal. 553, 77 P. 453 (1904), put to rest the notion of state control of a charter
city's power to tax "municipal affairs." See 11 CAL. JuP. 3D Business and Occupation
Licenses §§ 18, 19, 21, 34 (1974).
17. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 13, 812 P.2d at 922-23, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 575-76. See 9 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAw, Taxation, §§ 265-67 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp.
1991).
18. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 13, 812 P.2d at 922, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
19. Id. at 14 n.12, 812 P.2d at 923 n.12, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 576 n.12. See Richard I.
Hiscocks and Marie Backes, Charter Ciat Financing in California-A Growing 'State-
wide Concern'? 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 603 (1982); Sato, supra note 5.
20. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 6, 812 P.2d at 917, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 570. "Although this
court and the Court of Appeal have parsed that cryptic phrase in literally scores of
cases.., those 'wild words' have defeated efforts at a defining formulation of the con-
tent of "municipal affairs." Id. See also Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. City and County of
San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 336 P.2d 514, 517 (1959).
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dispute between a "municipal affair" and a "statewide concern."
First, the case must present an "actual conflict" between the compet-
ing claims of the state and the charter city.21 Second, the focus of the
inquiry must be whether the subject matter falls within the ambit of
a legitimate statewide concern. 22
In CalFed, the potential multiple taxation of the savings bank in
the face of section 23182 fulfills the "actual conflict" requirement.
Attempting to divine the legitimacy of the statewide concern, the
court noted that the legislature had actively attempted to place all fi-
nancial and non-financial corporations on an equal tax footing for
over 60 years. 23 During that period, the state had the exclusive
power to tax commercial banks. When major federal legislation of
the 1970s and 1980s expanded both the investment powers and the
services that savings banks could provide,24 thrift institutions were
transformed into something resembling their commercial counter-
parts. The current statewide deterioration of financial health in the
savings and loan industry weighed heavily in favor of declaring all
regulation of the industry a "statewide concern." 25
The regulatory aspects of taxation were also addressed.26 The
court noted that the sole issue was whether the income tax burden
on financial corporations "is of sufficient extramural dimensions to
support legislative measures reasonably related to its regulation."27
The court cited the legislative history2 s and the expressed legislative
intent 29 of section 23182 in support of its deference to this current
legislative intrusion into "municipal affairs."30 The limited incursion
21. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 16, 812 P.2d at 925, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
22. Id. at 17, 812 P.2d at 925, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See supra note 19 and accompa-
nying text.
23. CalFed, 54: Cal. 3d at 18-19, 812 P.2d at 926-27, 281 Cal. Rptr. 579-80. The court
noted that the United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1920s forced national
bank taxation into the realm of a "statewide concern." By extension, the legislature's
attempt to maintain competition throughout the financial services industry must also
be construed as a "statewide concern." Id
24. Id. at 22 n.18, 812 P.2d at 928 n.18, 283 Cal. Rptr. 581 n.18.
25. Id. at 22-23, 812 P.2d at 929, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
26. Id.
27. Id, at 23-24, 812 P.2d at 930, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See generally Ronald Han-
sen, The Municipal Income Tax and State Preemption in California, 11 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 343 (1971).
28. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 10 n.9, 812 P.2d at 921 n.9, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 574 n.9. See
supra note 19 and 22 and accompanying text. Cf CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23184.5
(West Supp. 1991).
29. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 9-10 nn.7&8, 812 P.2d at 920 nn.7&8, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 573
nn. 7&8.
30. Id. at 24, 812 P.2d at 930, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d
into the taxing powers of the municipalities lent additional weight to
the court's belief that the taxation of financial corporations was a
statewide concern 3 ' which could be preempted by the legislature.
III. IMPACT
Perhaps as important for its analysis as for its holding, CalFed pro-
vides a framework for resolving future "municipal affairs" cases. 32
As the economic and political interests of California's charter cities
become increasingly intertwined with state interests, CalFed's broad
definition of the term "statewide concern" foreshadows further limi-
tation of municipal sovereignty. Those areas that are truly "munici-
pal affairs" will remain under the purview of the charter city.
Governmental areas that assume "supramunicipal dimensions" 33 will
fall within the everexpanding ambit of "statewide concern."
ARTHUR S. MOREAU III
XI. TORT LAW
A. To obtain an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff
must introduce evidence of a defendant's financial
status: Adams v. Murakami.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Adams v. Murakami,1 the California Supreme Court resolved a
split in the courts of appeal regarding: (1) whether presentation of a
defendant's financial status is a prerequisite to obtaining a punitive
damages award; and (2) whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears
the burden of introducing evidence of the defendant's financial condi-
tion.2 The court determined that in order to obtain an award of puni-
128, 140, 649 P.2d 874, 881, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 239 (1982) (doubt as to legitimacy of in-
trusion into municipal affairs must be resolved in favor of the state). But see Bishop v.
City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61-63, 460 P.2d 137, 140-41, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468-70 (1969)
(legislative attempts to deal with an issue are not dispositive as to whether it is a state
or municipal affair).
31. CalFed, 54 Cal. 3d at 24-25, 812 P.2d at 930, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
32. See supra note 20-22 and accompanying text. The court provided an analytical
framework for state preemption of certain elements of local taxation in In re Hubbard,
62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964). However, the limited scope of this
analysis has made it inapplicable to many "muncipal affairs" questions.
33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
1. 54 Cal. 3d 105, 813 P.2d 1348, 284 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1991).
2. Id. at 108-09, 813 P.2d at 1349, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 319. Compare Dumas v.
Stocker, 262 Cal. App. 3d 1262, 1267, 213 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314-15 (1989) (an award of pu-
nitive damages is unsupported where plaintiff does not introduce enough evidence of
defendant's financial condition) with Hanley v. Lund, 218 Cal. App. 2d 633, 645-46, 32
Cal. Rptr. 733, 740 (1963) (introduction of the defendant's financial condition is not a
prerequisite to punitive damages award). See also Barragan v. Banco BCH, 188 Cal.
App. 3d 283, 302, 232 Cal. Rptr. 758, 769-70 (1986) (award of punitive damages was re-
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tive damages, the plaintiff must introduce evidence of the defendant's
financial condition.3
In Adams, Lonetta Ree Adams lived in a convalescent home while
suffering from schizophrenia. While at the home, she became preg-
nant and gave birth to an autistic baby. Ms. Adams' conservator
brought an action against Adams' doctor, Clifford Murakami, and the
convalescent home, alleging both parties failed to prevent a patient of
the home from impregnating Adams.4
Although the claim against the convalescent home was settled, the
claim against Dr. Murakami proceeded to trial. During the trial, the
plaintiff did not introduce evidence of the defendant's financial con-
dition. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, and the jury
awarded Adams $750,000 in punitive damages and $274,266 in actual
damages.5 The defendant appealed,6 and the court of appeal af-
firmed.7 The supreme court reversed the award of punitive damages
and stated that to obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must introduce
evidence of the defendant's financial status.8
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court first analyzed the need to introduce
evidence of the defendant's financial condition before punitive dam-
ages 9 may be awarded. The court noted that the purpose of punitive
damages is to deter and punish improper behavior by the defend-
versed where there was insufficient evidence of the defendant's financial state); Fen-
Ion v. Block, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1174, 1179-83, 265 Cal. Rptr. 324, 326 (1989) (evidence of
the defendant's financial condition is not a prerequisite to an award of punitive
damages).
3. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 109, 813 P.2d at 1349, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 319. Justice Baxter
wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli and Arabian
concurring. Justice Kennard wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Mosk dis-
sented in a separate opinion in which Justice Stone joined. Justice Stone, of the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal, sat under assignment.
4. Id, at 109, 813 P.2d at 1349-50, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20. The causes of action
asserted were medical malpractice, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Id,
5. Id, at 109, 813 P.2d at 1350, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
6. Id The defendant claimed that a plaintiff must introduce evidence of a de-
fendant's financial status before punitive damages may be properly awarded. Id.
7. Id
8. Id. at 109, 813 P.2d at 1349, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 319. The supreme court ordered
the court of appeal to remand the action to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.
at 123-24, 813 P.2d at 1360, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
9. See generally 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1378-79
ant,10 not to destroy the defendant."1 Furthermore, the court stated
that without information regarding a defendant's financial state,
neither a juryl 2 nor a court of appeal' 3 could determine the amount
of punitive damages which would deter and punish, but not destroy.14
Therefore, the court held that evidence of a defendant's financial sta-
tus must be introduced before punitive damages may be awarded.15
The court then determined that a plaintiff bears the burden of in-
troducing evidence of a defendant's financial condition.16 The court
stated three reasons for this conclusion: (1) evidence of the defend-
ant's financial condition is "essential to the claim for relief"'17 of a
plaintiff requesting punitive damages;' 8 (2) requiring a defendant to
introduce evidence of his own financial condition suggests that the
defendant believes he is culpable;19 and (3) a plaintiff has the ability
to acquire evidence of a defendant's financial information.20
(9th ed. 1988) (examples of punitive damage awards which were upheld or
overturned).
10. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 110, 813 P.2d at 1350, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (citing Neal v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399
(1978)). See generally 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts §§ 1327-28
(9th ed. 1988); 23 CAL. JUR. 3D Damages §§ 116-17 (1976 & Supp. 1991); 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages §§ 731-33 (1988); Carl W. Chamberlin, Comment, Punitive Damages in Cali-
fornia " The Drunken Driver, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 793, 793-804 (1985) (discussing the defi-
nition and purpose of punitive damages).
11. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 112, 813 P.2d at 1352, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
12. Id. at 114, 813 P.2d at 1353-54, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24. A jury should not spec-
ulate on issues related to the awarding of punitive damages. Id. (citing Dumas v.
Stocker, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1262, 1269, 262 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (1989)). See generally
BAJI, California Jury Instructions, Civil No. 14.71 (7th ed. 1986) (the standard puni-
tive damage jury instructions direct a jury to evaluate the defendant's financial status).
13. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 112, 813 P.2d at 1351, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 321. The court of
appeal will reverse a punitive damages award where the record indicates that the
award was the result of "passion and prejudice." Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d
910, 926-27, 582 P.2d 980, 989, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 398 (1978). In determining whether a
punitive damage award was the result of "passion and prejudice," the reviewing court
must consider: (1) the type of offense committed by the defendant; (2) the award of
compensatory damages; and (3) the financial condition of the defendant. Id. at 928,
582 P.2d at 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 399. See generally 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE, Appeal § 287 (3rd ed. 1985) (discussing the review process for punitive damage
awards); 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 1353 (9th ed. 1988) (dis-
cussing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange).
14. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 112, 813 P.2d at 1352, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
15. Id. at 119, 813 P.2d at 1357, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
16. I&
17. CAL. EVID. CODE § 500 (West 1966) (emphasis added). "[A] party has the bur-
den of proof as to each fact, the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the
claims for relief or defense that he is asserting." Id.
18. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 119, 813 P.2d at 1357, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The court
reasoned that evidence of the defendant's financial status is essential because a puni-
tive damage award cannot be sustained without this information. Id.
19. Id. at 120-21, 813 P.2d at 1358, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The court stated this re-
sult would be unfair. Id. at 121, 813 P.2d at 1358, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
20. Id. at 122, 813 P.2d at 1359, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3295(c) (West Supp. 1991)). Civil Code section 3295 states that after a proper show-
ing, a plaintiff may "subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at the trial for
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B. Dissenting, Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Mosk argued that introducing the defend-
ant's financial state should not be a prerequisite to an award of puni-
tive damages. 21 Mosk noted that the legislature permits a plaintiff to
introduce a defendant's financial information; however, this is not re-
quired.22 The focus of Justice Mosk's concern was that requiring
a plaintiff to introduce this evidence may be both costly and
unnecessary. 23
III. CONCLUSION
In Adams, the court concluded that a plaintiff must introduce evi-
dence of the defendant's financial condition in order to obtain puni-
tive damages. 24 The court did not rule, however, whether
California's current system of review for punitive damages is consti-
tutionally adequate. 25 This case may indicate only the beginning of
larger changes to come in the area of punitive damages.26
Requiring a plaintiff to introduce evidence of a defendant's finan-
cial status may be prejudicial to both parties.27 As noted by the
court, however, considering a defendant's financial status is vital to
enabling a jury and court of appeal to render an equitable decision.2 8
Requiring a plaintiff to introduce a defendant's financial condition,
therefore, may insure that a more equitable resolution will be
reached.
RICHARD JOHN BERGSTROM III
the purpose of establishing the profits or financial condition" of the defendant. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1991). In addition, the court noted that plaintiffs may
use pretrial discovery to obtain defendant's financial information. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at
122, 813 P.2d at 1359, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
21. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 128, 813 P.2d at 1363, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id, at 126-27, 813 P.2d at 1362, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 1991).
23. Adams, 54 Cal. 3d at 125-26, 813 P.2d at 1361, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (citing Rawnsley v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 3d 86, 91, 227 Cal. Rptr.
806, 808-09 (1986)).
24. I at 109, 313 P.2d at 1349, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
25. 1I at 120 n.9, 813 P.2d at 1356 n.9, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 326 n.9. See Pacific Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Halip, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991) (examining the constitutional-
ity of Alabama's review system of punitive damages awards).
26. Stacy Adler, Financial Data Required for Punitive Damages, BUSINESS INSUR-
ANCE, Sept. 2, 1991.
27. Id,
28. See supra note 11-13 and accompanying text.
B. In a failure to warn cause of action, under strict
liability, state of the art evidence is admissible as a
relevant defense: Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation.
INTRODUCTION
In Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation,' the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court granted review to resolve a conflict in the
courts of appeal2 as to whether a failure to warn cause of action,
under strict liability, necessarily invokes the manufacturer's knowl-
edge or knowability of risk at the time of manufacture as a factor in
imposing liability, thereby permitting state of the art evidence to be
admitted as a relevant defense.3 The First Appellate District in Ver-
meulen v. Superior Court held that determining the manufacturer's
knowledge, actual or constructive, of a product's potential risk in-
volves state of the art information.4 In the present case, the Second
Appellate District held state of the art evidence is not admissible in
failure to warn cases because it speaks to the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct, which is irrelevant in strict liability.5 The
supreme court declined to follow the Second District, holding instead
that without the knowledge or knowability element in strict liability
cases, the manufacturer would be the virtual insurer of its product's
safe use,6 which is inconsistent with the tenets of strict liability.
7
Thus, state of the art evidence, subject to the California rules of evi-
1. 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991). The original complaint
stated causes of action for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. At the
time of trial, the plaintiff proceeded on only a strict liability action including manufac-
turing- and design-defect and failure to warn allegations. The defendant's pleadings
raised a state of the art defense, i.e., that scientific knowledge at the time the product
was sold could not identify the product as dangerous to the consumer. At trial, the
court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed on the design-defect claim, but with no state-
ment of reasons, refused the plaintiff's request that the jury be instructed on the
grounds -for failure to warn. The jury found for the defendant, but the plaintiff suc-
cessfully moved for a new trial asserting the trial court erred in precluding proof of
liability on a failure to warn theory. The court of appeal upheld the new trial order,
adding however, that "in strict liability asbestos cases, including those prosecuted on a
failure to warn theory, state of the art evidence is not admissible since it focuses on the
reasonableness of defendant's conduct." Id.
2. California Rules of Court, rule 29(a)(1) provides: "Review by the supreme
court of a decision of a court of appeal will be ordered where it appears necessary to
secure uniformity of decision or settle important questions of law." CAL. R. CT.
29(a)(1) (Deering 1991).
3. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 990, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
4. Vermeulen v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 251 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1988)
(asbestos litigation).
5. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 993, 810 P.2d at 552, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 531. See supra
note 1.
6. Id.
7. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 573 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 335 (1963). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
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dence, is admissible in failure to warn cases.8
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
California courts have never construed strict liability to make the
manufacturer the absolute insurer of a product's safe use.9 In Ander-
son the supreme court noted that in Canifax v. Hercules, the court of
appeal held that a product may be defective under strict liability,
even though faultlessly constructed, if it is unreasonably dangerous
and supplied to the consumer without adequate warning.' 0 In post-
Canifax failure to warn cases, 1 the manufacturer's knowledge or
knowability of risk was an implicit condition12 and was at issue only
when the product's danger was found to be unknowable at time of
manufacture.' 3 The supreme court therefore reasoned that exclud-
ing state of the art evidence at the time of manufacture, and holding
the manufacturer liable for risks not yet scientifically known, would
be anomalous and effectively would make the manufacturer its in-
surer.' 4 Because such a result is not consonant with the tenets of
strict liability,J5 the court found it necessary to scrutinize state of the
art evidence in failure to warn cases, which has the effect of casting
negligence principles into the strict liability arena.16
The supreme court noted in Anderson that even where a particular
action "rings of" negligence it is not necessarily precluded from strict
liability.17 The court also acknowledged that failure to warn cases
8. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 990, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
9. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 773, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978) (car door opened upon impact with wall); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (bread racks in delivery
truck broke free during accident, injuring driver). For a comprehensive historical re-
view, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98-9,
at 694-702 (5th ed. 1984) and 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§§ 1241-44 (9th ed. 1988).
10. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965)
(no warning for burn rate of dynamite fuse). See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liabilityj
§ 545 (1984).
11. See Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 3d 1143, 238
Cal. Rptr. 18 (1987) (failure to warn about the need to adjust air brakes); Rosburg v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 726, 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1986) (deflated
breast implant).
12. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 997, 810 P.2d at 554, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
13. Id. at 997, 810 P.2d at 555, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
14. Id. at 998, 810 P.2d at 555, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
15. Id. at 991, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529. See supra note 9.
16. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
17. Id. See alkso Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d at 734, 575 P.2d at 1167,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (strict liability is a judicial invention and a blend of "theoretical
are more deeply rooted Mi negligence than other strict liability theo-
ries,I8 because unlike manufacturing- or design-defect cases,19 the de-
fective warning implicates the manufacturer's conduct.20 However,
the manufacturer's standard of due care and reasonableness are not
at issue in strict liability failure to warn cases. 2 ' Instead, a plaintiff is
required to prove merely that the manufacturer failed to give an ap-
propriate warning of dangers that were scientifically knowable at the
time of manufacture. 22
In a concurring opinion, Justice Broussard emphasized that the is-
sue of whether state of the art evidence is admissible in manufactur-
ing- and design-defect analysis is left undecided.23 He asserted that
strict liability manufacturing- and design-defect actions are decided
without regard to whether the manufacturer knew or could have
known of the specific danger at the time of manufacture. 24 Conse-
quently, the court should expressly hold state of the art evidence ir-
relevant in those instances.2 5
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's decision to grant a new
trial in order to include a failure to warn cause of action.26 Contrary
to the majority, however, he rejected incorporating negligence princi-
ples into strict liability doctrine.27 He asserted that failure to warn
actions should sound in negligence alone.28 In the alternative, how-
ever, he argued that the court should draw a distinction between evi-
dence proving the defendant's actual knowledge of an unreasonable
danger at time of manufacture, which renders any state of the art ev-
idence irrelevant because the manufacturer has acted negligently,
and evidence proving a defendant should have known of an unrea-
and semantic distinctions between the twin principles of strict products liability and
traditional negligence").
18. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
19. See Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978).
20. See Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965). See also 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAIFoRNI4 LAW, Torts §§ 1265-70 (9th ed.
1988).
21. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1002-03, 810 P.2d at 558-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1004-05, 810 P.2d at 560, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (Broussard, J., concurring).
24. See generally Geenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 573 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963). See also Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
25. Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 1005, 810 P.2d at 560, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (Broussard,
J., concurring).
26. Id. at 1005, 810 P.2d at 561, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 540 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting). See supra note 1 (trial court, without a statement of reasons, refused to in-
struct the jury on a failure to warn cause of action).
27. 53 Cal. 3d at 1006, 810 P.2d at 561-62, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
28. Id. at 1008, 810 P.2d 563, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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sonable danger at time of manufacture, which should allow state of
the art evidence to be admitted.2 9
III. CONCLUSION
In Anderson, the supreme court concluded that state of the art evi-
dence is admissible as a relevant defense in strict products liability
failure to warn actions. The majority found it axiomatic that elimi-
nating the knowledge component, i.e., state of the art evidence, "had
the effect of turning strict liability into absolute liability."30
Although state of the art evidence implicates the manufacturer's con-
duct and consequently invokes negligence principles, these notions do
not preclude a strict liability cause of action because scientific knowl-
edge of risk at time of manufacture determines the manufacturer's
liability without regard to the manufacturer's standard of duty or
reasonableness. 31
Although the majority asserted this opinion does not create a pure
negligence failure to warn cause of action, Justice Mosk's dissent is
noteworthy. His distinction between actual and constructive knowl-
edge of risk, against the breadth of the Anderson holding, may com-
pel a closer examination of strict liability objectives.
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29. Id. at 1008-09, 810 P.2d at 563, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
30. Id. at 1004, 810 P.2d at 599, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
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